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A B S T R A C T
The purpose of this essay  is to discuss  and analyze the public 
c a r e e r  of Thomas Nelson Page,  noted Southern w r i te r  and A m erican  
Ambassador  to Italy during World War I. This essay  concentrates  on 
P ag e 's  am bassador ia l  c a ree r .  It d iscusses  P ag e 's  qualifications for 
a diplomatic position and why he received the post in 1913. During 
P ag e 's  t enure as  A m bassador  to Italy f rom  1913 to 1919, he had to 
deal with the complex problems of I tal ian and A m erican  neutrality,  
I tal ian and A m erican  par tic ipation  in World War I, and the P a r i s  Peace  
Conference.  P ag e 's  goals his a t tempts  to rea l ize  them, and why he 
was unable to accomplish  them a re  considered in this analysis .
P a g e ' s  am bassador ia l  c a re e r  was m arked  by futility His major  
objective, that of c loser  I ta lo -A m erican  re la tions,  failed to m a te r ia l ize ,  
p r im a r i ly  because  of the clash  between the two countries  at the P a r i s  
P eace  Conference in 1919. Page resigned his post because he was 
discouraged both by his government 's  position at the peace negotiations 
and by its ignoring his suggestions for promoting be t te r  re la tions with 
Italy
The failure of I ta l ian -A m erican  re lations during this period was 
due to severa l  fac tors  The state of A m erican  poli tics allowed Page to 
become an am bassador  although he lacked the experience and the ability 
to surmount the problem s caused by war and peace. Because he became 
increas ingly  pro-I ta l ian  in his sentiments,  the State Department, the 
A m erican  peace negotiators ,  and the P res iden t  ignored his repor ts ,  
some of which might have helped to avoid the clash at P a r i s .  M oreover 
P ag e 's  government did not provide him with sufficient information or 
personnel to help him coordinate his actions with his government 's  
policies.  Finally, the Ital ian government 's  lack of realis t ic ,  decisive 
leadersh ip  contributed to the I ta lo -Am erican  misunderstanding at P a r i s  
and, ult imately,  to its downfall at the hands of Benito Mussolini.
v
THOMAS NELSON PAGE, DIPLOMAT
INTRODUCTION
Serious students of A m er ican  foreign policy during World War I 
a re  very  aware  that the h is to ry  of this period is far from complete.
Much has been w rit ten  on this important period; however, many of 
these works have dealt with general  top ic s . Such studies, moreover ,  
have focused mainly on the United States without giving adequate a t ­
tention to European developments.  Much remains  to be lea rned  about 
World War I diplomacy, pa r t icu la r ly  the activ it ies  of individual diplomats.
The c a r e e r  of Thomas Nelson Page,  United States Ambassador  to 
Italy f rom  1913 to 1919, is  worthy of study for several  reasons .  Basically, 
it offers the opportunity to consider a very  neglected a rea  of World War I 
diplomacy: the relationship between the United States and Italy. Although
much has been writ ten  about the conflict between these  two countries at the 
P a r i s  Peace  Conference, very  l i t t le has been concerned with I ta lo -A m erican  
re la tions from 1914 to 1918. Yet this era  is of crucial  importance to an 
understanding of both the problems at the P a r i s  Peace  Conference and 
Benito M ussolin i 's  subsequent r i s e  to power. Since P ag e 's  a m b a ss a d o r ­
ship was at the cente r  of I ta lo -A m erican  re lations,  this study should 
contribute to a m ore  effective understanding of this problem.
2
P a g e 's  c a r e e r  also  offers an interesting  comment on the conduct 
of Wilsonian diplomacy. Wilson had to face many cr i t ica l ,  complex 
foreign problem s during his two adm inis tra tions .  In dealing with them, 
Wilson had to bear  the consequences of his own inexperience,  inade­
quate knowledge, and planning. Thus, decisions made during his f irs t  
two pres identia l  y e a r s  sometimes hindered his subsequent actions.
His selection of Page as  A m bassador  to Italy is one indication of this 
lack of serious thought about foreign policy a t  the onset of his adm in is t ra  
tion.
Wilson's dealings with Page during the l a t t e r ' s  am bassadorsh ip  
provide additional com menta ry  on Wilsonian diplomacy. Several h is to­
r ians  have noted Wilson's tendency to neglect or  at  le a s t  par t ia l ly  ignore 
foreign policy officials. Reliance on unofficial sources  of information, 
such as  Colonel House, tend to co rrobora te  this interpre ta tion.  Page 
was the v ic tim  of this tendency. Although his advice and information 
initially found an audience in Washington, he increasingly  fell out of 
favor with Wilson and his policymakers .  By the time of the P a r i s  Peace 
Conference,  Wilson re lied  on the advice of his commission of experts, 
the Inquiry, and m ore  informal counsel, such as  that  offered by Brit ish  
journa l is t  Wickham Steed. Page found difficulty in m ere ly  presenting 
his opinions, especially  a f te r  the Conference ground to a halt over the 
Fiume question.
This study d iscusses  four main aspec ts  of P ag e 's  diplomatic c a re e r  
Chapter I deals with P a g e 's  qualifications for the Ital ian am bassadorsh ip
and Wilson's reasons  for selecting him for that post. Chapter II is 
concerned with the period of A m erican  neutra li ty  during World War I. 
P a g e 's  a im s ,  methods and achievements  a r e  analyzed in the context 
of A m er ican  and Italian policies. Chapter III desc r ibes  P a g e 's  a t ­
tempts  to deal with the growing tension between Italy and the United 
States during the t ime when both fought Germany and Austr ia-Hungary .  
The study concludes with an analysis  of the  rupture  of I ta lo -A m erican  
re la tions ,  P ag e 's  differences of opinion with P re s id en t  Wilson, and 
the am b a ssa d o r ' s  resignat ion from the diplomatic service.
C H A P T E R  I
PRELUDE: THE PREAMBASSADORIAL CAREER 
OF THOMAS NELSON PAGE
On June 17, 1913, the United States Senate received P res iden t
Woodrow Wilson's nomination of Thomas Nelson Page,  "one of the most
popular of living A m erican  writers,"'*' to be "am bassador  ex traord inary
and plenipotentiary  of the United States to Italy. " Four days la te r  the
Senate confirmed this nomination. Page succeeded Thomas J. O'Brien,
who had served  as  A m bassador  to Italy since 1911. The announcement
of this appointment was received enthusiastically  by a generation which
did not, for the m ost part ,  consider  professional training or experience
“2
an important qualification for an influential diplomatic position. News­
papers  and.personal and professional fr iends  p ra ised  P ag e 's  appointment. 
At leas t  by the s tandards  of his t ime his general  qualifications could
*New York T i m e s , June 18, 1913, p. 1.
^U. S. , Congressional Record,  63rd Cong. , 1st Sess. , 1913, L, 
P a r t  3, 2047.
3The New York Tim es decried  political appointees but envisaged 
no end to the system and concluded pess im is t ica l ly  that "the best 
we can hope for is the appointment of genera lly  competent men- 
who will spend some par t  of the ir  t ime in trying to le a rn  the r e ­
quirem ents  of the ir  posts, other than purely social requ irem ents ,  
and will not fail in an emergency. " New York T i m e s , M arch  22, 
1913, p. 12.
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hardly have failed to im p re s s  most people as  impeccable.  By m ore  
objective s tandards ,  however, his life style, experience and personal 
outlook suggested that  he would have problems in his new c a re e r .
1. EARLY LIFE: EDUCATION AND LAW 
Thomas Nelson Page was born  on April  23, 1853, at  "Oakland", a 
plantation near Beaver  Dam in Hanover County, Virginia. His childhood 
experiences  provided him with the m a jo r  sources  of his l i t e r a ry  works 
and the bas is  of his Southern conservat ism . His family ancestry ,  d is t in ­
guished on both sides,  led him to s t r e s s  genealogical tradit ion  as a source 
of Southern g rea tness .  Too young to rem em ber  or understand the course  
of events leading up to the Civil War, he never the less  re ta ined vivid and 
romantic  m e m o r ie s  of the war  itself.  But as  his m em or ie s  included 
nothing of the hardships  of the conflict, his writ ing was c h a ra c te r iz e d  
by an un rea l is t ic  view of the Civil War. Also, his lack of physical suf­
fering during the war probably made it psychologically e a s ie r  for him 
to s t r e s s  sectional reconci l iat ion in his s to r ies  and poems. The declining 
fortunes of the Page family was an additional influence on him. Oakland 
was not a f lourishing plantation during P age 's  childhood.^ He could never 
reconcile  h im self  to the fact that  while his a r i s to c ra t ic  fam ily ’s wealth
4Ha r r i e t  Holman, "The L i te r a ry  C a re e r  of Thomas Nelson Page" 
(unpublished Ph .D .  d isser ta t ion ,  Depar tment of A m er ican  L i t e r a ­
tu re ,  Duke University ,  1947), p. 5.
was shrinking, indus tr ia l i s ts  w ere  becoming ex trem ely  wealthy. F o r  Page 
honor, duty, and family trad i t ion  were  much m ore  important than wealth, 
and a d is t ru s t  of indus tr ia l i sm  and urbanization, sources  and re su l t s  of 
this  new wealth, pervaded his writing.
P a g e ' s  education was typical for one of his c lass  and environment.
A s a  child, he studied at a nearby school run by his aunt. His father also  
taught him Latin and Greek. In the fall of 1869 Page enrolled at  Washing­
ton and Lee College, where he was inevitably im p re s sed  by its president,  
General  Robert  E. Lee.  Although he edited the college newspaper ,  academ-- 
ically he "sc raped  through in damnable mediocrity.  In June 1872, he 
withdrew without receiving a degree.  Returning home, he studied law 
under  his fa th e r 's  tutelage,  and in 1873 he enrolled at the University  of 
Virginia to study law. Applying himse lf  with unusual diligence, Page 
finished the two-year  course  in one year.  But in working so hard  he suf­
fered  a nervous breakdown on the eve of his comprehensives  and had to 
wait until the autumn of 1874 to pass  these te s t s  and receive his law degree.
Page  p rac t iced  law with his father for a year .  Then he was offered 
a position as  a lawyer  for the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway and moved to 
Richmond in 1876. Tw enty-three  y e a r s  old at the t ime, much of the pa t te rn  
of his future life was a l ready  discernible:
^Thomas Nelson Page,  "Recollections and R ef lec t ions ,"  undated 
m anuscr ip t ,  Thomas Nelson Page P ap e rs ,  Duke Univers ity  MSS, 
p. 53. Here inafte r r e f e r r e d  to as Page Collection.
8He was a sensitive young man. . . , m arked  by r e s t l e s s n e s s  
and charm , a conservative by inclination and training, yet 
burning with ambition  to achieve the reputation and wealth 
which he regarded  as  the right of an educated man of good 
family. Rem em brance  of the past  g lor ies  of his family 
must have been as powerful a spur to h im  as  the im pover­
ished fa rm  he had ju s t  escaped. ^
At Richmond Page quickly made a place for h im self  in the c i ty 's  
social and political life. His family connections a s su re d  him of contact 
with the "better  people, " and he took an act ive in te re s t  in the public 
a ffa i rs  of the city, serv ing on its Board of A lderm an  and being elected 
a l ieutenant of the Richmond Light Infantry Board. Trying to build up 
his wealth, Page spent m ore  t im e with personal business  and investments 
than with his law prac t ice .  Nonetheless, he re ta ined  many clients because 
of his reputation of honesty. &
At this t ime Page began the l i t e r a r y  c a re e r  that led him to strongly 
des ired  wealth and fame. One of his fr iends,  A rm is tead  Gordon, had pub­
lished a poem in Negro dialect . Page was im p re s sed  and convinced he
could do as  well. Thus motivated,  he wrote "Uncle Gabe's White Folks, "
q
which he sold to the publishing form of S c r ibner 's  for fifteen dollars .
It was an inauspicious debut for what proved to be a gratifying and d is ­
tinguished l i t e r a ry  c a re e r .
^Holman, pp. 18-19.
7Ro sewell Page,  Thomas Nelson Page (New York: Char les
S c r ib n e r 's  Sons, 1923, p. 79.
^Holman, pp. 21-22.
9 "Recollections and Reflec tions ,"  p. 65.
His rea l  s ta r t  in l i t e r a tu re  did not come until severa l  yea rs  la te r ,  
however. In 1880 he saw a sem i- l i t e ra te  le t te r  taken f rom  a dead Con­
federate  soldier.  The le t te r  told the soldier of his sw ee thear t 's  love for 
him and of her  p rom ise  to m a r r y  him on his next furlough. But she warned 
the so ldier that she would m a r r y  him only if he came home "honorably. ’’ 
Im p re ssed  by the l e t t e r ' s  emphasis  on duty, love, and honor, qualities he 
considered  essentia l  to the Southern experience,  Page wrote a story based  
on it and submitted the ta le  to S cr ibner 's .  The editors  did not publish 
"M arse  Chan" until 1884,*^ but when it was rep r in ted  in an anthology,
Short Stories by A m erican  A u tho rs , P ag e 's  l i t e r a ry  reputation began to 
grow.
2. PAGE THE WRITER: LITERATURE AS POLEMIC
F ro m  1884 to 1898 Page became increasingly  well known and popular 
a s  a w r i te r .  He spent correspondingly  le ss  t ime with his law practice  a s  
he ente red  the busy life of s to ry  w r i te r ,  novelist,  essay is t ,  and public 
l e c tu re r .  In 1893, af te r  his second m arr iage ,  to F lo rence  Lathrop F ie ld ,  
he gave up his law prac t ice  and moved to Washington, D. C. During this 
period his most popular books were:  In Ole V irg in ia , a s e r ie s  of Negro 
dialect  ta les ;  The Buria l  of the Guns, a collection of s to r ie s ;  Two Little 
Confederates  and Among the C a m p s , two books for children; The Old South, 
a se r ie s  of essays;  and Red Rock, a novel about Reconstruction in the South.
lOpage thought that  the editors  had withheld publication for some 
time because  they feared  the North would not accept a war  
sto ry  from the Southern viewpoint. Ibid. , p. 24.
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Because  Page was essen tia lly  a racon teur ,  his most successful  
efforts  w ere  his local color shor t  s to r ies .  His l i t e r a r y  formula was 
simple:  he took the Virginia plantation and descr ibed  its romantic  and
idyllic qualit ies.  His main  points of in te re s t  were  the devotion of the 
slave to a kindly m a s te r ,  the loyalty of the m a s te r  to his state and code 
of honor, and the glorification of women and antebellum Southern society. ^  
The m ajo r  sources  of his s to r ie s  were  the experiences of his family and 
fr iends .  Concentrating his at tention on grea t  p lan te rs  and faithful house 
se rvan ts ,  he neglected the freedmen, the field hands, the yeoman f a r m e rs ,  
and the poor whites. His p ic tu re  of the South was at bes t  a l imited one.
In his milieu, however, Page was surpr is ing ly  effective. His fiction 
of the 1890's reca l led  a golden age, a t ime of stabil ity when the South was 
a g ra r i a n  and self-contained. By concentrating on general ized,  idealized 
a spec ts  of Southern society, Page was one of the major  c r e a to r s  of the 
myth of Southern "hero ism . " His influence on Southern w r i t e r s  of the e ra  
was g rea t ,  and he was in many ways the leading l i t e r a r y  spokesman of the 
South during the 1880's and 1890's. ^
^ H o lm a n ,  p. 63.
12Ibid. , pp. 139-140.
^ L a w r e n c e  J .  F r iedm an  maintains that Page may have been the 
m ost popular novelist in the country at the tu rn  of the century. 
The White Savage: Racial  Fan tas ies  in the Postbellum  South
(Englewood Cliff s , N . J . :  P ren t ice  Hall, Inc . ,  1970), p. 62.
The myth he projec ted  was pervasive .  It persuaded  a generation of
contem porary  r e a d e r s  of the au th o r ’s accuracy  and still l in g e rs  on in
14the popular mind even though P a g e ’s fiction is r a r e ly  read  today.
Even the spokesmen of the New South and old- time abol i tionists were 
effected by this ’’mythic im a g e . ”
N or the rne rs ,  who eagerly  bought P ag e 's  books, were quite 
susceptible to his approach. His s to r ie s  descr ibed  a society markedly 
different f rom the developing urban  society and i ts  resultant tensions.  
Also, many N or the rne rs  subconsciously wanted to make up for the 
destruction  of the South during the Civil War. Illogically, they wanted 
to be told that  s lavery  was not so bad, tha t  Negroes were lovable but 
simple. Finally, P ag e 's  theme of sectional reconcil iat ion,  thinly sym ­
bolized by his s to r ie s '  frequent inter sectional m a r r i a g e s ,  was one that 
everyone wanted to hear .  15
Of course ,  P a g e 's  natura l  audience was in the South. To many 
Southerners  P ag e 's  nostalgic s to r ie s  by the ir  emphasis on the g reatness  
of antebellum Southern civilization provided vindication for the b it te r  
defeat of the Civil War. To the advocates of the New Southern indus­
t r i a l i s m  this emphasis  on a nostalgic, ag ra r ian  pas t  was not contradic tory
^ T h e o d o r e  L. G ross ,  Thomas Nelson Page (New York: Twayne Pub 
l i sh e r s ,  Inc. , 1967), P re face .
15Edmund Wil son, Pa tr io t ic  Gore: Studies in the L i te ra tu re  of the
A m erican  Civil War (New York: Oxford University  P r e s s ,  1962), 
p. 605.
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Instead, this in terpre ta t ion  of the South was congenial to the mentali ty 
of the New South, because it emphasized Southern nationalism and it 
did valuable service  in the cause of sectional reconcil iat ion.  ^
P a g e ' s  influence on the actual  course  of sectional reconcil iat ion 
was probably minimal.  Indeed, it could be argued that  his popularity 
was a reflection ra th e r  than a cause of national unity. Certa in ly  there 
w ere  many other fac tors  contributing to this during the la s t  quar te r  of 
the nineteenth century.  Many N or the rne rs  and Southerners sought polit­
ical, economic, and social reconci l iat ion by var ious means,  including 
celebra tions  like M emoria l  Day, a r t ic le s  in journals  and newspapers ,  
educational funds to help Southern education, and f ra te rna l contacts. 
Southerners  like L. Q. C. L a m a r ,  Walter Hines Page,  Henry W. Grady, 
Robert  E. Lee,  and Joel Chandler H a r r i s ,  among others ,  contributed to
this trend. Still, one of P a g e 's  m ajo r  l i t e r a ry  contributions was the ex-
17press ion  of this ideal of national reunion.
After  the publication of Red Rock in 1898, the quality and quantity 
of P a g e ' s  work declined. Much of his writing was hasti ly  done and inade­
quately revised.  Also, he suffered from insomnia, dyspepsia, frequent 
colds, and a p e rs is ten t  rash .  At the same time he became more  involved
i
l^Pau l M. Gaston, The New South Creed  (New York: Alfred  A.
Knopf, 1970), pp. 160, 179.
^ P a u l  H. Buck, The Road to Reunion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc. , 1937), pass im .
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with W ashington 's  social life and frequent t r ip s  to Europe,  where Italy 
especia lly  appealed to him. Po li t ics  also became a m ore  act ive in te res t .
As a resu l t ,  P a g e 's  in te re s t  in l i te ra tu re  was gradually shunted to the 
background.
But f rom  1900 to. 19 10 Page continued to write.  He experimented 
unsuccessfully  with short  s to r ie s ,  factual essays ,  poems, plays, and 
p rob lem  novels. All of these at tempts  lacked his fo rm er  intense enthu­
s ia sm  and sure  knowledge of subject m a t te r .  M oreover ,  Page was out of 
touch with the l i t e r a ry  c u r ren ts  of the United States. He had been bypassed 
by the na tu ra l is ts  and the social c r i t ic s  of the era .  Although he t r ied  to 
adapt to these  new styles of writing, he lacked the n ece ssa ry  abil ity and 
flexibility. D re ise r ,  N orr is ,  London, Howells, and others  rep laced  him 
as  l i t e r a r y  spokesmen at the beginning of the twentieth century.
In one respec t ,  however, Page  continued to be a l i t e r a r y  r e p r e s e n ­
tative of the Old South. F ro m  1900 to 1910 he wrote a s e r ie s  of a r t i c le s  
on race  re la tions  that  vividly defined the Southern conservat ive position.
One of his essays ,  The Negro: The Southerner 's  P ro b le m , rem a ins  today
1Ras one of the c lass ic  definitions of a Southern view of Negroes.  Page
easily  a ssum ed  the pa terna lis t ic  attitude of noblesse  oblige so common to 
m e m b ers  of the p lanter  a r is to c racy .  He wrote and believed that  backward 
blacks had accepted  s lavery  cheerfully and had em erged  f rom  a state of 
b a r b a r i s m  with the twin benefits  of civil ization and Chris t ianity .  Southern
18G ross ,  p. 105.
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whites were  the natura l  p ro tec to rs  of ’’good b lack s11 '19 and would protect
them from  "bad b lacks"  and evil N or the rners  teaching social equality.
Because  Southern whites knew Negroes and what was bes t  for them, it
was u nnecessa ry  for blacks to vote. Whites, responding to the ir  duty,
would always pro tec t  them. 2®
Page was no Negrophobe; in fact, he had a genuine affection for
7 1ce r ta in  types of blacks,  the abject  or serv ile  ones. His d is t ru s t  was
re s e rv e d  for those blacks who demanded equality and those whites who
27bel ieved blacks were  entitled to this equality. He strongly believed 
that  freedom for blacks had resu l ted  in a reve rs ion  to b a rb a r i s m  exhibited 
in b lacks '  sexuality. Thus, he defended lynching as a defensive reaction 
by whites to black sexual assu l ts  on white Southern women. ^3 To combat
l^Thom as  Nelson Page,  "The Great A m erican  Question, " M cC lure1 s 
Magazine, XXVIII (March, 1907), pp. 565-572 dem onstra tes  what 
Page meant by "good" and "bad" blacks.  "Good" Negroes were 
those who rem ained  under white subjection and were  "docile, 
amiable ,  t rac tab le ,  and pleasant to deal with. " "Bad" Negroes 
were  those who had some power and were  mostly  "swaggering, 
a r rogant ,  dangerous,  and intolerable.  " p. 565.
^ T h o m a s  Nelson Page,  "The Negro: The Southerner 's  P roblem , " 
M cC lure 's  Magazine,  XXII (March, 1904), pp. 548-554, XXII 
(April, 1904), pp. 619-626, XXIII (May, 1904), pp. 96-102, 
pas s im .
^^Rosewell Page,  p. 135. F riedm an, p. 72.
22Ibid.
2 ^Thomas Nelson Page,  "The Great A m erican  Question, " p. 568.
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this r e t ro g re s s io n  he offered two solutions. F i r s t ,  he bel ieved that  " r e ­
sponsible" Negro le ade rs  like Booker T. Washington should exer t  more  
positive le adersh ip  over the ir  people. He approved of the "modera te  
approach"  of these  men. Second, he wrote that blacks could be elevated 
considerably  by industrial  education. But this would be a segregated  
education; blacks did not need the book learning that  whites did. Instead, 
they had to l e a rn  c ra f t sm en 's  skills .  24 P ag e 's  opinions on race  r e l a ­
tions where  those of the friendly pa te rna lis t  who wanted the best  for blacks 
and knew that equality and partic ipation in much of Southern life was not 
in the bes t  in te res t  of blacks or whites.
Page also  rep resen ted  a common line of Southern thought in political 
a f fa i rs .  A lifelong dem ocra t  in the trad it ion  of Jeffersonian  ag ra r ian ism ,  
he resen ted  the growth of Northern  corporations and the ir  poli tical influ­
ence. His hosti l ity to big business  was due to his family 's  loss  of status 
and his rea liza tion  that this new orde r  had supplanted his ideal, an ag rar ian ,  
a r i s to c ra t ic  society. He thought that the Republican P a r ty  was the party of 
big business  and frequently cha rac te r iz ed  it as  the defender of the "pr iv i­
leged c lass .  " In pa r t icu la r ,  he c r i t ic ized  the Republicans ' defense of the 
protec tive  ta r i f f  at the-expense of the consumer.  26 Even 'his personal
24Quion Griffis  Johnson, "Southern P a te rn a l i s m  toward Negroes
afte r  Emancipation, "Journal of Southern History,  XXIII (November, 
1957), p .  493.
2 5Ibid. , p a s s im .
^ New York T im e s , October 27, 1912, p. 14.
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re g a rd  for Theodore  Roosevelt  did not prevent him from  cr it icizing 
Roosevel t 's  fai lure to re fo rm  the tariff,  the "nursing mother of the t ru s t s .  "27
Considered  together P a g e 's  l i t e r a r y  efforts indicate a reac t ionary  man, 
one who looked to the past  not only for solutions but also  for escape.  This 
may explain his reason  fo r  writing. To be sure ,  Page believed that  he 
wrote to satisfy a d es i re  to see h imse lf  in print .  28 His writ ing also  earned 
money and soothed his status anxieties,  but his family was venera ted  in 
Virginia, and his m a r r i a g e  to M rs.  Field  freed him from  money w orr ie s .
His l i t e r a tu re  provided him with a vehicle to satisfy his " s e m i-m e ss ia n ic  
compulsion to justify the South to the nation. . .and  to explain the nation to 
techy Southerners .  "29 This compulsion was probably not only to inform 
o thers  but also to provide psychological the rapy  for himself.  Writing about 
the pas t  and its g lor ies  may have helped him to d irec t  his thoughts away 
f rom  adve rse  rac ia l  re la tions and the rea l i ty  of industria l  and urban  
A m erica .  He could always d irec t  his thoughts to the good old days through 
his escap is t  l i te ra tu re .  3-0
P a g e 's  life and l i t e r a ry  c a r e e r  did l i tt le to p rep a re  him for a diplo­
matic post. His formal education had been fragmentary ,and  his pe r fo rm ance  
had been m ediocre .  His in te re s t  in law had never been deep, and his legal
2^Thomas Nelson Page,  "The Democrat ic Opportunity, " The North 
A m erican  Review, CXIII (February ,  1911), p. 195.
28,|R ecollections and Reflections,  " p. 25.
2 9 H o l m a n ,  p. 56.
30priedm an, pp. 69-71.
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c a r e e r  was undistinguished. The subject of his writ ings had been confined 
to a definite locale and era  in the past. M oreover ,  in none of these  ac t iv ­
i t ies  had he shown any rea l  abili ty to analyze, to dig below the surface for 
underlying rea l i t ie s .  Although he had trave led  extensively in Europe, he 
had never system atica lly  studied European culture or history .  Nor was he 
fluent in any foreign language. In short ,  Thomas Nelson Page was a suc­
cessful  local coloris t ,  Southern apologist, conservative  essay is t ,  and W ash­
ington sociali te with powerful poli tical fr iends. And it was p rec ise ly  these  
qualities that enabled him to become an am bassador .
3. AMBASSADORIAL APPOINTMENT: THE WRITER AS DIPLOMAT
By 1910 P ag e 's  in te re s t  in writing had a lm os t  d isappeared.  He was 
very  active in Washington’s social life, local and national organizations,  
and poli tical affa irs .  Although he was not a close personal fr iend of Theodore 
Roosevelt , he had a cordial  re la tionship with the P re s id en t  during his two 
t e rm s ,  and Roosevelt often consulted Page on V irg in ia 's  federal  patronage.  31 
People seeking government jobs for themselves  or for o the rs  frequently 
asked  Page to use  his influence on the ir  behalf. Roosevelt  usually followed 
P a g e 's  suggestions. Page also  had a strong position in Virginia state 
poli t ics through his t ies  with the adm in is tra t ion  of the University  of V i r g i n i a ^
O I
Several l e t t e r s  f rom  Roosevelt  to var ious  people substantiate that 
Page was consulted. See Roosevelt to Silas McBee, F e b ru a ry  3,
1903 and Roosevelt to C la rk  Howell, F eb ru a ry  24, 1903, for v e r i f i ­
cation of P a g e 's  role. Elting E. Moorison (ed. ), The L e t te r s  of 
Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge,  Mass:  H arvard  Univ. P r e s s ,  1951- 
1954), Vol. Ill, pp. 419, 433.
^ D u m a s  Malone, Edwin A. Alderman: A Biography (New York: Double-
day, Doran and Company, Inc. , 1940), pp. 152, 172, 202-203.
and Senator Thomas S. M ar t in 's  "Virginia Machine. " All of these  involve­
ments made him a busy man and led to his 1910 renunciation of l i t e ra tu re  
for what he hoped would be a full life as  committeeman, com m iss ion-  
m em ber ,  and sta tesman. 33
Having given up his l i t e r a r y  c a r e e r  without much reg re t ,  Page became 
even m ore  involved with Washington 's political and social ac tiv it ies .  He 
se rved  on many com mit tees  and spoke for various causes ,  including pacifism, 
b e t te r  public roads,  an ti -v iv isec tion ,  alumni contributions to the Univers ity  
of Virginia, technical  education for blacks,  and the A m er ican  Academy of 
A r t s  and L e t te r s .  Despite, or perhaps  because of, these  activ it ies ,  he did 
not seek active poli tical office, although others  urged him to do so. ^4
In 1912 Page became m ore  actively involved in poli t ics.  He p a r t i c i ­
pated in the 1912 Democratic  Convention in Balt im ore  as  an unofficial 
obse rver .  The power struggle in Virginia between the entrenched, M artin -  
led regu la r  D em ocrats  and the p ro g re ss iv e  insurgents ,  both rep re sen ted  on 
the Virginia delegation, was one reason  for his in te res t .  The regu la r  Demo­
c ra t s  favored O scar  Underwood for the Democrat ic p res iden t ia l  nominations 
while the p rog ress ive  insurgents  supported Woodrow Wilson. 35
^ H o lm a n ,  p. 133.
34A November. 6, 1910 le t t e r  f rom  E. D. Gallion to Page,  for example,  
u rged  him to run for the Senate. Page Collection.
^ F o r  m ore  details  on this struggle see Allen W. Moger, V irg in ia : 
Bourbonism to Byrd, 1870-1925 (Charlottesvil le:  The University  
P r e s s  of Virginia, 1968), pp. 273-287. See also Burton I ra  
Kaufman, "Virginia Po li t ics  and the Wilson Movement,  1910-1914, " 
Virginia Magazine of H is tory  and Biography, LXXVII (January,  19 69), 
pp. 8-15.
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Page la te r  cla imed that he had worked for unity within the par ty  and 
had supported Wilson's nomination, 36 but the re  is strong circumstant ia l  
evidence indicating otherwise.  A conserva t ive  Southerner,  he had a close 
re la tionship  with severa l  m e m b ers  of the dominant Democrat ic "Machine, "
•2 7
especia lly  Senator Martin .  M ar t in 's  avers ion  to Wilson was well-known. 
M oreover ,  Underwood's candidacy had severa l  appeals to Page. He was the  
f i r s t  Southerner  living in the South to be an active candidate for the p r e s ­
idential nomination. 38 The o f t-heard  cry  of "The South for a Southerner. " 
re f lec ted  P a g e 's  sen timents .  Also, Underwood had studied law at  the Uni­
ve rs i ty  of Virginia, P a g e ' s  alma m a t e r . Most importantly,  however, U n d e r ­
wood, the Chairm an  of the House Ways and Means Committee,  was the ou t­
standing Democratic  authority on the ta r i f f  and a conservat ive in the J e f f e r ­
sonian tradit ion.  39 Cer ta in ly  his belief in a  ta r i f f  for revenue only, his 
opposition to the concentration of government authority, and his advocacy of
3^Let te r  to the Editor,  Richmond News L e a d e r , September 14, 1912. 
Page was possibly " tr im m ing"  in this le t te r .  The fact that it was 
w rit ten  over two months a f te r  the Bal t im ore  Convention indicated 
that he was now supporting Wilson for var ious reasons ,  including 
the d es i re  to be cons idered  for a political office.
3"^The Richmond T im es-D ispa tch ,  June 24, 1912, p. 1, for example, 
noted M ar t in 's  influence in pushing the Virginia delegation for 
Underwood f i r s t  and anyone but Wilson a f te r  that.
38Arthur S. Link, The Underwood P res iden t ia l  Movement of 1912, " 
Journal of Southern History,  XII (May, 1945), p. 230.
39ib id . , p. 231. Wil son 's  ideas,  although general ly  the same as  U n d e r ­
wood's, were  le s s  well-known than Underwood's at this t ime. Link, 
Wilson: The Road to the White House (Princeton: P r ince ton  University
P r e s s ,  1947), p. 128.
state sovereignty  coincided with P a g e ’s poli tical  opinions. Therefore ,  it 
is  reasonable  to a s su m e  that  Page originally supported Underwood at 
Bal t im ore .  ^0
If Page actually  hoped for Underwood's candidacy at  Bal t im ore ,  he 
was disappointed. Wilson, aided by some of the poli tical bosses  whom he 
strongly opposed, secured  the Democrat ic nomination. But this nom i­
nation was not at all displeas ing to Page.  Page des ired  a Southern P r e s i ­
dent, and Wilson, though his t ie s  were  p r im a r i ly  with New J e r s e y  and 
Pr ince ton  University ,  was a native Southerner.  The two men were  well 
acquainted with each other through mutual fr iends,  work for the Alumni 
A ssocia tion  of the Univers ity  of Virginia, and m em bersh ip  in the Southern 
His tory  Association.  These  t ies ,  P ag e 's  lifelong loyalty to the Democrat ic 
P a r ty ,  and the hope that  Wilson might appoint him to some high office, ^2 
influenced him to openly support Wilson's campaign. Of special in te re s t  
was his open le t te r  to the edi tor of the New York T i m e s . Page wrote,
^ T h i s  opinion is at  le a s t  par t ia l ly  bo ls te red  by a M arch  14, 1913 
l e t te r  f rom  M iss iss ipp i  Senator John Sharp Williams to P re s id en t  
Wilson. In the le t te r  Williams said that  Page had probably sup­
ported Underwood at  the convention. Page Collection.
4 lF o r  a fuller  d iscuss ion of this,  see Link, Wilson: The Road to 
the White House, pp. 440-444. Ironically,  Martin,  who had g rea t  
. .fears of Wilson destroying his organization had much to do with 
the Virginia delegation's  swing to Wilson. Ibid. , p. 460, Moger, 
p. 279.
^^A le t te r  to Page immedia te ly  a f te r  the Bal t im ore  Convention urged 
him to le t  his fr iends  speak to Wilson about the am bassador  ship 
to G reat Brita in .  J. G. Hiden to Thomas Nelson Page,  July 6, 1912, 
Page Collection.
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"Mr. Wilson is the only candidate who rep re sen ts  t rue  dem o cracy - - th e
government by the peop le - - fo r  the benefit of all the people, as  opposed to
a sys tem  which, for the lasting  y e a r s  has been for the benefit mainly of
a p r i v i l e g e d  c l a s s .  "43 After the 1912 election, Page maintained close
contacts  with Wilson. He served  as  cha irm an  of the Reception Committee
at  the inauguration. The night before  the inauguration Wilson stayed at
P a g e ' s  home in Washington.
After  the election, Page was frequently mentioned in the newspapers
a s  an am bassado r ia l  candidate. Some of his fr iends wrote that  they would
be ve ry  happy to write  l e t t e r s  on his behalf. At f i r s t  his reaction  was coy.
"Natura lly  one r e a re d  in Virginia is  not likely to tu rn  his back and run f rom
a high poli tical  honor, but I have never  sought political p re fe rm en t  and I am
too set in my ways to begin it now. . . .  I am  not and could not be a candidate
for o f f i c e .  "44 L a te r ,  as  indicated in a le t te r  to Virginia Governor William
Hodges Mann, his reac t ion  was m ore  positive:
I am  in no sense a candidate for the position. It appea rs  to 
me so exalted that  one who should seek it h im self  would t h e r e ­
by indicate his unfitness for it, and from the beginning I have 
told all the friends .  . . tha t ,  however highly I should es teem  
such an honor, I could not take any steps whatever to promote 
my chances of obtaining it. These  I must leave wholly in the 
hands of fr iends .  I should think that Virginia might well cla im 
by v ir tue  of her  position to be entitled any honor. If she thinks 
me worthy to rep re sen t  he r ,  no one would be prouder  than I, or 
would m ore  zea lously  devote whatever abil i t ies  he possessed
to h e r  service. 45
43]qew York T i m e s , October 27, 1912, p. 14.
44Thomas Nelson Page to John S. Wise, December  23, 1912,
Page Collection.
^ T h o m a s  Nelson Page to Governor William Hodges Mann, M arch  
13, 1913, Page Collection.
Page originally des ired  to be Ambassador  to Great Britain.  Although^ 
the newspapers  frequently mentioned him in this connection, he was  not 
ser ious ly  considered for this position which instead  was offered to Walter 
Hines Page,  a close, personal f r iend of Wilson. Disappointed, Page  reso lved  
to se tt le only for an appointment to Italy or  F rance ,  46 but he still refused 
to openly push his cause with his fr iends or the P res iden t .  Undoubtedly, 
however, the frequent ru m o rs ,  the flat tering comments ,  and the efforts of
!
various poli t icians on his behalf  p leased  h im greatly.
In fact, it was the efforts of poli ticians that secured  an a m b a ssa d o r -  "j 
ship for Page.  P re s id en t  Wilson had des ired  to b reak  the custom of r e ­
warding r ich  contr ibu tors  to par ty  funds and worn-out poli ticians with 
diplomatic posts.  ^  Cer ta in  conditions, however, grea tly  modified this d e ­
s i re  to put only qualified men in high posit ions.  One of his basic prob lem s 
was that  he had to offer these  positions to people who could afford to accept 
the resu l tan t  financial sac r i f ices .  Poor  men could not afford to be a m b a s s a ­
dors .  The annual sa la ry  of $17, 500 was not near ly  sufficient to cover the 
expense of maintaining a pretentious  home and entertaining in a manner  
befitting a g rea t  and wealthy power. 48 Wilson was also forced to consider 
influential leg is la to rs  in his appointments.  A p rac t ica l  politician, more 
concerned with the passage  of domestic legis la tion  than with foreign af fa i rs ,  
he could not afford to endanger c r i t ica l  p rog ram s  by alienating m em bers  of
46Thomas Nelson Page to Minna Burnaby, May 3, 1913, Thomas 
Nelson Page Collection, College of William and Mary.
4^Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New F reedom  (Princeton: P r ince ton  
Univers ity  P r e s s ,  1956), p. 98.
4 8 i b i d .  , p p .  1 0 0 - 1 0 1 .
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Congress .  Page benefited f rom  these rea l i t ie s ;  he was wealthy, and he had 
influential C ongressm en  backing his appointment.
One of Wilson's problem s during the f i r s t  few months of 1913 was 
V irg in ia 's  federal  patronage.  A la rge  group of Democrat ic insurgents led  
by Henry St. George, Andrew Montague, C a r t e r  Glass ,  Richard  E. Byrd, 
and Allan D. Jones had fought to b reak  the control over the par ty  by Thomas 
S. M artin ,  Claude Swanson, Henry D. Flood, and others .  Wilson 's v ictory  
had appeared  to indicate a v ic tory  for the insurgents ,  the original Wilson 
backe rs  in Virginia.  M ar t in 's  regu la r  Democrats  were  fearful.  They 
had vigorously opposed Wilson's nomination, p r im a r i ly  because  he was a 
th rea t  to machine poli tics,  although they endorsed  his candidacy af te r  the 
Democratic  convention. N ever the less ,  Wilson strongly at tacked the Martin  
machine in a speech delivered  in Staunton, Virginia in late 1912.49 Those 
who had sought to b reak  the machine  stranglehold  on local and state govern­
ment awaited an over t  dem onstra tion  of Wilson's g ra te fu lness  for their  
support. His nomination of Joseph  E. Willard, a wealthy poli tician, ^0 for 
an  am bassado r ia l  post would be the f i r s t  sign.
Although Wilson was ve ry  much in sympathy with the insurgents,  he 
had to deal rea l is t ica l ly  with the situation. His f i r s t  considera tion  was the
49Moger, pp. 282-287. See also Kaufmann, pp. 12-16 and Richmond 
T im es-D ispa tch ,  M arch  13, 1913, p. 1.
50joseph E. Willard was a r ich  res iden t  of Fa ir fax ,  Virginia. He 
had been a m em ber  of the House of Delegates,  V irg in ia 's  L ieu­
tenant governor  f rom  1902-1906, and an unsuccessfu l  candidate 
for Senator. Moger, pp: 178,212
s lim  D em ocrat ic  m a jo r i ty  in the Senate (51 Demoncrats  to 44 Republicans).  ^
CO
The machine backed Page for an appointment, and the P re s id e n t  could not 
afford to offend these  poli ticians .  M artin  was one of the m ost influential 
D em ocra ts  in the Senate. He had been Senate m a jo r i ty  le ade r  in the 62nd 
Congress  and had expected to become the m ajo r i ty  leader  in the 63rd Con­
g re s s .  But S ec re ta ry  of State Bryan  and Wilson backed Senator John W.
K ern  of Indiana instead. ^  It would have been dangerous for Wilson to 
antagonize M artin  and the regu la r  Virginia D em ocrats  any fur ther.  As 
cha i rm an  of the c r i t ica l  Senate Appropria tions Committee ,  M artin  re ta ined  
considerable  influence. The junior Senator f rom  Virginia,  Claude Swanson, 
held an important position on the Naval Affa irs  Committee .  Other machine 
suppor te rs  held powerful positions in the House of R epresen ta tives .  R e p r e ­
sentative H a r ry  Flood, for example, was the C hairm an  of the House Fore ign  
A ffa irs  Committee .  ^4
Equally important,  however, Wilson could not r i sk  alienating the 
insurgen ts .  They also held c ruc ia l  positions on key com mit tees .  E s p e c ­
ially  c r i t ica l  was Represen ta tive  C a r t e r  Glass,  C ha irm an  of the House 
Banking and Currency  Committee .  If Wilson's plans for re forming  the
5lDewey W. Grantham, J r .  , "Virginia Congressional L eade rs  and 
the New Freedom , 1913-1917, " Virginia Magazine of H is tory  and 
Biography, LVI (July, 1946), p. 304.
53paschal Reeves,  "Thomas S. Martin: Committee  Stesman, "
Virginia Magazine of His tory  and Biography, LXVIII (July, I960), 
pp. 359-360.
^ G ra n th a m ,  p. 304.
cu rrency  sys tem  were  to be rea lized ,  he could not r i sk  a b reak  with 
G lass .  55 Rather  than choose one man and r i s k  alienating the opposing^ 
faction, Wilson named Joseph E. Willard  A m bassador  to Belgium and 
Thomas Nelson Page Ambassador  to Italy. °
^JThe public reac t ion  to P ag e 's  appointment was quite favorable^  
Hundreds of congratu la tory  te leg ram s ,  le t t e r s ,  and notes came to his 
Washington home. The New York T im e s , the New York Sun, and the 
Richmond T im es-D ispa tch  p ra ised  his appointment because  he was a 
man of l e t t e r s  and culture .  To these  newspapers  and o thers  the appoint­
ment was a suitable rew ard  for a man of P a g e 's  reputation. They all 
exp ressed  the opinion that Page would make an excellent am bassador .  ^7 
Page reac ted  with understandable pride and uncharac te r is t ic  
humility. In a l e t t e r  to his b ro the r ,  Rosewell Page,  he wrote:
As the t im e draws n e a r e r  to cut loose f rom  the old m o o r ­
ings and launch out in such new seas ,  I find myself  con­
s iderably  sobered by the p rospec t,  but I t r u s t  and pray  
that  everything will come out all r ight. Certa in ly  I mean
55Link, Wil son: The New F re e d o m , p. 161. It is in te res ting  to 
note that Senator Robert  L. Owen of Oklahoma, the Chairman 
of the Senate Committee  on Banking and Currency, endorsed 
Page in a M arch  le t te r  to P re s id en t  Wilson. Page Collection.
^ L a t e r ,  when his poli tical position was s tronger ,  Wilson moved 
away f rom  com prom ises  and increas ingly  favored the machine 
Dem ocra ts .  Link, Wilson:, The New Fredom , p. 162.
^ New York T im e s , June 16, 1913, p. 8; New York Evening Sun, 
June 18, 1913, Page Collection; and Richmond Tim es-Dispatch .  
June 18, 1913, p. 7.
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to do my u tm ost to justify  the confidence which my friends 
have imposed in me. ^8
Because  Page had a lm os t  no rea l  qualif ications for his new position, 
his six y e a r s  in Italy was an ex trem ely  try ing experience.  He was sixty 
y e a r s  old and had severa l  physical  a i lm ents  that  plagued him until he died.
A c a r e e r  as  a lawyer,  w r i te r ,  Washington socia li te ,  and poli tical d ilet­
tante had done l i t t le to p rep a re  him for the adm in is tra t ive  aspec ts  of his 
position, al though they enabled h im  to deal very  effectively with the social 
requ irem en ts .  Although he worked very  diligently to m a s te r  Italian, his 
lack  of fluency and int imate knowledge of I tal ian poli tics often caused h im  
to depend on unreliab le  or informal sources  of information. All of these 
l iab il i t ies  ham pered  his effectiveness as  A m bassador  to Italy.
^ T h o m a s  Nelson Page to Rosewell Page,  August 27, 1913. 
Page Collection.
C H A P T E R  II
TRIAL UNDER FIRE: PAGE AS AMBASSADOR,
1913-1917
On September  3, 1913, Thomas Nelson Page and his wife left  the 
United States on the L us i tan ia . Heeding diplomatic protocol he purposely- 
planned to t rave l  to England and then to Italy. This would avoid his a r ­
rival  in I taly long before  he could p resen t  his c reden t ia ls  to King Victor 
Emmanuel III, who was not expected to r e tu rn  to Rome f rom  his sum m er  
vil la until the Ita l ian  P a r l ia m e n t  reconvened in November.  1 Consequently, 
the P ages  a r r iv e d  in Rome in la te  September.  Because  the King was not 
yet in Rome, the re  was nothing much for Page to do.
1. A NEW JOB: PEACEFUL INTERLUDE, 1913-1914
Although Page did not w o r ry  very  much about the exact na tu re  of his 
job, he did have some general  goals. Of u tm ost im portance  was his des i re  
for a s tronger ,  f r iend l ie r  re la tionship  between the United States and Italy. 
He bel ieved that an im portant f i r s t  step was to make Italy and the United 
States be t te r  known to each other.   ^ Mutual ignorance was a fundamental 
p rob lem  in I ta l ian -A m erican  re la tions .  The A m erican  attitude toward Italy 
had been shaped by two m ajo r  fac tors :  a r t  and im m igran ts .  F ro m  the
^New York T i m e s , July 27, 1913, Section III, p. 8.
^New York T i m e s , October 13, 1913, p. 4.
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Ita l ian  im m igran ts  the A m er ican  people c rea ted  a durable,  tenacious 
stereotype; I taly for them was tru ly  a t e r r a  i n c o g n i t a .^  Likewise ,  the 
Ita l ians had v e ry  l i t t le  knowledge of the United States. The sources  of 
the i r  conceptions w ere  Ita l ian  em ig ran ts  and A m erican  to u r is t s .  The 
re su l t  was an  ex trem ely  d is to r ted  p ic tu re  of the United States. 4 S u r ­
p r i sed  and shocked a t  the extent of I tal ian ignorance of A m erica ,  Page 
spent much of his t im e in an a t tem pt to make his country be t te r  understood.
One of P a g e ’s m ajo r  ta sks  was to le a rn  Italian. The ability to speak 
and write  I ta l ian fluently would obviously draw him c loser  to the people by 
showing them  that he ca red  about and respec ted  the ir  culture.  This im ­
p ress ion  was re in forced  by his observation  of popular reaction  to his 
I ta l ian-speaking  wife. Page spent four y ea rs  learn ing the language and 
was able to talk to government officials and make public speeches  in 
Ital ian by the end of this period.   ^ This undoubtedly helped him to become 
a very  popular pe rson  in Rome.
Although his goals were  ra th e r  vague and genera l ,  Page was d e te r ­
mined to be a successfu l  am bassador .  An efficient em bassy  staff was a 
n e c e s s a ry  f i r s t  step. Unfortunately, he face severa l  handicaps. F o r  one
3
H. Stuart  Hughes, The United States and Italy (2d ed. rev. ; 
Cambridge,  M ass.  : H arvard  Univers ity  P r e s s ,  1965), pp. 5-6.
^John Wells Gould, ’’Italy and the United States, 1914-1918:
Background to Confrontation” (unpublished Ph. D. d is ser ta t ion ,  
Departm ent of His tory ,  1969), p. 82.
V5Ronald T ree ,  "Thomas Nelson Page,  " Forum , LXIX (January ,  1923), 
p. 1142.
thing, he was the th ird  A m er ican  A m bassador  in four yea rs .   ^ M oreover ,
n
the United States did not even own a permanent Em bassy  in Rome. P age  
soon found that  th e re  was considerable  fric t ion  among the em bassy  staff.
To make m a t te r s  w orse ,  the F i r s t  Secre ta ry  of the em bassy ,  P o s t  Wheeler, 
was accused  of abusing his diplomatic pr iv i leges  in the im porta tion  of duti-  
^ a b le  a r t i c le s ,  especially  gas. ^
Page reac ted  quickly to a llev iate these p rob lem s.  After searching 
Rome for suitable q u a r te r s ,  he leased  the Palazzo  del Drago, which had 
been occupied by two previous  A m er ican  am b assad o rs .  He was glad to 
obtain a res idence  that  would com pare  favorably with the other em bass ies  
in Rome. 9 He a lso  asked the State Departm ent to investigate  the problem s 
of the em bassy  staff. As a re su l t ,  the two s e c r e t a r i e s  of the embassy 
w ere  reca l led ,  and A rthur  F r a z i e r ,  Second S ec re ta ry  of the A ustr ian  E m ­
bassy ,  was te m p o ra r i ly  t r a n s f e r r e d  to Rome. By the end of December 1913, 
the em bassy  had two perm anent s e c r e t a r i e s ,  Norval Richardson  and P e te r  
Jay.  Page was p leased with all these  men, especia lly  F r a z ie r .
The two previous am b assad o rs  were  John G.A. Leishman, who 
served  f rom  April  1, 1909, to August 12, 1911, and Thomas J. 
O'Brien, who served  f rom  August 12, 1911 to June 21, 1913.
^Gould, p. 66.
^Thomas Nelson Page to Woodrow Wilson, January  1, 1914, Woodrow 
Wilson P a p e r s ,  L ib ra ry  of Congress ,  Ser ies  4, F ile  Case 89A.
9 Ibid.
1 °Ibid.
Except for the unpleasant af fa ir  of the em bassy  staff, Page liked 
I taly and his new job, and was pleased by the public reac t ion  to him. "The 
new spapers ,  " he noted, "all had the most f lat ter ing rep o r ts ,  much too 
fla t tering.  He was a lso  im p re s se d  with his cerem onia l  reception  by
King Victor Emmanuel III a t  his sum m er  es ta te ,  Via R osso re ,  and found 
the King and Queen to be delightful people. P a g e ’s ex t rem e des ire  for 
fo rm al  recognition was satisfied,  and he was elated. "I w ish  you could 
have been the re ,  " he wrote  to his daughter, "we reached  the highest point j  
of social eminence.  "12
But six months la te r  much of the glamor had faded away as  Page faced 
the routine nature  of his job. He became disappointed and bored  with much 
of his work, and found l i t t le t im e to spend on writing. He was unhappy b e ­
cause m ost of what he did seemed unimportant.  Thus, he complained that
m os t  of his days w ere  spent seeing people who wanted to use him fo r  the ir  
1own purposes .  Obviously, these  ac tiv it ies  did not co rrespond  to his
expectations of recognition and importance.
^When not concerned with these  routine daily ta sks ,  Page worked z e a ­
lously  to convince Ita l ian  officials to rati fy  Secre ta ry  of State B ryan 's
^ T h o m a s  Nelson Page to Rosewell Page,  October 5, 1913, Thomas 
Nelson Page Collection, Duke University.  H ere inaf te r  r e f e r r e d  
to as  Page Collection.
1 ?Thomas Nelson Page to Minna Burnaby, November 30, 1913, Thomas 
Nelson Page Collection, College of Will iam and Mary.
^ T h o m a s  Nelson Page to Rosewell and Ruth Page,  April  12, 1914,
Page Collection.
a rb i t ra t io n  trea ty .  Page was in te res ted  in it because it was c lo se r  to his
ideal of an a m b a ss a d o r ' s  duties and because of an assoc ia t ion  with the
cause  of in ternational a rb i t ra t ion .  ^  He was enthusiastic  about convincing
Italy of the t r e a ty ' s  importance:
F o r  such a long t ime, al l  the great  powers have been shy of 
such t r e a t i e s - - I  mean t r e a t i e s  to investigate all questions of 
differences and if I can get Italy to consent to do it as  I b e ­
l ieve she is  going to do, it will be the f i r s t  case in which one 
of the g rea t  powers  has consented to do it. ^
The t r e a ty  called for a "cooling-off" per iod  in the event of an i n t e r ­
national dispute, and provided for the es tab lishment of a f ive -m em ber  
com m iss ion  to investigate  and rep o r t  on the problem. ^  F o r  once his 
efforts were  rewarded. The a rb i t r a t i o n  t r e a t y ' s ra t i f ication  was approved 
by the United States Senate on August 13, 1914, and P re s id e n t  Wilson signed 
i t  on M arch  17, 1915. The Ita l ian  government ra tif ied  it on November 29,
1914. These  ra ti f ica tions  w ere  exchanged on M arch  19, 1915, and the
17t r e a ty  was p roc la im ed  M arch  24, 1915.
14In 1910 for ins tance,  Page had add ressed  the A m er ican  Society for 
Judicia l  Sett lement of In ternational Disputes, Page  Collection.
^ T h o m a s  Nelson Page to Roosevelt  and Ruth Nelson Page,  April  12, 
1914, Page Collection.
16See F o re ign  Relations of the United States, 1915 (Washington: Gov- 
ernm ent Prin ting  Office, 1928), pp. 551-553, for the text of the 
t rea ty .  F o r  a m ore  extended d iscuss ion of the Bryan  t r e a t ie s  see 
Paolo C. Coletta, William Jennings Bryan: P ro g re s s iv e  Poli t ic ian
and M oral Statesman, 1909-1915 (Lincoln, Nebraska: Univers ity
of Nebraska  P r e s s ,  1969), pp. 239-249, and M erle  E. Curti ,  Bryan  
and World Peace  ( re is sue ;  New York, Octagon Books, 1969), Pp. 
143-164.
1 ^ Fo re ign  Relations,  1915, p . 551.
Any exhil iara tion  that  Page  might have felt about this achievement,
however, was lo s t  in the course  of events that  began in July 1914. World
War I began while the P ages  were  in England on a sum m er  vacation. They
im media te ly  cancelled the i r  plans and hastened back to Italy. "I a m  here  in
England trying to get off to Rome am id  chaotic and indescribable  conditions, "
wrote Page.  "The whole world seems going to war.  Thank God we had a
18wise strong P re s id en t  with sense and ch a rac te r  enough to save us this. "
A week la te r  he was in Rome to begin a long, f rus t ra t ing  f ive-year  at tempt 
to deal with the complex problem s of war and peace.
2. WORLD WAR I: THE PERIOD OF ITALIAN NEUTRALITY 
P a g e ' s  initial react ions  to the "Great W ar"  were  mixed. Shocked by 
i ts  magnitude and bruta li ty ,  he believed it consti tuted the g raves t  danger to
mankind in h is tory .  ^9 Simultaneously, he was exulted by the tremendous
<
change. Now his job became m ore  im portant and re levan t ;2^ he had been 
re le a sed  f rom  the drudgery  of his fo rm er  existence.  He cabled the govern­
ment m ore  frequently,  because  he believed he had im portan t news to tell.
He was in s t rum enta l  in forming a Relief Committee  to deal with the p roblem s 
of A m er ican  c it izens  in w ar- th rea tened  Italy. The Relief Committee  was 
effective in getting A m ericans  back to the United States,  and P res iden t  J
^ T h o m a s  Nelson Page to Rosewell Page,  August 3, 1914, Page 
Collection.
^ T h o m a s  Nelson Page to Rosewell Page,  August 27, 1914,
P age  Collection.
2 0 Ib id .
21Wilson congratulated Page for his ac tiv it ies  during this period.
P a g e 's  analysis  of the war  was unsophisticated and oversimplified.
He thought that its roots were  inc reased  a rm am en ts  and un iversa l  m ili ta ry  
se rv ice ,  which had caused the r i s e  of European m i l i t a r i sm .  He blamed 
an international conspiracy  of munitions m anufac tu re rs  for encouraging 
this m i l i ta r ism .  22 The war  i tse lf  was a th rea t  to civilization, and the 
biggest  th rea t  of all was Germany, P age 's  vil lian. G erm an  m i l i ta r ism ,  
and i ts  insane des ire  for t e r r i to ry ,  had caused the war,  and a G erm an v i c ­
to ry  would bring a re tu rn  to "medievalism . ”23 The Entente, especially 
G rea t Brita in,  opposed this G erm an  madness  and fought to save c iv il iza­
tion. Reverting to his fo rm er  r a c i s t  ideas,  he predic ted  that  the Anglo- 
Saxon qualit ies of b ra v e ry  and forti tude would bring an Entente victory. 24
In August 1914, the Ital ian government found i tself  in a p recar ious  
diplomatic position. Technically  it was bound to the T r ip le  Alliance, 
originally  ra ti f ied  in 1882 and most recently  renewed in 1912. But in 
1914 Italy was not p repa red  for, and did not want, war .  Her  Foreign 
M in is te r ,  Marquis  Antonio Di San Giuliano recognized the tradit ional 
I tal ian  hatred  for A ustr ia  and the popular belief that A ustr ia  had caused 
World War I. He also  knew that  fighting on e ither  side would be d isas t rous
^W o o d ro w  Wilson to Thomas Nelson Page,  December  8, 1914, Page 
Collection.
2^Thomas Nelson Page,  "Has Civilization Failed? , " undated ms, 
Page Collection, p. 3.
24jbid. , p. 6.
for Italy. The Ital ian A rm y was woefully unprepared  and had 50, 000 m en j 
fighting in Libya. ^5. F o r  him neutra li ty  was the only feasible a l te rnative .  
A r t ic le  Seven of the T r ip le  Alliance offered him an escape.  It provided 
specifically for consultation p r io r  to any m ili ta ry  action, but the A ust r ian  
government had not notified Italy about its  u lt im atum to Serbia on July 23, 
1914. Consequently, Di San Giuliano was on sound legal ground when he
refused to honor the all iance and declared  Italian neutra li ty  on August 3,
- J
191426
The p reca r io u sn e ss  of I ta ly 's  diplomatic position was not appreciab ly  
diminished  by the neutra li ty  declaration.  If her  fo rm er  a l l ies  won a de­
cisive victory,  Italy could not expect much generosity  at the peace table. 
More likely, I tal ian neutra li ty  would be regarded  by A ustr ia  as  a pretext 
to in sure  her  dominance in the a r e a s  to which Italy also asp ired .  Entering 
the war as  a cobell igerent with he r  fo rm er  a ll ies  also seemed dubious. 
A us tr ia -H ungary  had broken the all iance by ignoring A rtic le  Seven; it 
seemed reasonable  to assum e that she would continue to t r y  to cheat I taly 
of her  t e r r i t o r i a l  ambitions if the Centra l  Powers, were  v ic to rious .  Even
2 5William A. Renzi, "I ta ly 's  Neutrali ty  and Entrance into the 
G reat War: A Re-examinat ion,  " The A m erican  H is tor ica l  
Review, LXXIII (June, 1968), pp. 1417-1418.
? AF o r  accounts of this decision,  see Renzi, pp. 1418-1412;
Rene* A lb re c h t -C a r r ie ,  I taly f rom  Napoleon to Mussolini 
'(New York: Columbia Univers ity  P r e s s ,  1950), pp. 91-92; 
C hr is topher  Seton-Watson, Italy f rom  L ib e ra l i sm  to F asc ism ,  
1870-191 5(London: Methuen and Co. , Ltd. , 1967), pp. 413- 
417; and Denis Mack Smith, Italy: A Modern History  (Ann 
A rbor:  The Univers ity  of Michigan P r e s s ,  1959), pp. 292-293.
35
m ore  decisive to Ital ian  foreign policymakers  was the Batt le of the M arne,  
which sha tte red  the myth of G erm an  m i l i ta ry  invincibility. Now it  appeared
tha t I taly had everything to lose  and nothing to gain by cobell igerency with J
the Centra l  Pow ers .  ^
By October 1914, Di San Giuliano was sure  that  the Entente would win. 1 
If Italy rem ained  neutra l ,  she would gain nothing. If, however, she en tered  
the war on the side of the Entente, she would have the opportunity to achieve 
he r  goals of national unity and expanded Italian  boundaries.  Di San Giuliano 
died la te r  that  month, but his successo r ,  Baron Sidney Sonnino, and P r e m ie r  
Antonio Salandra shared  his views. Although they consulted with Germany 
and A ustr ia -H ungary ,  they concentra ted on the Entente. Their  success  came 
with the sec re t  T rea ty  of London, which was signed April  26, 1915. In this 
t r ea ty  Italy modified her  initial t e r r i t o r i a l  demands,  par t ia l ly  because of 
Russ ian  objections but p r im a r i ly  because  of her  fea r  that  the w ar might end 
before  she could enter it. ^8 Nonetheless,  the T rea ty  p rom ised  substan­
tial amounts of t e r r i to r y  to I ta ly 's  north and east .  If the Entente won and 
honored the T rea ty  of London, Italy would have defensible f ron t ie rs  and /  
dominance in the Adria tic  Sea. ^
When Salandra signed the T rea ty  of London, he ag reed  to declare  war
27Renzi, p. 1423.
^ S e to n -W atso n ,  pp. 431-432.
2<^ For a complete v e rs ion  of the T rea ty  of London, see Rene'
A lb re c h t -C a r r i e ' , Italy at  the P a r i s  Peace  Conference ( re is sue ; 
Hamden, Conn. : Archon Books, 1966), pp. 334-338.
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in one month. Because  the interventionis ts  w ere  a dist inct  minority in Italy, 
the government had to face the prob lem  of creating  an a tm osphere  of w ar  
enthusiasm. It carefu lly  planned i ts  campaign with organized  public demon­
s tra tions .  Gabrie lle  D'Annunzio, the flamboyant I tal ian p o e t -adv en tu re r , 
cam e to Rome and c rea ted  popular war fever with his inflammatory  speeches 
After the King's d es i re  for war  became known, the neu t ra l is ts  seemed to  
m e lt  away. As a re su l t ,  when war was dec lared  on May 23, 1915, the
O I
Italian public and the P a r l iam en t  overwhelmingly supported bell igerency.
Throughout this per iod  of I tal ian neutra li ty  Page t r ied  to keep the 
State Departm ent and P re s id en t  Wilson informed. Although he had no know­
ledge of the t e rm s  and c i rcu m stances  of the T rea ty  of London, 32 his le t te r s ,  
t e leg ram s ,  and dispatches  provided the adm in is tra t ion  with a reasonably  
accu ra te  account of I ta l ian diplomacy and poli t ics. He rea l ized  that the 
declara tion  of neutra li ty  was tem pora ry ,  that Italy was quite unprepared  for 
hosti l i t ies  in August. Thus, he wrote of the quiet war  p repara t ions  of the  
Ital ian  government during the winter of 1914. Troops  w ere  sent to the 
n o r thea s te rn  Ital ian  bo rde r ,  and fac tor ies  ran  night and day. The govern ­
ment bought war  supplies and coal f rom the United States. 33 F ur ther  j
3 0J The Roman Catholic Church, organized labor,  P a r l ia m e n t  and 
. the general  population were  decidedly neu tra l is t  a t  this time.
Seton-Watson, p. 1438.
31 Ibid.
3 ^ P a g e  did not le a rn  the exact t e rm s  of the T rea ty  of London until 
the R uss ian  government prin ted them in 1917. He did have a 
genera l  idea of the t e r r i to r i a l  provisions of the agreem ent,  however.
33Thomas Nelson Page to Sec re ta ry  of State Bryan, August 22, 1914, 
Foreign  Relations of the United States, Supplement 1914, p. 69.
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indications of I tal ian  war p repara t ions  w ere  dem onstra ted  by the appointment 
of General  Vittorio Zupelli. as  M in is te r  of War/*4 in c reased  governmental  
funds for m i l i ta ry  purposes ,  35 money borrowed for test ing new siege guns, 36 
and a troop build-up to a fighting capacity of 1,2 00, 000 men by Decem ber,
1914 .37
Page  also kept the government informed about the cour se of diplomatic 
negotiations between Italy and the Entente. His rep o r ts  ref lec ted  the belief 
tha t  I taly was craf t i ly  bargaining with both sides to obtain m axim um  t e r r i ­
to r i a l  concess ions.  3  ^ As ea r ly  as  August 1914, he pred ic ted  that  I taly would 
declarewar  on Austr ia  to gain t e r r i to r y .  39 Although he occasionally  wrote  
tha t  the Centra l  P ow ers  might be able to lu re  Italy to its side.,'4 ® his d i s ­
patches  usually  indicated that  Italy would join the Entente. Of u tm ost
34page to Bryan, November 19, 1914, ibid. , p. 143.
3 5 i b i d .
36pa ge to P re s id en t  Wilson, January  1, 1915, Wilson P a p e r s ,  Series  2. 
37ibid.
3^This in te rpre ta t ion ,  which has colored so many subsequent h is to r ie s  
of the per iod is disputed by William Renzi, who convincingly a rgues  
that  Italy could rea l is t ic a l ly  enter, the war only on the side of the 
Entente. He w r i te s  that  the negotiations with Vienna were  a ru se  to 
deceive the Centra l  P ow ers  about I ta ly 's  t rue  intentions and to a l a r m  
the Entente, the reby  maximizing its  u lt imate receptiv ity  to Ital ian  
demands.  , p.. 1427.
39page to Bryan, August 19, 1914, Foreign  Relations Supplement, 19 14, 
p. 67.
4®Page to Bryan, M arch 12, 1915, Fore ign  Relations Supplement, 1915, 
pp. 18-19.
im portance  w ere  his l e t t e r s  to the chief po licym akers ,  P re s id e n t  Wilson, 
Sec re ta ry  Bryan, and Colonel House. These  le t te r s  emphasized  I ta ly ’s
sole motivation as  sac re  egoism o. Thus,  I ta ly 's  policy of "watchful w a i t ­
ing" was designed to maximize what she could gain f rom  the war.  41 At 
Nice, in April  1915, Page  met with Colonel House and told him, "Italy is 
acting in a wholly selfish  way and. . . it m a t te r s  l i t t le with her  whether  she 
supports the Allies or  the Dual Alliance,  provided she is  on the winning 
side. "42 The image was c lea r :  I ta ly 's  motives were  solely t e r r i t o r i a l .
L
It was a p ic tu re  that  Washington never  forgot, and helped determ ine A m e r i ­
can policy towards Italy f rom  1917 to 1 9 1 9 . ^
3. AMERICAN NEUTRALITY: PAGE'S PROBLEMS
AND EFFORTS
F r o m  the outbreak of war in 1914 until A m erican  intervention in 
Apri l  1917, A m er ican  foreign policy centered  on the two most powerful 
a d v e r s a r i e s ,  Great B r i ta in  and Germany. Relations with these  two coun­
t r i e s  w ere  of p r im a ry  im portance  because  each pursued  policies  tha t  d irec tly
4 1T hi s sentiment is  most c lear ly  exp ressed  in Page to Bryan,
December 25, 1914, The Lansing P a p e r s ,  1914-1920 (Washing- 
ton: Government Pr in ting  Office, 1939-1940), Vol. I, p. 718. 
See a lso  Page to Wilson, January  1, 1915, Wilson P a p e r s ,  
Series  2, and Page to Colonel House, F e b ru a ry  5, 1915, Page 
Collection.
4 2 c h a r l e s  S e y m o u r  ( e d .  ), The Intimate P a p e r s  of Colonel H o u s e  
(4 v o l s .  ; New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1926-1928),
Vol. I, p. 412.
c / 4 3 G o u l d ,  p. 73.
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influenced A m erican  in te re s ts .  ^  Italy, however, rem ained  t e r r a  incognita. 
I ta l ian  bell igerency did not change the indifferent re la tions  between her  and 
the United States. A m ericans  were  ignorant of the Ital ian war effort. To 
be sure  the re  was some reaction  to her  declaration  of w ar  on A ust r ia -  
Hungary. Some people condemned Italy for deser ting  the T r ip le  Alliance, 
while o thers  p ra ised  her  for joining the Entente. But p re s s  and cinema 
coverage of the Ita l ian m i l i ta ry  effort against  A ustr ia -H ungary  was m in i­
mal; concentration again focused on the W este rn  F ro n t ' s  deadlock. Also, 
the Ital ian war effort had l i t t le  effect on the A m erican  economy. Italy 
purchased  coal, wheat, i ron  ore ,  and cotton and woolen goods f rom  the 
United States, but these  o rd e rs  did not come close to the size of Brit ish  
and F ren ch  o rd e r s .  Thus, at the popular level, I ta ly 's  w ar  was a guerra  
incognita. 45
The A m er ican  policym akers  also remained re la tively  indifferent to 
Italy during this period.  Lansing, House, and Wilson were  m ore  concerned 
with the Allied blockade and the G erm an submarine.  T he ir  indifference was 
re inforced  by the Entente 's  attitude towards Italy. Their  w ar  was with G e r ­
many; I ta ly 's  was with A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y .  46 Believing that  the ir  troops had 
to rem ain  in W este rn  Europe,  G rea t  B r i ta in  and F rance  forced Italy to fight 
in isolation.  G rea t B r i ta in  negotiated with the United States for the Entente.
{
44jr;rn e s t R. May, The World War and A m erican  Isolation,  1914- 
1917 (Cambridge,  M a s s . :  H arvard  Univers ity  P r e s s ,  1959), 
pas s im .
^ G o u ld ,  pp. 61-64.
^ I t a l y  did not dec lare  war on Germany until August 28, 1916.
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Italy was not even consulted during ei ther of the House peace miss ions  to 
E u ro p e .47
Conversely ,  Italy rem ained  aloof and indifferent to the United States } 
during this period. The poor people, who knew the most about America  
f rom  the ir  re la t ives  in the United States and A m er ican  to u r i s t s ,  thought 
of her  in t e rm s  of m a te r ia l  p ossess ions 'and  wealth. 48 The upper class 
had a lm os t  no knowledge of the country. Many Italians disl iked or d i s ­
t ru s te d  the United States and believed that A m erica  was motivated by u n ­
c lea r  t e r r i to r i a l  asp ira t ions .  According to Page,  some even believed 
that  the United States eyed a r e a s  coveted by Italy. ^  This f ixation on ^
tangible t e r r i t o r i a l  motives made it difficult to understand Wilson’s purposes.  
In addition, Italy was ex trem ely  apprehensive about the possib il i ty  of A m e r ­
ican in tervention on the side of the Entente. Many Italians  believed that this 
might d ivert  war  supplies away f rom  Italy. Also, the re  was the possibil i ty  
that  A m er ican  m i l i ta ry  efforts might overshadow Italian exert ions and d i ­
m in ish  her  influence at  the peace conference,  thus endangering her  t e r r i ­
to r ia l  hopes. 51 Italy, to say the leas t ,  was not overly en thusiastic  about^y 
the United States.
47j}anxel M. Smith, The G reat Depar ture:  The United States and World 
War I, 1914-1920. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1905), pp. 85, 
93-94.
48page to Senator John Sharp Williams, M arch  14, 1915, Page C o llec ­
tion.
4 9 G o u l d ,  p. 61.
50pa ge to House, F eb ru a ry  1, 1916, Page Collection.
51page to Wilson, F eb ru a ry  3, 19.17, Wilson P a p e r s ,  Series .  2.
The Ita lian  government was responsib le  for much of this d is trus t .  The 
officials did not unders tand  A m erican  policy. Two people in par ticu la r  were 
responsib le  for th is.  In Washington, the Ita l ian A m bassador  to the United 
States,  M arquis  Di C el le re ,  failed to t ra n s m i t  accu ra te  information about 
Wilson 's policies.  Because  he had few contacts with A m erican  officials, he 
constantly m is in te rp re ted  Washington's plans to Italy. ^2 The only thing he 
c lea r ly  understood was A m erican  ignorance of Italy. At this level,  however, 
he was f ru s t ra te d  by the dominant person  of I ta l ian  foreign policy, Fore ign  
M inis te r  Baron Sidney Sonnino. Dedicated to the point of fana t ic ism  to a 
d ream  of Ital ian  secur ity  as  defined in the T rea ty  of London, Sonnino a d ­
hered  to a policy of secrecy . He refused to approve the n e c e ssa ry  funds to 
spread Ita l ian propaganda. According to Page,  Sonnino recognized the 
United States as  a power and feared  her .  ^3 N ever theless ,  he refused to 
take any act ive steps to deal with the situation and remained relatively  
indifferent.
It was within these  confines of mutual ignorance and different em ­
phases  that Page had to work. Obviously, th is  condition complicated an 
a l ready  difficult task .  Still, Page made some definite contributions to 
improving Italian popular opinion of the United States. Such successes  were 
not equalled on the governmental  level,  however, because P a g e 's  influencej 
on official policies was minimal.
52Gould, p. 87.
^ P a g e  to House, November 27, 1914, as  cited in Gould, p. 87.
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One of the few specific i s sues  involving both countr ies  a t  this t im e 
was the p rob lem  of na tura lized  ci t izens.  In 1907 the United States govern­
ment had begun the p ro cess  of negotiations for a natu ra liza tion  convention.
In p a r t icu la r ,  the State Departm ent was concerned with a conflict of I ta l ian 
laws. A r tic le  XI, clause  2 of the Ital ian  Civil Code provided that I tal ian 
ci t izenship was lost  by any pe rson  acquiring cit izenship of a foreign coun­
t ry .  But under  Ital ian law the natura liza tion  of any Ital ian in a foreign 
country without the consent of the Ital ian government was considered  no ba r  
to m i l i ta ry  serv ice .  3 Consequently, the United States government asked  
for a t r e a ty  of mutual recognition of natura liza tions and immunity for a 
na tu ra lized  cit izen f rom  punishment in his native land for offenses com m it­
ted a f te r  his emigration.
C £
The Ita lian government, however, declined to negotiate in 1907, 
and the p rob lem  stil l existed in 1914. Thus, when war  broke out and Italy 
began i ts  rapid buildup of m i l i t a ry  forces ,  many I ta l ian -A m ericans  found 
them se lves  in an unpleasant situation. The Ital ian government contended 
tha t  all na tura lized  A m erican  cit izens of I tal ian birth ,  all persons  bo rn  in the 
United States of I ta l ian  paren ts  before  the pa ren ts '  naturl ization  , and even 
some people born  af te r  the paren ts  natura liza tion  were  l iable
^^F ore ign  R ela t ions , 1914, p. 391.
55Ibid. , p. 392.
5&The Ital ian  government told Ambassador  G r iscom  that the sub­
jec t  was too complex to regula te  by in ternational ag reem ent  and 
that  an Ital ian com m iss ion  would investigate  changing Italian 
laws regard ing  cit izenship.  A m bassador  G r iscom  to the S e c re ­
ta ry  of State (Elihu Root), June 19, 1908, ibid. , p. 395.
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to m i l i t a ry  serv ice .  In accordance  with this policy, I ta l ian -A m erican  
m a les  trave ling  or studying in Italy were  detained, and many were  forced 
into Ital ian m i l i ta ry  units.  To compound the prob lem  the Ital ian au th o r i ­
t i es  objected that A m erican  p a s s p o r t s  w ere  the same for native and nat­
u ra l ized  c it izens.  Their  ins is tence  on b ir th  cer t i f ica tes  and other proofs
c7
of identity resu l ted  in the detention of many innocent people. And as
the need for manpower inc reased ,  the Ital ian government r e s o r te d  to hold­
ing wives and children  of na tu ra l ized  Ital ian ci t izens  in the United States to
c o
compel the i r  husbands arid fa thers  to r e tu rn  to Italy for m i l i ta ry  serv ice .  30
Page was kept busy with negotiations for the r e le a se  of these  dual 
c i t izens.  F r o m  1914 to 1917 the Em bassy  received  a steady s t r e a m  of in ­
qu ir ies  f rom  paren ts ,  spouses,  re la t ives ,  congressmen, and State D epar t ­
ment officials. In each case  Page and his aides had to t ry  to get a l l  the in ­
formation f rom  Italian and A m er ican  sources .  He made repeated  v is i ts  to 
the Ital ian Fore ign  Office and wrote many le t te rs .  Often he received  only
vague ve rba l  p ro m ise s  to investigate .  Some of the reques ts  for re le ase  f rom
59Ital ian  m i l i t a ry  serv ice  w ere  leg it imate ,  but o thers  were  not. Although
^ C o n s u l  Shank to the S ec re ta ry  of State, September 2, 1914, ibid. , 
pp. 404-405.
^ P a g e  to S ec re ta ry  of State Lansing, M arch  4, 1916, Fore ign  R e la ­
tions,  1916, p. 403. Charge' Jay  to Lansing, May 4, 1916, ibid. , 
p. 411.
590ne example of this was the request  for exemption f rom  Italian m i l i ­
t a ry  serv ice  of C arm ine  Mazza.  Upon investigation it was found that  
b o th  young Mazza and his father were  Ital ian cit izens.  F u r th e rm o re ,  
Mazza had been an Ital ian res iden t for th i r teen  y e a r s  p r io r  to his 
m i l i ta ry  induction. The M in is t ry  of Fore ign  Affa irs  to A m bassador  
Page,  F eb ru a ry  2, 1916, ibid. , p. 401.
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some were  honored by the Ital ian government, many o thers  were  denied.
The complexity of the laws involved, the t im e-consuming investigations, 
and the futility of so many cases  t i r ed  the A m bassador  and his overworked 
staff.
Realizing that the ea s ie s t  way to reso lve  the p roblem was a n a tu ra l iz a ­
t ion t rea ty ,  in September 1914, Page reques ted  the State Department for 
pe rm iss io n  to talk to Ital ian  officials.^® Counselor Robert  Lansing wrote 
back tha t  the t ime was not favorable for such negotiations.  61 Page was 
not sa tisfied  with this answ er  and repea ted  his request .  62 This met with a 
m ore  favorable response  f rom  the State Department. Lansing answered 
P a g e ' s  te leg ram : "The D epar tm en t 's  views coincide with your own as to
the grea t  des irab i l i ty  of concluding a natura liza tion  t rea ty  with Italy. It 
is  believed that such a t r e a ty  will be the only means of solving the vexed 
question of disputed nationality. "63
Encouraged by this m essage ,  Page talked with Ital ian  officials about 
the proposed trea ty .  In December ,  conversations  with Sonnino convinced 
h im  that  an ea r ly  se tt lement was a distinct possibil ity.  He believed that 
the Ital ian d es i re  for c lo se r  com m erc ia l  re la tions  and increas ing  A m erican  
to u r i s m  would convince the officials of the des irab i l i ty  of such an agreem ent .  64
^ P a g e  to Bryan, September 15, 1914, Foreign  R ela t ions , 1914, pp.
406-407. Page to Bryan, October 2, 1914, ibid. , p. 408.
6 lCounse lor  Lansing to Page,  October 7, 1914, ibid. , p. 409.
^ P a g e  to Bryan, October 14, 1914, ib id . , pp. 410-411.
63La n s ing to Page,  November 20, 1914, ib id . , p. 412.
64page to Bryan, December  14, 1914, ibid. , p. 412-413.
45
But his initial op tim ism  dwindled with endless conferences  bringing no 
tangible r e su l t s .  Sonnino continually expressed  a des ire  to reach  a se t t le ­
ment, but he always said that  the p re sen t  t ime was not convenient for 
negotiations.
As P a g e 's  hopes for a t r e a ty  disappeared,  the State Depar tment b e ­
came m ore  ir r i ta ted  with the Ital ian  government. What especia lly  irked 
A m erican  officials was the Ital ian p rac t ice  of holding wives and children 
of natura lized  A m er ican  cit izens to induce the la t te r  to r e tu rn  for m i l i ta ry  
serv ice .  ^  After severa l  y e a r s  of complaints the Ital ian government was 
persuaded  to p e rm i t  the u n re s t r ic te d  depar tu re  of these  people. ^7 But the 
im p re s sm en t  of natura lized  ci t izens and sons of natura lized  ci t izens  con-
/LQ
tinued to be a source  of d isag reem ents .  DO Although a re la tively  minor 
affa ir  in com parison  with the G erm an  submarine or the B r i t i sh  blockade, 
the failure to reso lve  this difficulty was an ominous indication of subsequent
^ P a g e  to Lansing, M arch  4, 1916, Fore ign  R ela t ions , 1916, pp. 
402-403.
66 See for example, Lansing to Charge' Jay, May 1, 1916, ibid. , 
pp 409-410. Also, Lansing to Jay, May 12, 1916, ibid. , p. 414.
^^Jay to Lansing, May 23, 1916, ibid. , p. 417.
6 8°In 1918, Italy and the United States solved p a r t  of the p roblem 
with a t r e a ty  on conscription.  This t r e a ty  allowed male citizens 
of one country to choose serv ice  either in the ir  res iden t country 
or the ir  country of res idence .  It set a t ime l im it  of sixty days for 
choosing serv ice  under ei ther flag af te r  the p roclamation  of the 
t rea ty  and allowed for p rese rva t ion  of nationali ty r e g a rd le s s  of 
which flag the cit izen se rved  under. U. S. Departm ent of State, 
T re a t ie s ,  Conventions, International A c t s , P ro toco ls  and A g ree ­
ments between the U. S. and Other Pow ers ,  1910-1923 (Washing­
ton: Government Prin ting  Office, 1923), III, pp. 2708-2711.
I ta l ian -A m er ican  re la tions .
Unsuccessful in his a t tem pts  to bring the two countr ies  together on 
natura liza tion ,  Page was m ore  fortunate in some of his unofficial ac ts .
On January  13, 1915, cen tra l  I taly was devastated by an earthquake whose
in
t r e m o r s  la s ted  for a week. 07 The death toll was over  30, 000 and dam ages
w ere  es timated  a t  $60, 000, 000. Page reac ted  quickly and inquired about
any aid that the United States might offer. The Ital ian  government replied
71tha t it  would not accept a id  f rom  any foreign country. After visit ing the
ear thquake-dam aged a re a ,  Page and his wife es tablished a pr iva te  fund to
which many people contributed.  A dm in is te red  by M rs .  Page,  the fund fu r -
7 ?nished money for the construct ion of she l te rs  and the making of clothes.
This ac t  was greatly  apprec ia ted  by the Ita l ian public and Page l a te r  r e ­
ceived a medal for his generos ity  during this t ime.
Other ac ts  to befr iend Italy during her  per iod of be l l igerency  were
)
r e s t r i c t e d  by A m erican  neutra li ty  and Italian apathy to aid. Though d is ­
^ T h e  ha rdes t  hit town was Avezzano, located forty m iles  west of 
Rome. Of 11,279 people in the town, only 800 survived the d is ­
a s te r .  New York T i m e s , January  15, 1915, p. 1. Rome and 
Naples a lso  felt t r e m o r s ,  but damage the re  was minimal.  The 
A m erican  Em bassy  was cracked  by the quake and p la s te r  fell 
f rom  its  ceiling. New York T i m e s , January  14, 1915, p. 1.
^ N e w  York T im es ,  January  18, 1915, p. 1. New York T i m e s , 
January  19, 1915, p. 1.
7 1New York T i m e s , January  16, 1915, p. 1.
^ New York T i m e s , June 12, 1921, Section II, p. 6.
couraged by this i n d i f f e r e n c e ,^  the Pages  worked to help w ar- ravaged  
Italy. Page sought money for the A m er ican  Red C r o s s ' s  ac t iv it ies ,  while 
his wife led volunteer work of A m erican  lad ies  in Rome. The women made 
sh ir ts  for I tal ian  so ld ie rs  and supplies for hospitals.  .74 M rs .  Page a lso  
organized  the A m er ican  Relief C lear ing House, which received private 
A m erican  funds to buy badly needed medical  supplies. She spent much 
t im e and effort on these  pro jec ts .  Efficiently operated,  the p rogram s 
w ere  popular with Ita l ians  because  they showed the sympathy of the Pages  
for Italy. 75
4. THE WANING OF PAGE'S INFLUENCE 
M ore than any other t ime, the period of May 1915 to April  1917, 
c rys ta l l ized  P a g e 's  opinions. Like Walter Hines Page,  United States A m ­
bassador  to G rea t  Brita in ,  he became an advocate of the country to which 
he was accredited .  He sympathized with I ta ly 's  hardships  and war s a c r i ­
f ices,  which he com pared  to the suffering of the Confederacy during the
7 3Thomas Nelson Page to Rosewell and Ruth Nelson Page,  October 
22, 1915, Page Collection. Page believed that the Ital ians  had 
some justif icat ion for this feeling: "The 'he lpers '  have probably
bragged too much about this.  " Ibid.
74See New York T i m e s , F e b ru a ry  8, 1917, p. 11 for a d e sc r ip ­
tion of these  ac tiv it ies .  The efforts of the A m erican  women 
were  quite im press ive .  By 1917 they had produced m ore  than 
100,000 sh ir ts ,  bandages, and other supplies. Ibid.
7 5Even af te r  P a g e 's  death these  acts  were  reca l led  by the Italian 
people. New York T i m e s , November 3, 1922, p. 16.
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Civil War. 76 His views w ere  re inforced  by the sight of wounded sold iers
7 7in Roman hospitals and even in the Em bassy  itself . ' ' In August 1916,
the Ital ian  government pe rm it ted  him to v is i t  the Ital ian  front. Page cam e
away deeply im p re s se d  by the difficulty of the Ita l ian so ld ie rs '  ta sk  and their
obvious b rav e ry .  "No one who knows the region will ever  say the Ital ians
78a r e  not doing wonders,  " he wrote.  "It is rea l ly  incredib le .  "
This sympathy caused Page to seek means to promote  a m ore  complete
understanding by the A m er ican  people. He believed that this was necessa ry
because  both countr ies  were  isolated,  the United States by neutrality, I taly
by he r  war  with Austr ia -H ungary .  79 Aware that the A m erican  public did
8 0not get much information about I ta ly 's  war,  he sought to explain her 
rea son s  for fighting as  well as  her  m i l i ta ry  b ravery .  When he visited the  
Ital ian  front he wrote a dispatch for the Associa ted  P r e s s  that  was c a r r i e d  
in many m ajo r  new spapers .  Even m ore  im portant was his journey to the 
United States in 1916. Although the visi t  was p r im a r i ly  personal,  Page
76pa ge to House, October 29, 1918, Page Collection. See also 
Page to Minna Burnaby, August 28, 1916, Thomas Nelson Page 
Collection, College of William and Mary.
7 7 G o u l d ,  p p .  71-72.
^78P age  to Minna Burnaby, October 1, 1916, Thomas Nelson Page 
. Collection, College of Will iam and Mary. F o r  a m ore  detailed 
descr ip tions  of his v isi t  and reactions,  see New York T im e s , 
September 16, 1916, p. 4, and September 24, 1915, Section I,
- p. 4.
7 9 P a g e  to House, F eb ru a ry  1, 1916, P a g e  Collection.
^SOxhis was as  much a re su l t  of I tal ian censorsh ip  as  it was a 
lack of in te re s t  by A m er ican  newspapers .
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used  two in terv iews with the New York T im es  to defend I ta ly 's  war motives
and he r  fa ilure  to dec la re  war  on Germany. ^  He also  p ra is e d  the courage
82of the Ita l ian so ld ie rs .
As his sympathy for I taly grew s tronger ,  his abil i ty  to objectively a s ­
se s s  the Ital ian  situation dwindled. In his e a r l i e r  dispatches  of 1914-1915 
Page had dem onstra ted  a good g rasp  of Realpolit ik and a rem arkab le  a d ju s t ­
ment to Old World poli t ics. A man accustomed to write  of "L iberty"  and 
"Democracy , " he noted a lm ost wistfully that "None of these  countr ies  seem
to consider the sentimental  side as  our people do. They look the facts coldly 
83in  the face. " Despite his inexperience,  his rep o r ts  during the period of 
I ta l ian neutra li ty  had been reasonab ly  accura te ;  however, even though he now 
had m ore  experience,  they becam e le s s  p rec i se  in 1916 and ea r ly  1917.
P a r t  of P a g e 's  p rob lem  was a lack of objectivity, which clouded his 
perception  of events. Many of his rep o r ts  and l e t te r s  contained explana­
tions  of why Italy was fighting. These  dispatches  differed in tone f rom  his 
e a r l i e r  m essages .  His sympathy caused him to emphasize the w ar idea l ism  
of the Ita l ian people r a th e r  than the machinations of the government.
/g  l M rs .  Page wished to v is i t  her c r i t ica l ly  ill b ro the r ,  B ryan  Lathrop, 
who died while the Pages  w ere  in the United States. Thom as Nelson 
Page to Rosewell Page,  May 28, 1916, Page Collection. See also  
New York T i m e s , M arch  20, 1916, p. 2, M arch  28, 1916, p. 5 
and April  17, 1916, p. 4.
^ New York T i m e s , June 4, 1916, IV, p. 4, and July 2, 1916, I, p. 2. 
Page a lso  defended Wilson's neutra li ty  policy in the la t te r  interview.
^ T h o m a s  Nelson Page to Rosewell  Page,  M arch  19, 1915, Page 
Collection.
S^See, for example,  Page to Lansing, M arch  20, 1917, The Lansing 
P a p e r s , I, pp. 757-758.
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In 1916 Page became concerned by the forthcoming pres iden t ia l  election.
Consequently, many of his t e le g ra m s  and le t t e r s  concentrated  on pra is ing
Wilson 's domestic and foreign policies ,  and denouncing the Republicans,
o c
especia lly  Theodore  Roosevelt,  as  w a r -m o n g e re r s .  ° Instead of analysis ,  
many of his m essag es  contained jus tif icat ion of pas t  events. His information 
during this t im e was l imited.
P a g e 's  lo ss  of objectivity was not the only reason  for his lack  of p e r ­
ception. The condition of A m er ican  and Italian diplomacy at this t ime played 
a big part .  Because  diplomatic appointments were  considered as  par t  of the 
spoils system, to be free ly  d istr ibuted  a f te r  pres ident ia l  elections to p o l i t i ­
cal appointees,  Page was an inexperienced and untra ined official. He brave ly  
faced the p rospec t  of perform ing  his functions, but Orlando 's policy of s e ­
c recy  and a lack  of knowledge and re liable  sources  of information ham pered  
him. It took t im e to in te rp re t  the mood of another  country and to develop 
contacts among other diplomats,  government officials, and the p re s s .  Page  
simply could not approach  the professional level of reporting  of am b assad o rs  
like Claude B a r r e l e  of F rance  and Sir Rennell Rodd of G reat Brita in .  Be-
O L
tween them these  men had had twenty-five y e a r s  of serv ice  in Italy by 1914. 
F o rced  to re ly  on information f rom  the Ital ian p re s s  and t idbits  gathered f rom  
other a m b assad o rs  and the ir  staffs and handicapped by his own abili ty to
i  ’ . • .
85pa ge to Wilson, August 26, 1916, and October 20, 1916, Wilson 
P a p e r s ,  Series  2. Page to Lansing, October 28, 1916, Page 
Collection.
86Qould, p. 66.
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analyze, Page ju s t  had to overcome too many obstac les .  He did his best  by 
cultivating people like Salvatore Corte s i ,  the Ita l ian  rep resen ta t ive  for the  
A ssocia ted  P r e s s ,  and creating  his own intelligence department under the
o n
m il i ta ry  attache' at  the Em bassy .  Nonetheless,  his repo r ts  became 
le s s  re liab le  about I tal ian  governmental  policy. SonninoVs policy of with­
holding information about war  a im s, coupled with P age 's  lack  of access  to  
many people with in timate knowledge of I tal ian poli t ics,  made it im poss ib le  
for the A m bassador  to forward  c lea r  views of what Italy planned. Moreover ,  
Sonnino's evas iveness  in personal interviews made it difficult for Page to 
adequately analyze the a im s  of the enigmatic Foreign  M inis ter .  Finally, 
h is preoccupation with justifying Italy and defending Wilsonian policies kep t 
Page f rom  devoting all his energ ies  to repo r ts  of p resen t and future policy 
r a th e r  than past  ac tions.
There  is  evidence that  Page fell out of favor with the major foreign 
policymakers  in Washington during the period of A m erican  neutrali ty.  A l-
oo ^
though P re s id en t  Wilson wrote severa l  le t te r s  of commendation, 
pr iva te ly  confided to S ec re ta ry  Lansing that he found some of P ag e 's  d i s ­
patches vague and somewhat inaccura te .  89 He also  made some com ments
87page to Wilson, July 13,' 1915, and July 13, 1917, Wilson P a p e r s ,  
Ser ies  2. Page to Lansing, April 18, 1917, Page Collection.
®^Wilson to Page,  January  26, 1914, and November 3, 1914, Wilson 
P a p e rs ,  Series  4, F ile  Case 894. Wilson to Page,  September 10, 
1915, and November 16, 1915, Page Collection.
89wil son to Lansing, December 29, 1915, The Lansing P a p e r s , I, 
p. 733.
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about an interview with Page that had caused some controversy .  "Evidently,
he wrote ,  "the A m bassador  has  as  much trouble in Italy as we have on this
side of the water in regulating interv iews and determining the ir  content. "9 0
House a lso  los t  some faith in Page during this period,  p r im a r i ly  because
o y
of P a g e 's  inabili ty to m a s te r  a diplomatic code. 7
These  opinions made it unlikely that P ag e 's  r e p o r ts  received  much 
ser ious  considera tion by the P re s iden t  or the State Departm ent in 1916 and
1917. Page had become another of Wilson 's superfluous ambassador s. 92 
Even his ea rn es t  efforts to support Wilson's r e -e lec t ion  in 1916 came to 
no avail.  Believing that his writing talent could help the P res id en t ,  he p r e ­
pared  a sp ir i ted  essay  on Wilson, "P res iden t  Wilson 's C r i t ic s :  A Challenge- 
Not a Defence, " which he hoped to publish in A m erican  newspapers .  The 
State Department was not en thusiastic  about this and advised h im  not to 
publish it. 93
^ W i l s o n  to Lansing, November 16, 1915, Wilson P a p e rs ,  Ser ies  
4, F ile  Case 894.
^ H o u s e  Diary, April  4, 11, 1915, as  cited in Gould, p. 72.
9^See, for example, the a r t i c le s  on Walter Hines Page.  Ross 
Gregory ,  "The Superfluous A m bassador :  Walter Hines P age 's
Return  to Washington, 1916, " The Historian,  XXVIII (May, 1966), 
pp. 389-404. M ary R. Kihl, "A F a i lu re  in A m bassador ia l  Di­
plomacy, " Journal of A m er ican  H is to ry , (December,  1970), 
pp. 636-653.
9 3In April,  1916, Colonel House, having heard  of P ag e 's  plans, 
wrote to Secre ta ry  Lansing, "I have a feeling that it may not be 
in the bes t  of ta s te  for an A m bassador  to write  com plim entary  
a r t i c l e s  concerning the A dminis tra tion  under which he is serving 
and is  a part .  " House to Lansing, April  20, 1916, The Lansing 
P a p e r s , I, p. 736.
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An adm in is t ra t ion  that was wary  of its am bassador  would not pay 
much heed to him in formulating i ts  policy. Wilson might have considered 
removing Page,  but the re  was a dearth  of qualified rep lacem ents  a t  this 
t ime. He decided against  replacing Walter Hines Page,  A m er ican  A m b a s s a ­
dor to G rea t  Bri ta in ,  for the same r e a s o n . ^  Also,  the United States was 
not deeply involved with Ital ian affa i rs  a t  this t ime. Why rep lace  a man in 
a re la tively  unimportant country at a t ime when other m a t te r s  were  so much 
m ore  p ress ing?  In any case,  the United States had no c lea r ly  defined Ital^>y^ 
ian policy. Diplomatic attention, focused on G reat B r i ta in  and Germany. 
Although m a t te r s  concerning Italy came up during this  period,  no coherent 
plan was developed. An example of this lack of d irec tion  was the case of 
the Attualitci.
On September 9, 1916, the owner of a Greek s team er ,  the Mina, filed 
suit in the United States D is tr ic t  Court  for the E a s te rn  D is t r ic t  of Virginia 
against  the Ita l ian s teamship  Attualit^. to recove r  $800, 000 in lo s se s  r e s u l t ­
ing f rom  a coll ision between the two ships in the M edite rranean  Sea. The 
Attualitei had been at tached in Norfolk pending the cou r t ' s  decision. On 
September .28, 1916, the D is tr ic t  Court  o rde red  the r e lea se  of the vesse l ,
but the United States C ircu it  Court  of Appeals for the Fourth  C ircu it  over-
q c
ruled  this decree .  7 The Ital ian  government p ro tes ted  the decision and 
cla imed exemption f rom  attachment as a requis it ioned vesse l  of a fr iendly
^^Arthur  S. Link, Wil son: Campaigns for P r o g r e s s iv i s m  and Peace ,  
1916-1917 (Princeton: P r ince ton  U nivers ity  P r e s s ,  1965), p. 369.
^ L a n s i n g  to Di C e l le re ,  October 26, 1916, October 26, 1916,
F ore ign  Relations Supplement, 1917, pp. 680-685.
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country. 96 S ecre ta ry  Lansing, in a closely reasoned  and legalis t ic  le t t e r ,
re jec ted  the Ital ian  argum ent and said the Attualitd was not an a rm ed  public
v esse l  entitled to immunity under international law. 97 Italy continued to
d isagree ,  especially  when a United States judge o rdered  the sale of the
ship to pay the damages  awarded to the Greek  cla imants .  98
Although the case  was closed by the sale of the ship on August 7, 1917,
to an Ital ian company, ^  it indicated severa l  salient fea tu res  of I tal ian-
A m er ican  policy. Like the p rob lem  of naturaliza tion,  the Attualitd case
was never sa ti s fac to r ily  resolved . As a resu l t ,  mutual i r r i ta t io n s  between^
the two countries  began to develop, i r r i ta t ions  that grew when they became
cobell igerents .  The policy of the United States was a response,  a reaction
ra th e r  than a par t  of an overa ll  plan. The diplomatic preoccupation with j
G reat Brita in  and Germany precluded the framing of such a policy. Even
m ore  indicative of I ta l ian -A m erican  re lations was a te leg ram  sent by Page
to Lansing in December 1916:
M in is te r  for Fore ign  Affairs (Sonnino) ea rnes t ly  reques ts  
my aid in obtaining r e le a s e  and prompt depar tu re  for Italy 
of s team er  Attualitd requis it ioned by Ital ian Government,  
now under se izure  Norfolk on complaint of Greek shipowner.
Grain  cargo Attualitd greatly  needed here .  Baron Sonnino 
rem inds  me agreem ent  had previously  been reached with
96xhe Counselor of the Ital ian  Embassy  (Brambilla)  to Lansing, 
September 12, 1916, ibid. , pp. 675-677. DiCellere  to 
Lansing, October 2, 1916, ibid. , pp. 677-678.
9^Lansing to DiCel lere,  October 26, 1916, ib id . , pp. 680-685.
98DiCell e re  to Lansing, November 20, 1916, and May 12, 1917, 
ibid. , pp. 686-687.
^^I b i d . , p. 687.
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Departm ent that  no ships requis it ioned by Italy would be 
subjected to seizure .
To say that  the re  was a fa ilure  to communicate is  an unders ta tem ent .  
Baron  Sonnino was e ither  unaware of Lansing 's  l e t t e r  to A m bassador  Di 
C e l le re  or he chose to ignore the A m erican  position. This bland ind if fe r­
ence on Sonnino's p a r t  continued to plague I ta l ian -A m erican  rapprochement,  
especia lly  at  the P a r i s  Peace  Conference.  No le s s  strange is  P a g e 's  un- 
aw areness  of his government 's  posit ion Despite the s t r e s s  of these  months, 
the State D epar tm en t 's  failure to inform Page  of i ts  policies was inexcusable.  
As far  as  the State Depar tment was concerned, Italy and its A m er ican  a m ­
bassado r  were  not worthy of ser ious  considera tion.  Mutual ignorance and 
indifference were  policies that  would have d isas trous  re su l t s  two yea rs  la te r .
-^OOpage to Lansing, Decem ber 11, 1916, ibid. , p. 68 5.
C H A P T E R  III
ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES AT WAR, 1917-1918
The G erm an  government announced the resumption of u n res t r ic ted  
submarine w a r fa re  on January  31, 1917. Until April  6, 1917, the United 
States rem ained  a state between peace and war.  Each of P re s id en t  Wilson 's 
m a jo r  decisions during this period was reached only af te r  much mental a n ­
guish and deliberation.  By M arch  21, Wilson believed that he had no a l t e r ­
native but w ar .  He had los t  faith in his abil i ty  to br ing Germany to the 
peace table because  of her  a s sau l t  on A m er ican  shipping and he r  Z im m er-  
mann te le g ra m  proposing to involve the United States in a war  with Mexico 
and Japan. Wilson was convinced that A m erican  bell igerency  would bring 
an ear ly  peace,  an inc reased  influence with the Entente and Germany, and 
a g rea te r  chance to promote  an effective and jus t  peace sett lement.  * Thus 
he appeared  before  Congress  on April 2 and asked  for a declara tion  of war.  
On April  6, 1917, Good Fr iday ,  Congress  declared  war on Germany. A l­
though Italy and her  enemy A ustr ia -H ungary  had played no significant par t  
in Wilson's decision, the United States and Italy were  now co-be l l igerents .  
Two short  y e a r s  la te r ,  the two countries  were  abysm ally  divided.
^Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for P r o g r e s s iv i s m  and
Peace  (Princeton, New Je rsey :  P r ince ton  Univers ity  P r e s s ,
1965), pp. 411-416.
56
57
1. INITIAL REACTIONS TO AMERICAN BELLIGERENCY 
Page had followed Wilson 's diplomacy with much in te res t .  For 
severa l  y e a r s  he had w rit ten  fr iends ,  re la tives ,  and public officials that 
A m er ican  secur ity  was inextr icably  t ied to the outcome of the European "7 
war.  He expressed  this  feeling to P res id en t  Wilson as  ea r ly  as  November 
1914, th ree  short  months a f te r the conflict 's  beginning . ^ Although he 
originally  did not believe G ermany to be a prac t ica l  menace,  he gradually 
changed his mind. By m i d - 19 15, he was convinced that German m i l i t a r ­
i s m  and des ire  to intervene in Lat in A m erican  a f fa i rs  consti tuted a grave 
danger. He wrote that a v ic to r ious  Germany would take the f i r s t  possible 
opportunity to interfere in the a ffa i rs  of Mexico and South A m er ica .   ^ The 
sinking of the Lusitania  and the Sussex confirmed his d is t ru s t  of Germany.J 
Page , who believed in power as  a force in world diplomacy, thought 
a strong United States could exer t  much influence on the European powers.  
Fo r  much of the per iod of A m er ican  neutra li ty  Page hoped that  its  power /  
could be used  to peacefully intervene to save the world f rom  se lf-destruction.  
When Italy entered the war,  he abandoned his original  idea of a concert  of
2Thomas Nelson Page to P res iden t  Wilson, November 11, 1914,
Thomas Nelson Page Collection, Duke University.  Hereinaf ter 
r e f e r r e d  to as  Page Collection.
3
Page to Wilson, August 23, 1915, and Page to Thomas S. Martin, 
December  1, 1915, Page Collection. Page to Wilson, M arch 28,
1917, Woodrow Wilson P a p e r s ,  L ib ra ry  of C ongress ,  Series  2. 
Hereinafte r  r e f e r r e d  to as  Wilson P ap e rs .
neutra l  powers to end the war and hoped for mediation by the United States 
a lone .^  F ro m  May, 1915, to November, 1916, his hopes dwindled, but 
Wilson 's ree lec tion  in 1916 once again inc reased  his expectations.  Now 
European governments  would m ore  readily  recognize Wilson's power and 
aid the United States to effect a jus t  and durable peace.  ^ But the failure 
of the Wilson peace movement in the winter of 1916-1917 quickly ended 
these  hopes.
(B es ides  supporting mediation, he also advocated m i l i ta ry  read iness .  
During A m er ican  neutra li ty ,  Page  frequently wrote le t t e r s  arguing for p r e ­
paredness .  He was concerned about the r i s e  of G erman m i l i t a r i s m  and 
feared  a postwar  revolutionary sp ir t  in Europe. Apprehensive of American 
secur ity  in genera l ,  he bel ieved that A m erica  would have to show its "teeth. 
He strongly backed Wilson's p rep a red n ess  p ro g ram  of 1916, although i ts  
emphasis  on naval building neglected the swift an t i -subm ar ine  craf t  n ece s -  
a r y  to deter  the G erm an navy. Even in 1916, however, he did not rea l ly  
believe that d i rec t  A m erican  m i l i t a ry  involvement was n e c e s s a ry  or wise .  7 
Nonetheless,  he never  ruled out the possibil i ty of.United States bel l igerency 
If the honor and welfare of the United States were  challenged, the country J
4F o r  the change in P a g e 's  position, See Page to Wilson, August 
26, 1914, January  1, 1915, M arch  23, 1915, Wilson P ape rs ,
Ser ies  2. F o r  his la te r  opinion, see Page to Lansing, November 
25, 1916, ibid.
^Page to Mrs.  Burnaby, November 10, 1916, Thomas Nelson Page 
Collection, College of William and Mary.
^Page to Wilson, April  19, 1915, Wilson P a p e r s ,  Series  2
7P a'ge to Colonel House, April  2, 1916, Page Collection.
would have to fight. Considerat ions of future national security ,  ending
the war  quickly, and creating  a situation to make future w a rs  im p o ss ib le^
o
w ere  the only reasons  for going to war.  °
Confident that these  conditions existed in April  1917, Page vigorously  
defended W ilson’s w ar  declaration.  A m erica  fought, he declared ,  to make 
the world safe for "Democracy" by thoroughly defeating the m i l i ta r is t ic  
G ermans.  War would a lso  insure  the nation 's  security .  9 Finally,  by d e ­
feating G erm any quickly and decisively,  the United States would be able to 
es tab l ish  a jus t ,  enduring peace and world-wide democracy, even in 
Russ ia .  All of this would be through the efforts of P re s id en t  Wilson^
who was un ive rsa l ly  recognized as  the w or ld 's  g rea te s t  man. H
Page  believed that a shared state of be l l igerency  could fos ter 
m ore  I ta lo -A m er ican  friendship.  I ta ly 's  feeling of isolation f rom  her  a l l ie s  
Great B r i ta in  and F rance ,  would cause her to be " l ibe ra l"  in her  relation^-
ship to A m erica ,  wrote Page to Lansing. "She would do much to be em an-
IPcipated f rom  this subjection (to Great B r i ta in  and France) .  " Several 
of his d ispatches  to Lansing emphasized Italian hopes of securing big loans
^Page to Ruth P. Nelson, October 26, 1916, Page to Rosewell 
Nelson Page,  April  15, 1917, Page Collection.
^Page to A m bassador  Will iam Sharp, May 19, 1917, Page Collection.
lOpage to John S. H arr ison ,  April  6, 1917, Page Collection.
l l P a g e  to Judge Anderson, June 22, 1917, Page Collection.
1 2Page to the S ec re ta ry  of State, April 18, 1917, P a p e r s  Relating to 
the F ore ign  Relations of the United States: The Lansing P ape rs  (2 
vols. ; Washington: Government Prin ting Office, 1939-1940), Vol.
II, pp. 8-10. Here inaf te r  r e f e r r e d  to as  Lansing P ap e rs .
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f rom  the United States.  A m ore  l ibe ra l  loan policy, he intimated,  would
1 3be v e ry  helpful in promoting be t te r  I ta lo -A m erican  re la tions .
P a g e ’s hopes for a rapprochem ent soared  with the Ital ian  govern­
m e n t ’s estab lishment of a com m iss ion  to go to A m erica .  He wrote en­
thus ia s t ic  l e t t e r s  to A m er ican  officials and at  le a s t  one m em b er  of the 
Ita l ian group. These  l e t t e r s  s t r e s s e d  two m ajo r  des i re s .  F i r s t ,  he hoped 
for a c lo se r  understanding between the two governments.  "Your ta sk  will 
be to t ry  to explain and in te rp re t  to my people your own. . . In fundamentals 
we a re  and stand for the same things. . . . "  he wrote to M arquis B o rsa re l l i  
di Rifreddo, a m em ber  of the Ital ian delegation. ^  These  "sam e things" 
were ,  he believed, the devotion to dem ocracy  and l iberty .  ^  He hoped that  
the com m iss ion  would c lar ify  to A m ericans  that Italy was fighting not solely 
for t e r r i t o r i a l  expansion but ra th e r  for the freedom of Ita l ians living in 
A ustr ian  land and for a defensible f rontier  secu re  f rom  the Dual Monarchy. ^
Page  also hoped that the com miss ion  would be helpful in m ore  tangible 
ways. M ore  d irec t  financial re la tions between the two countries  was most 
des irab le .  Even m ore  c r i t ica l  was the resolution of the m ajo r  specific
13Page to Lansing, M arch  23, 1917, P ap e rs  Relating to the Fore ign  
Relations of the United States, 1917, Supplement 2: The World War 
(2 vols. ) (Washington: Government Prin ting  Office, 193), Vol. I,
pp. 518-519. H ere inaf te r  r e f e r r e d  to as  Fore ign  Relations,  1917, 
Supplement 2. Page to Lansing, April 6, 1917, ibid. , p. 520.
14Page to M archese  B o rs a re l l i  di Rifreddo, May 5, 1917, Page 
Collection.
^ P a g e  to Wilson, April  25, 1917, Wilson P a p e r s ,  Ser ies  5A.
^ P a g e  to B o rsa re l l i ,  May 5, 1917, Page Collection.
^7Page to Wilson, April  25, 1917, Wilson P a p e rs ,  Series  5A.
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source of I ta lo -A m erican  fr ic t ion  during the period of A m er ican  neutrali ty.  
Page ex p ressed  his strong opinions on this subject to S ec re ta ry  Lansing:
"I do not think it r e m is s  to suggest  to them (the Italians) the deep in te res t  
which our Government takes  in the negotiation of the na tu ra liza tion  t rea ty  
as  a means  of doing away with what may be a possible point of fr iction 
between us in the future.
I ta ly 's  reaction  to United States bell igerency was m ixed .  On the 
surface ,  I ta l ian poli t icians and people alike were  enthusiastic  about the ir  
new w ar  p a r tn e r .  The New York T im es  repor ted  that Rome "throbbed 
with en thusiasm. " A crowd of I ta l ians gathered  in the center  of Rome and 
proceeded to the A m erican  Em bassy  to show its apprecia tion  of America .  
Receiving a deputation f rom  the crowd, Page appeared with its m em bers  
and made a short  speech. The people responded with tremendous cheering 
for Page and the United States as  an ally. ^  This en thusiasm  at the popu-  ^
l a r  level was apparently  duplicated by the officials of the Ital ian government,  
who honored Page at a luncheon. P r e m i e r  Paolo Bosell i at tended the luncheon, 
and Page spoke briefly,  emphasizing that  both countries  w ere  fighting for 
l iber ty .  ^0
This initial reaction,  however, did not ref lec t  deeper feelings. As
y
Page had noticed before,  I tal ian  opinion about the possibil i ty of future A m e r i ­
can be l l igerency  was not noticeably enthusiastic.  This ref lec ted  I taly 's  un-
^ P a g e  to Lansing, May 2, 1917, Page Collection. 
^ New York T i m e s , April  9, 1917, p. 3.
2ONew York T i m e s , April 15, 1917, Section I, p. 4.
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certa in ty  about the pa r t  the United States would play in the war  and the su b ­
sequent peace sett lement.  2 1 Other o b se rv e r s  rem a rk ed  cynically that the 
April 8 dem onstra tion  of public sp ir i t  was typical of such ac tiv it ies  in 
Italy. Gino Speranza,  then in Italy as a r e p o r te r  of the war for the New 
York Evening P o s t , wrote  in his diary,  "A m em ber  of the A m b assad o r 's  
staff asked naively whether I knew that a dem onstra tion  like this is  always 
carefully  worked up. I a s s u re d  h im  this was no exception. " Page h im ­
self noted that the announcement of A m erican  intervention caused only —/
m odera te  public reaction  in Italy. ^3
The hopes for a w a r - in sp i red  I ta lo -A m erican  rapport  were misfounded.
I
The mutual ignorance of the neutra li ty  period c a r r i e d  over into the war effort. 
A m er ican  newspapers  still concentrated  on the Allied war effort on the W est­
e rn  front and a lm ost completely neglected Italy. Similarly, I ta l ian new s­
papers  gave the ir  at tention to the Alpine front and invariably ignored 
A m er ican  mobilization  and subsequent fighting. Page complained of I tal ian  
journa l is t ic  inattention in a le t te r  to Colonel House. ^  This indifference 
was a resu l t  of I ta ly 's  isolated  fight in the Alps, a struggle which was not
21Ibid.
22jri0rence G. Speranza (ed. ), The Diary of Gino Speranza: Italy, 
1915-1919 {2 vols. ; New York: Columbia University  P r e s s ,
1941, Vol. II, p. 25.
“ Page to Rosewell Page,  April 15, 1917. Page Collection.
24pa ge to Colonel House, November 27, 1917, as  cited in John
Wells Gould, "Italy and the United States, 1914-1918: Background
to Confrontation" (unpublished Ph. D. d is ser ta t ion ,  Department 
of History,  Yale University ,  1969), p. 85.
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aided by G reat Brita in .  Because  Italy did not send so ld ie rs  to other fronts 
and received  ve ry  few troops  in tu rn  f rom  her  a l l ies ,  she tu rned  her  a t ten ­
tion inward. If her  a l l ies  were  not going to help her ,  she would have l i tt le 
to do with them.
The attitude of Fore ign  M in is ter  Baron Sonnino was very  important 
in determining I ta lo -A m erican  re la tions .  He was preoccupied with his 
"b lessed  d ream "  of obtaining a secure  Italy through determ ined  adherence 
to the provisions of the T rea ty  of London. Sonnino showed li t tle in te res t  
in the United States and made few efforts to unders tand  P re s id e n t  Wilson
o r
or his diplomacy. An adequate p ic ture  of the United States was an im -  j 
possibil i ty  because  of the incomplete, scornful d ispatches  f rom  his a m ­
bassad o r  in Washington, Di Cel le re .  Sonnino's policy of secrecy , his 
inadequate financial aid to Ital ian propaganda in te re s ts  in the United States, 
and his ha l f -hear ted  support of the Ital ian m iss ion  in the United States i n ­
sured  a lack of knowledge on both sides of the Atlantic. Actually, Sonnino 
did not des ire  too frank an understanding of I tal ian  war a im s.  He rea l ized  
that  the United States posed the biggest  th rea t  to I ta ly 's  Adria tic  cla ims 
because  A m er ica  had not signed the T rea ty  of London. His policy of s i ­
lence  on Ital ian war a im s  was unrea l is t ic ,  but he refused to depart  f rom  it. ^  
Page warned  him about the dangers  of such an approach, but Sonnino did not J  
take any co rrec t ive  m e asu re s .
2 5pbid_. , p. 86.
^^Sonnino's policy was un rea l is t ic  because it prevented any rea l  
d iscussion of I ta ly 's  c la im s. Thus, Italy was never sure  of the 
’A m er ican  position on the Adriatic.
^ 7Page to Lansing, September 21, 1917, Page  Collection.
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P a g e ' s  des i re  for close economic t ies  between the two countries  
was not fully rea l ized  because  of ce r ta in  developments. I taly becam e 
m ore  dependent on A m er ican  financial aid during the war.  The United 
States made cred i ts  available to Italy under the L iber ty  Loan Acts.  A 
$100, 000, 000 loan was floated in May 1917, a $60, 000, 000 loan in July, 
and a $40, 000, 000 loan in August. The A m erican  government a lso ex ­
tended $230, 000, 000 cred i t  to the Ital ians.  The m i l i ta ry  d is a s te r  at 
Caporetto  in the fall of 1917, when I ta ly 's  a rm y  frantically  re t r e a te d  in 
the face of an A ust r ian  offensive, g rea t ly  weakened the Ita l ian financial 
situation. Facing m il i ta ry  d isa s te r ,  tremendous shortages in grain  and 
coal, and imminent starvat ion,  I taly needed her  a l l ies  to survive.  She 
was in despera te  s t ra i ts .  Only A m erica ,  with her  vas t  f inancial r e s e rv e s ,  
could help he r  much. Thus, by the end of 1917, Italy was a lm os t  wholly | 
dependent on A m erican  loans.  28
Even before  Caporetto,  Sonnino becam e in te res ted  in vigorous 
act ion on the question of f inancial re la tions.  Although he completely n e ­
glected the l a rg e r ,  m ore  c r i t ica l  issue  of war a i m s ,  he pushed hard  for a 
be t te r  economic situation with the United States. Exactly why he em phasized 
this is  unclear ,  but he exp ressed  his des ire  to Page severa l  t im es .  ^  
Caporet to te m p o ra r i ly  modified even Sonnino's Adria tic  policy; foreign 
affa i rs  had to be concerned with survival,  not t e r r i to ry .  Vittorio Orlando,
28Gould, pp. 105-116.
2 ^ P a g e  to Lansing, April  6, 1917, Fore ign  R ela t ions , 1917, Supple­
ment 2 , Vol. I, p. 520. Page to Lansing, April  18, 1917, The 
Lansing P a p e r s , Vol. II, p. 8.
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the new Italian P r im e  M in is te r ,  and F rancesco  Nitti, his M in is te r  of 
Finance,  cal led for increas ing  cooperation with the Allies,  especially  
the United States. Nitti in p a r t icu la r  was v e ry  desirous  of establishing 
long-range  com m erc ia l  t ie s  with A m erica  and t r i ed  to es tab l ish  sound 
economic re la tions .  30
Events seemed to favor c lo se r  t ie s  between the two countries .  Italy 
needed f r iend l ie r  re la tions  with the United States because  of he r  economic 
situation. As for A m erica ,  the re  was a possibil i ty that  b e t te r  re la tions 
might bring pos t-w ar  business  opportuni t ies .  Mindful of this, Page ad­
vised the sending of an A m er ican  com m iss ion  to study bus iness  and finan­
cial poss ib il i t ies  in Italy. Never the less ,  these  mutual economic ad ­
vantages did not m a te r ia l ize .  Sonnino's preoccupation with the Adriatic 
question caused him to genera lly  ignore I ta ly 's  growing re liance  on A m e r i ­
can loans. M oreover ,  the United States became i r r i ta te d  with Ital ian 
methods.  The Ita l ian m iss ion  in the United States had the responsibil i ty  
of making financial a r ran g em en ts  with the A m er ican  government. Its 
disorganization,  inefficiency, corruption,  and complete d is reg a rd  for 
p roper  purchasing  p rocedures  d ispleased A m erican  officials. 33 Finally,  
I tal ian m i l i ta ry  v ic to r ies  at the end of the war  led to delusions of grandeur
3 0C hris topher  Seton-Watson, Italy from L ib e ra l i sm  to F a s c i s m ,
1870-1925 (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd. , 1967), pp. 485-488.
31New York T im e s , May 21, 1917, p. 12.
32Gould, pp. 107-110. Page also  became i r r i ta te d  with the attitude 
of the government of Italy. He complained about its a t tem pt to 
r a i s e  the amount of the loans and its  unwill ingness to cooperate,  
Speranza D ia ry , Vol. II, p. 2 6.
66and a r e tu rn  to Sonnino's t e r r i t o r i a l  policy. Nitti and Orlando 's  will ing­
ness  to conciliate the United States disappeared in the furor  caused by 
these  unexpected events. ^3
2. PAGE'S EFFORTS
Plagued by the two countr ies '  ignorance of each o th e r 's  policies,  
th e i r  suspicions,  and the ir  i r r i ta t ions  with each other, Page doggedly 
t r i e d  to cope with his diplomatic duties. He still believed that Italy and 
the United States had to le a rn  m ore  about each other. "Ships go back and 
forth  between Italy and A m erica ,  but the re  is no bridge over  the w ate rs  
upon which the two people may walk and meet,  " he said to Gino Speranza. 3^ 
One of the chief difficulties was that the A m erican  Em bassy  had few ways 
to gauge Ital ian public opinion or to le a rn  what was happening in the country 
except through inadequate consular repor ts  and random bits  of information.
Despair ing of help f rom  the State Department,  ^6 Page decided to 
organize a volunteer Intelligence Office to encourage the flow of news b e ­
tween the two countries .  To head th is  organization he asked Speranza,  an 
I ta l ian -A m erican  lawyer living in Rome as  a correspondent for the New York 
Evening Pos t  and The Outlook. The bilingual Speranza, who had previously
33Seton-Watson, pp. 505-506.
^ T h o m a s  Nelson Page,  as  quoted in Speranza D ia ry , p. 26.
3 ^ Ibid. , pp . 4 - 5.
^ P a g e ,  for ins tance,  complained about the State D epartm ent 's  
sending a m i l i ta ry  attache who spoke neither F rench  or 
I talian. Ibid. , p. 26.
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volunteered to help Page,  eager ly  accepted  the position. At f i r s t ,  Speran­
z a 1 s job was unofficial, but before  long he was given a regu la r  diplomatic 
appointment by Secre ta ry  Lansing. He became the Attache'  of P o l i t i ­
cal Intell igence,  and his function was to keep the State Departm ent informed 
on Ita l ian events and policies,  especially  trends  in Ital ian  public opinion. 
Speranza collected newspaper  opinions and did much of the em bassy 's  
poli tical  and m i l i ta ry  reporting.  3  ^ Page adm ired  Speranza 's  work, and 
his own rep o r ts  w ere  strongly influenced by his a id e 's  opinions. 3<^
Several  months a f te r A m er ican  intervention, Page began to u rge  the 
United States government to dec la re  w ar  on A ustr ia -H ungary .  At f i r s t ,  he 
indicated that this would be grea t ly  apprecia ted  by Ital ian le ad e rs  like 
Sonnino. ^0 He argued that  fa ilure  to decla re  war would a lso  alienate the 
Ital ian people. 41 By the end of October 1917, his m essages  became m ore  
insis tent.  Faced  with an impending G erm an-A us tr ian  offensive and low -j 
m ora le ,  the Ital ian  government was despera te  for signs of Allied concern.  ^
3 ^ Arthur Livingston, "Gino Speranza: The Evolution of an A m erican ,  "
ibid. , Vol. I, p. xv.
38Gould, p. 68.
^ Speranza D ia ry , Vol. II, p. 161-162. Page to Lansing, Septem­
be r  21, 1917, Page Collection.
^^Page to Wilson, September 26, 1917, Wilson P a p e r s ,  Series  2.
41Ibid.
MI would earnes t ly  suggest. . .we give every. . . support possib le,  " Page ^ 
w ired  Lansing. 4  ^ The Ital ian collapse at Caporetto  proved to Page that  
I tal ian m ora le  needed a t rem endous psychological lift. This could come 
f rom  an  A m er ican  w ar  declaration.  Page emphasized  the necess i ty  of 
such an  action: "I believe Ital ian Government would ra th e r  have our dec-
la ra t ion  of war against  A ust r ia  than our troops.
Until Caporetto ,  Washington showed li t tle concern over A us t r ia -  
Hungary. When the decision to dec lare  w ar  on Germany was made, Wilson 
had decided not to seek war  with A ustr ia .  F i r s t ,  he believed he had no 
jus tif ication .  Unlike Germany, the Hapsburg Em pire  had not committed  
any "overt  ac ts .  " Even m ore  centra l  to Wilson 's policy was his belief 
that  a "soft policy" might induce A ust r ia  to seek a separa te  peace. ^
Thus,  Germany became A m e r ic a ' s  sole enemy in 1917. As far  a s  the 
United States was concerned, A ustr ia  rep resen ted  the most feasible way 
to end the w ar  through a negotiated peace.
Toward the end of 1917, however, Wilson concluded that  a d ec la ra -  ^ 
tion of war would help the war effort. The Caporet to debacle had revea led
42pa ge to Lansing, October 29, 1917, Foreign  Relations ,  1917, 
Supplement 2, Vol. I, p. 283.
43page to Lansing, November 3, 1917, ibid. , p. 288. F o r  other 
en t rea t ie s ,  see Page to Lansing, November 8, 1917, ibid. , 
p. 298 and Page to Lansing, November 10, ibid. , p. 302.
44A rthur  J. May, "The Pa ssing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914- 
1918 (2 vols. ; Philadelphia:  Univers ity  of Pennsylvania P r e s s ,
1966), p. 561.
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the despair  of the Ital ian people and the possib il i ty  that the divided Italian 
government might sue for peace. Allied m ora le  rece ived  another shock 
in November 1917, with the news of the Russian  Revolution and R uss ia 's  
subsequent withdrawal f rom  the war.  Would Italy be the next to defect? 
P a g e ' s  anguished appeals  were  only a p a r t  of what Wilson had to l is ten  to. 
Senior po licymakers  in Washington, national groups in A m erica ,  various 
congressm en,  and sections of the A m er ican  p re s s  supported the argument 
that  a decla ra tion  of war would bo ls te r  Italy and counteract  Allied defeatism. 
M ore importantly ,  it was argued that such an action would enable the Allied 
and Associated countries to m ore  effectively coordinate m i l i ta ry  and dip­
lomatic s tra tegy. Convinced by these  a rgum ents ,  Wilson called for war on j- 
A ust r ia -H ungary  on Decem ber 4, 1917. ^
Wilson 's m essage  and the subsequent vote of Congress  to decla re  w ar   ^
on Austr ia  in sp ired  Italy. P r e m i e r  Orlando joyfully hailed the new Allied 
unity and welcomed the United States in i ts  fight against  a common enemy. ^7 
The Ital ian people were no le s s  enthusiastic.  I tal ian  clubs and organizations 
sent m essages  of grati tude to P re s id en t  Wilson. 48 Page also  was gratified;
he believed that Wilson's action had aroused  the Ital ian people. Before, J
♦
I ta ly 's  war effort and sac r i f ices  had not been adequately apprecia ted .  Wilson
^ S a lv a t o r e  Saladino, "Italy, 1917: The Poli t ica l  Consequences of
M ili ta ry  Defeat, " The Historian,  XXIV (November, 1961), p. 56.
46A rthur  J. May, pp. 570-573.
i
4^New York T i m e s , Decem ber  5, 1917, p. 3.
4^New York T im es,  Decem ber  6, 1917, p. 2.
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had dem onstra ted  that the United States was aware  of I ta ly ’s suffering a n d ^  
was willing to aid he r  at  this c ruc ia l  t ime. ^9
As everyone concerned rea l ized ,  the A m er ican  dec lara tion  of war was 
a symbolic act , a m o ra le -b u i lde r  for Italy. If Wilson planned to maintain  
Ita l ian en thusiasm  for the United States,  m ore  concre te  fo rm s  of aid would 
have to follow. Even before  Decem ber 4, Page had reques ted  Wilson and 
Lansing to send A m erican  troops  to Italy. 50 During 1918, his app rehen ­
sion inc reased ,  and he became m ore  adamant about the question of troop  
disposal.  F r o m  June 1918, to October 1918, he sent numerous  le t t e r s  and 
te le g ra m s  to civilian and m i l i t a ry  lead ers .  F u r th e rm o re ,  he v is i ted  S e c re ­
t a ry  of War Newton D. Baker  and General  John P e rsh in g  to advance his 
views. 51 He even suggested to an incredulous General  T a s k e r  H. B liss  
that  the Allies should send 500, 000 sold iers  to the Ita l ian front.  52
P a g e ' s  m e ssag es  furnished  two reasons  for his suggestions of t roops .  
He believed th e re  was an im pera tive  m i l i ta ry  need for m ore  men and 
equipment on the Ital ian  front. I taly had always lacked the n e c e s s a ry  
heavy a r t i l le ry ,  guns, and planes.  53 am ateu r  s t ra teg is t ,  Page  also
4 9 P a g e  to Wil son, Decem ber 11, 1917, Wilson P a p e r s , Series  2.
^ P a g e  to Lansing, July 10, 1917, Foreign  R e la t ions , 1917,
Supplement 2, Vol. I, p. 123. Page to Wilson, October 20, 1918. 
Page Collection.
51page to Lansing, September  24, 1918, Lansing P a p e r s ,  Vol. II, 
pp. 154-155.
52p red  er ick  P a lm e r ,  B l iss ,  P eacem aker :  The Life and L e t te r s  of
General  T ask e r  Howard B liss  (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company,
1934), p. 313.
53page to Lansing, July 10, 1917, Fore ign  R ela t ions , 1917, Supple­
ment 2 , Vol. I, p. 123. Page to Lansing, November 12, 1917, 
Lansing P a p e r s , Vol. II, p. 60.
believed that  A m erican  troops  were  needed to bo ls te r  the weak Italian de­
fenses in the Alps. He wrote that if the Ita l ian l ines  broke,  Northern  Italy 
would fall, endangering Southern F rance  and strengthening the Centra l  
P o w e r s 1 des ire  to continue fighting. ^4 All of this would prolong the war, 
perhaps  for y e a r s ,  a displeasing prospect.
To his m i l i ta ry  a rgum ents  Page added poli tical and psychological  ^
reasons  for aiding Italy. He s t r e s s e d  the symbolic value of sending troops 
to Italy. It would be "an emblem of future and possibly not distant victory ,  M 
he wrote to Wilson. '^5 By encouraging a w ar-w ea ry ,  defensive people, such 
an action would susta in  the ir  will ingness to fight. Finally, he believed this 
was a n e c e s s a ry  step to a lleviate I ta ly 's  anxiety about her  re la tions  with 
her  war  p a r tn e rs .  Italy was sure  tha t  England and F rance  had neglected 
her  throughout the enti re  war.  As a resu l t ,  she felt trem endously  isola ted 
f rom  the other Allies.  P e rh ap s  if the United States sent aid, the Allies 
would follow suit. If the United States did not send re in forcem ents ,  how­
ever,  Page did not want to guarantee how long her p resen t  enthusiasm for^ 
the United States would last .
M il i ta ry  le ad e rs  did not reac t  positively to P a g e ’s reques ts .  When 
he vis i ted  P a r i s  in July 1917, to a sk  P ersh ing  for A m erican  so ld ie rs ,  he 
was told that P e rsh ing  strongly opposed the deployment of troops anywhere
54pa ge to Martin ,  F eb rua ry  19, 1918, Page Collection, Page to 
F ran k  L. Polk (A ssis tan t S ec re ta ry  of State), September 4, 1918, 
Page Collection.
c c
Page to Wilson, December 15, 1917, Wilson P a p e r s ,  Series  2.
^ P a g e  to Lansing, March 26, 1917, Lansing P a p e r s ,  Vol. II, 
p. 117.
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except on the W este rn  Front.  ^  When Page pe rs is ted ,  Persh ing  wrote him 
the United States had neither  the troops nor the n ece ssa ry  ships for t r a n s ­
portation. M oreover ,  the United States could not make a un i la te ra l  de­
cision; only the Supreme War Council had the power to deal with m a t te r s
C O
concerning the coordination of the Ital ian and F rench  fronts.  General
B l iss ,  a m em ber  of the Supreme War Council was no m ore  sympathetic 
to P a g e ’s 1918 reques t  for 500, 000 troops for Italy. After telling the A m ­
bassador  that he did not have the authori ty to make the decision, he added
that Page would get ve ry  l i t t le encouragement f rom  either P e rsh ing  or 
59General  Foch. 7
This  unenthusiastic  m i l i ta ry  response  was matched by A m er ica 's  
civilian leader  s. Sending troops to Italy did not correspond with Wilson’s 
hopes to induce A ustr ia -H ungary  to conclude a separa te  peace.  Even a f te r  J  
the United States dec lared  war on the Hapsburg Monarchy, Wilson adhered  
to his "soft policy" and t r ied  to avoid offending A ustr ia .  He was encouraged 
in January  1918, when Count Czernin,  the A ustr ian  F ore ign  Minis ter,  said 
tha t  Wilson 's Four teen  Points might serve as  the b as is  of a compromise 
peace. Also, foreign policy adv iso rs  believed that A ustr ia  was w a r -w e a ry j
57John J. P e rsh ing ,  My Experiences in the World War (2 Vols. ;
New York: F r e d e r ic  A. Stokes Company, 1931), Vol. I, p. 106.
58P ersh ing  to Page,  M arch  19, 1918, Page Collection.
597Bliss  to General  Peyton C. M arch as  quoted in P a lm e r ,  Bliss,  
P e a c e m a k e r , p. 313.
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and ready for peace.  But hopes for a negotiated peace were  destroyed 
by F ren ch  P r e m i e r  Georges Clemenceau. In April  1918, newspapers  
published C lem enceau1 s s ta tements  that A ust r ia -H ungary  was double- 
c ross ing  Germany. As a resu l t  of this action, Czern in  res igned  and the 
A us t r ians  w ere  frightened back to Germany. Wilson then dropped the idea 
of a separa te  peace with Austr ia -H ungary .
Another s e r ie s  of events moved the United States towards a more 
positive Ital ian policy. In the spring of 1918, the United States became 
m ore  involved with the p rob lem  of oppressed  m inor it ies  in Austria -Hungary .  
Various nationali t ies  of the Hapsburg Em pire  c lam ored  for A m erican  sup ­
port  to b reak  up A ustr ia -H ungary  into separa te  na t ion-s ta te s .  At f irst , 
Wilson did not support this policy. Point X of his Four teen  Points  advo­
cated the federa liza tion  of Austr ia -Hungary .  Several  fac to rs  led him away 
f rom  th is  policy. As noted above, Wilson became discouraged with a "soft  
policy" towards A ustr ia -H ungary .  Also, Lansing supported the policy of 
completely  breaking up the A ust r ian  Em pire  along national l ines because he 
feared  a power vacuum in E as te rn  Europe. With Russia  out of the war, he 
believed it n e c e ssa ry  to c rea te  a new balance of power. Independent Centra l
^ A r t h u r  J. May, pp. 584-588.
^ V i c t o r  S. Mamatev, "The United States and the Dissolution of 
Austr ia -H ungary ,  " Journal of Central  European Affa irs ,  X 
(October, 1950), pp. 259-260. F o r  m ore  details  on the 
"Czern in -C lem enceau  imbroglio,  " see Mamatey, The United 
States and East  Centra l  Europe, 1914-1918, (Princeton, New 
J e r s e y :  P r ince ton  Univers ity  P r e s s ,  1957), pp. 234-236.
62European s ta tes  would counterbalance G erm an  m il i ta ry  power. Mili­
ta r i ly ,  support for the oppressed  nationali t ies  might prove advantageous. 
The Inquiry,  Wilson 's group of scho la rs  planning for  the future peace n e ­
gotiations, and the State D epar tm ent ' s  Putney Report  both stated that 
helping these  people would knock A ustr ia  out of the war  rapidly. Then the  
Allies  would be f ree  to concentrate on Germany alone. °~>
Wilson was im p re s sed  with these  a rguments ,  but was dubious about 
I ta ly 's  react ion.  After al l,  the Yugoslavs, one of these  oppressed  nat ion­
a l i t ies ,  occupied land that Italy cla imed by the T rea ty  of London. But the 
I ta l ian  government unofficially supported the Pact of Rome, which inti­
mated  that it supported Yugoslav t e r r i to r i a l  asp ira t ions .  ^4 This  apparent 
I talo-Yugoslav cooperation,  Wilson 's disil lusionment with Austria-Hungary,  
and p r e s s u r e  f rom  various congressm en  led to a cautious May 29, 1918
62George Barany, "Wilsonian Central  Europe: Lans ing 's 'G on tr i -
. bution, " The Historian,  XXVIII (February ,  1966), pp. 230-232.
6 3Ibid. , p. 227. Mamatey, "The United States and the Dissolution 
of Austr ia -H ungary ,  " p. 263.
64The Pac t  of Rome was a re su l t  of the Congress  of Oppressed 
Nationali t ies held in April,  1918. The Pact included a section 
in which the Yugoslavs and Ita lians  expressed  mutual in te res t  
in the unification of both nations and undertook to sett le frontier 
disputes in a friendly spiri t ,  according to the princip les  of 
nationali ty and se lf -dete rmination .  Orlando welcomed the pact 
in the name of the government,  thus giving it unofficial recogni­
tion. Seton-Watson, pp. 494-495.
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s ta tement favoring these  national groups. ^5
The Wilson adm in is tra t ion ,  however,  made no specific com mitments  
to the Yugoslavs to avoid arousing any Italo-Yugoslav r iva l ry .  At the 
same time, the re  was much concern for I ta ly ’s m a te r ia l  welfare.  V a r i ­
ous sources  indicated that  I tal ian m ora le  was ve ry  low because  of a lack  of 
A m er ican  recognition of her w ar  effort. ^  The United States was a lso  
concerned about a peace offer made by A ustr ia -H ungary  to Italy. There  
was no d es i re  for another  war dropout like Russia.  Lansing rea l ized  that  
G erm an  propaganda, the l im ited  amount of physical aid to Italy, and lack
of sympathy given by the State Department to Ital ian reques ts  for coal, war
67m a te r ia l s ,  and ships might c rea te  a s im i la r  situation.
To help bo ls te r  sagging Ital ian m ora le  and counter any aid given the 
Yugoslavs, the government sent th i r ty  ambulance sections with th ir ty  
o ff icers  and 1, 3 50 men to the Ital ian front. ^8 Lansing also wired  Walter 
Hines Page,  A m bassador  to G rea t Britain ,  to tell the A m erican  experts  
to be m ore  sympathetic to Ital ian requis it ions at the regu la r  meetings of the
^ R e n e  A lb re c h t -C a r r ie ,  Italy f rom  Napoleon to Mussolini  (New 
York: Columbia Univers ity  P r e s s ,  1950), p. 107.
L/
Page to Lansing, M arch  12, 1918, Lansing P a p e r s , Vol. II, p. 110.
L
Lansing to the A m bassador  in Great B r i ta in  (Walter Hines Page), 
May 16, 1918, P a p e r s  Relating to the Fore ign  Relations of the 
United States, 1918, Supplement 1: The World War (2 vols. ;
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933), Vol. I, pp. 
230-231. H ere inaf te r  r e f e r r e d  to as Fore ign  Relations Supple-^ 
ment, 1918.
^ L a n s i n g  to Page,  April  5, 1918, ibid. , p. 199.
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In te r-A ll ied  organizations.  ^  In June 1918, the United States took two
m ore  steps to aid Italy. F i r s t ,  the State Departm ent supported Italy 's
efforts  to stabilize her  exchange ra te .  One h is to r ian  has called this one
7 0of the United States '  g rea te s t  se rv ices  to Italy during World War I.
Second, in response to P a g e 's  te leg ram s ,  the government sent one in ­
fantry  reg im ent to Italy. 7  ^ This decision was formally  announced on 
June 28, 1918, the same day that  Lansing made a re la tively  strong s ta te ­
ment endorsing the Hapsburg subject nationali ties.  Thus, the Yugoslavs 
and the Ital ians were  encouraged at  the same time. 72
All of these actions indicated an I ta lo -A m erican  rapprochement,  1
but discouraging signs remained. As Page recognized, most A m ericans  
aid was symbolic. Surely one infantry reg iment would not help the Ita l ians 
v e ry  much. M oreover ,  neither  side had begun any ser ious  discussions about 
war a im s . For  the United States silence on this m a t te r  was deliberate.
Under the influence of Caporet to and the Pact of Rome, the government 
t r i ed  to keep Italy in the war  and ignored her war a im s  as  much as  Ita l ian 
m ora le  would allow. 73 Washington rea lized  that any specific d iscuss ion \
^ L a n s i n g  to Walter Hines Page,  May 16, 1918, ibid. , pp. 230-231.
See also  Lansing to Page,  June 11, 1918, ib id . , pp. 238-239, fo r  
this policy.
7°Gould, pp. 159-160.
V 1 Lansing to Page,  June 12, 1918, Fore ign  Relations Supplement 1, 
1918, Vol. I, p. 257.
7^Gould, p. 162. 
73Ibid. , p. 163.
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would reveal the incompatibili ty of Point IX of Wilson 's Four teen  Points j 
and the T rea ty  of London. They did not want a disi l lusioned Italy leaving j 
the war  a t  this t ime.
Ominously, however, th e re  were  indications that  Italy was moving 
away f rom  the P ac t  of R om e 's  conciliation of the Yugoslavs. Sonnino, the  
m a jo r  force  in Ital ian  foreign policy, had never  changed his mind. Fearing 
that  Yugoslav t e r r i t o r i a l  designs would endanger Ital ian  domination of the  
Adria tic ,  he refused to abandon the t rea ty  and endorse  the P ac t  of Rome. 
P a g e 's  r e p o r ts  to Washington made his position clear. 74
After I ta ly 's  troops managed to hold the line against  A ust r ian  fo rces  
in June 1918, the Ital ian  Cabinet began a lengthy, well-publicized discussion ) 
of war  a im s .  Sonnino's views were  opposed by Leonida Bissola ti ,  a p ro -
Yugoslav m em ber  of the Ital ian Cabinet. Orlando, though sympathetic to
7 5 'B isso la t i ' s  opinions, did not dare  contradict  Sonnino. 1 D Because  this d e ­
bate was fully reported  in the Ital ian  newspapers ,  a concerned Lansing 
asked Page in September 1918, to a sc e r ta in  the Ital ian position on Yugoslav 
cla ims. This was especially  im portant as the war was coming to a close, 
but the re  was no c larif ica tion of I ta ly 's  position. The Ital ian Cabinet i s ­
sued a contrad ic to ry  s ta tement recognizing Yugoslav asp ira t ions  but not
74Page to Lansing, May 18, 1918, Fore ign  Relations Supplement 1,
1918, Vol. I, pp. 805-806.
73Gould, pp. 163-167.
7 & L a n s i n g  t o  P a g e ,  S e p t e m b e r  7, 1918, Foreign  R e l a t i o n s  Supple­
m e n t  1, 1918, Vol. I, p .  825.
78
re t rea t ing  f rom  the T re a ty  of London. The United States was fu r the r  m is led  J  
by a Page le t te r  to Colonel House stating that Sonnino had given in to B isso -  
l a t i ' s  conci l iatory  policy. ^
Thus,  on the eve of the w a r ’s end, the United States and Italy w ere  $  
still woefully ignorant of each other.  The Ital ian government had no defin­
ite comprehension of Wilsonian diplomacy and the A m erican  position towards  
the ir  c la im s.  But they did have some clues f rom  the Fourteen  Points that 
the United States would not be entire ly  sympathetic.  F o r  its par t ,  the United 
States government had no adequate understanding of I ta ly 's  war a im s .  This 
was par tia l ly  so because  the Ital ian government was still divided on this 
issue.  Only the P a r i s  Peace  Conference revealed  the divergence between 
the two countries '  a t t i tudes  and policies.  P ag e 's  unsuccessful  a t tempts  to 
bridge the gap led to the complete collapse of his am bassador ia l  c a r e e r .
His failure  was par tia l ly  his own, but both the Ital ian government and the 
United States w ere  also  to blame.
77 Page to Lansing, September 26, 1918, ibid. , p. 826.
CHAPTER IV 
SHATTERED DREAMS, 1918-1919
World War I ended in the fall of 1918, when both A ustr ia -H ungary  and 
G ermany sued for peace.  A u s t r i a ’s f i r s t  proposal,  an appeal for a con­
fe rence  of all be l l igeren ts ,  was re jec ted  by P re s id en t  Wilson, who des ired  
a peace with a m i l i ta ry  v ictory .   ^ But when the Allies broke through the 
G erm an lines in no r thern  F rance ,  General  Ludendorff told the G erm an 
government to sue for peace.  Ludendorff apparently  hoped that  this would 
allow him to regroup the G erm an a rm y.  The A ust r ians  followed Germany, 
filing for peace on the bas is  of the Fourteen  Points on October 7, 1918.
The Allies  feared  that  Wilson would be trapped by the Centra l  Pow ers ,  
but Wilson adroit ly  handled the situation, leaving the two countries  l i t tle 
opportunity to re su m e  h o s t i l i t i e s . ^ As a resu l t  of these  negotiations, 
Wilson persuaded  the G erm ans  to depose the ir  em pero r  and democratize 
th e i r  government.  At the same time, he secured  what he believed to be 
a lm os t  complete Allied acceptance of the Fourteen  Points  as  the bas is  of 
peace.  The G erm ans  and the Allies signed an a rm is t ic e  on November 11,
^Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and Eas t  Centra l  E urope ,
1914-1918 (Princeton, New Je rsey :  P rince ton  Univers ity  P r e s s ,
T9'57), P : 319.
^Robert  H. F e r r e l l ,  A m erican  Diplomacy: A H is to ry  (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc . ,  1959), p. 297.
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1918. The war was now over and peacemaking could begin. All the v ic ­
to r ious  nations had plans for this peace.  The divergent viewpoints, how­
ever ,  w ere  never  sa ti s fac to r ily  reso lved  a t  the P a r i s  Peace  Conference. 
T he re in  lay.the tragedy of the T rea ty  of V ersa i l le s .
I. GLORIOUS EXPECTATIONS 
The bas is  of A m erican  peace plans was Wilson's Four teen  Points.
Six of these  guidelines were  general ;  they looked to the prevention of 
future w ars  by various means.  The co rners tone  of Wilson 's peace p ro ­
g ram  was Point XIV, which called for an associa t ion  of nations to provide 
collective security .  As for the conflicting Adriatic cla ims of Italy and "1 
Yugoslavia, Wilson's p ro g ram  was unclear.  Point IX of the Fourteen  
Poin ts  r e f e r r e d  to I ta ly 's  hopes: "A readjustm ent of the f ron t ie rs  of Italy
should be effected along c lea r ly  recognizable l ines of Nationality. "3 
Point X dealt with Yugoslavia: "The peoples of A ustr ia-Hungary .  . .
should be accorded  the f r e e s t  opportunity of autonomous development.
Both s ta tements  were  vague; consequently, they would cause difficulties
J
a t the peace talks unless  they were  clarif ied.
Between the t ime of the s ta tement of the Four teen  Points and the 
signing of the a rm is t ic e ,  at tempts  were  made to define the Adriatic
3Daniel M. Smith, The Great Departure :  The United States and
World War I, 1914-1920 (John Wiley and Sons, Inc . ,  1965), 
p p .103-105.
^A ddress  of the P res iden t  of the United States Delivered at a 
Joint  Session of the Two Houses of Congress ,  January  8, 1918,
P a p e r s  Relating to the Fore ign  Relations of the United States,
1918, Supplement 1: The World War (2 vols. ; Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1933), Vol. I, p. 15. H ere inaf te r-  
r e f e r r e d  to as  Fore ign  Relations -Supplement I, 1918.
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question m ore  p rec ise ly .  "The Inquiry," as  Wilson 's fact-finding com­
m iss ion  was known*assigned four m em bers  to analyze the prob lem s of 
Austr ia -H ungary .  Will iam E. Lunt of H arvard  worked on I ta ly 's  c la im s ,  
although he had no intimate knowledge of m odern  Italy.  ^ The Inquiry 
received  information about I ta ly 's  position f rom  A m bassador  Di C e l le re .
Even before  the Fourteen  Points A ddress  the group had t rea ted  I ta ly 's  
p rob lem s in some detail. I ts  m em orandum  at the t ime had balanced 
I ta ly 's  s tra teg ic  needs for defensive positions against  the ethnic compo­
sition of the population involved. As a resu l t  of its  study, the Inquiry had 
favored ceding Italy a nor thern  bo rder  consis tent with her defensive needs 
while continuing A ust r ian  dominion over the predominantly Austr ian  popu­
lation. In the eas t  the Inquiry had dealt negatively with I ta ly 's  cla ims. It 
a s s e r t e d  that the re  was no justif ication for extending Italian ru le  over the  i 
Yugoslav m ajo r ity  of the Dalmation coast and expressed  a fear of I tal ian
expansion in the Balkans. But Wilson overlooked this study and circumvented
A ^the con trovers ia l ,  complicated nature  of I ta ly 's  p rog ram  in his speech. °
F rank  I.' Cobb, editor of the New York W orld , and Walter Lippmann, 
S ecre ta ry  of the Inquiry, who was la te r  at tached  to the A m er ican  C o m m is ­
sion to Negotiate Peace ,  p repa red  a semi-offic ial  resum e of the A m erican  
position on Italy on October 1918. Their  m emorandum urged  a s t ra teg ic  ^  
nor thern  bo rder  for Italy, essentia lly  the one Italy c laimed by the T rea ty
^Lawrence E. Gelfand, The Inquiry: A m erican  P rep a ra t io n  for
Peace ,  1917-1919 (New Haven: Yale University  P r e s s ,  1963), p. 57.
6Ibid. , pp. 142-143.
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of London. ? The rep o r t  was le s s  c lea r  on I ta ly 's  e a s te rn  border .  A l­
though they advocated making both T r ie s te  and F ium e f ree  por ts ,  they 
outlined the p re c i se  boundar ies.  It also  made a s tra igh tforward  United 
States commitment to the pr incip le  of Yugoslav nationali ty and indepen­
dence.  ^ Thus,  the re  stil l remained  an ambiguity on the Adriatic  ques-  ^
t ion a t  the end of the war.
I ta ly ’s situation was no m ore  c lear .  After the April  1918. P ac t  of 
Rome, the Ital ian government appeared  to favor a policy of supporting 
the Yguoslavs' t e r r i t o r i a l  demands.  This was the policy favored by B is - j  
solati,  Nitti, and, to a ce r ta in  extent, Orlando. As a resu l t ,  the United 
States believed Italy would modify its Adriatic demands of the T rea ty  of 
London. In September 1918, the Ital ian Cabinet 's  sta tement recognizing 
the Yugoslav movement for independence strengthened th is  conviction. 
Although this policy was not supposed to be made public, the ensuing new s­
paper r e p o r ts  forced the Ita l ian  government to publicly pledge support for
the Yugoslavs. ^
Despite this apparent backing of the Yugoslavs, the Ital ian  govern­
ment and public were  divided. I ta ly 's  m i l i ta ry  situation favored a concil ­
ia to ry  policy towards the Yugoslavs before October 1918. Events during 
that  month changed the situation. During the sum m er of 1918, the Allies
^Colonel House to the Sec re ta ry  of State (Lansing), October 29,
1918, Foreign  Relations Supplement 1, 1918, p. 410.
8Ibid. , pp. 410-411.
9Mamatey, The United States and East  Centra l  Europe,  pp. 313-315.
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had continually prodded Italy to launch a m il i ta ry  offensive. Fear ing  o v e r ­
extension and another  Caporetto,  the Ital ian government reques ted  more 
m i l i ta ry  aid before initiating such a move. In late October, however, the 
Ital ian a rm y  unexpectedly broke through the demora lized A ustr ian  lines 
at  Vittorio Veneto. It was Caporetto  in r e v e r s e ;  the Ital ian a rm y  pushed
through into A ustr ia  and occupied Fiume. These '’glorious"  m i l i ta ry  vic-
’ f
to r i e s  w ere  seized upon by the v ic to ry - s ta rv ed  Ital ians.  The p r e s s  called
for the annexation of Fiume and the t e r r i t o r y  p rom ised  in the T rea ty  of 
London. ^  When the A us t r ian  Yugoslavs declared  the ir  independence and 
claimed land pledged to Italy by the London Pact ,  the Ital ian p re s s  reac ted  
violently. The newspaper s t r e s s e d  that the Yugoslavs had fought for the 
Hapsburg Monarchy against  I taly and now claimed to be Allies.  They 
fu r the r  emphasized the ungratefu lness  of the Yugoslavs to Italy, the con­
quero r  of A ustr ia .
J
The m i l i ta ry  events of October 1918, re lieved the Ital ian Cabinet ’ s 
anxiety. The government had rea l ized  that I ta ly 's  c la ims would be en-
I-dangered  if foreign troops were  stil l on he r  soil when the war ended. 1
Vittorio Veneto removed the possibil i ty  of Italy playing the 'beggar  at the j —
l^Rene A lb rech t -C a r r ie ,  Italy at the P a r i s  Peace  C onference , 
( re issued; Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1966), p. 69.
^ T h o m a s  Nelson Page to Lansing, November 15, 1918, P ape rs  
Relating to the Fore ign  Relations of the United States: The P a r i s
Peace  Conference (13 vols. ; Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1942-1947), Vol. I, p. 447. Here inaf te r  r e f e r r e d  to as 
P a r i s  Peace  Conference. Mamatey, The United States and East 
Centra l  Europe, pp. 359-360.
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peace table and caused a lengthy, well-publicized debate in the Cabinet.
On one side was the inflexible Sonnino, who rem ained  steadfastly loyal to 
his d ream  of Ital ian security  a s  defined by the T rea ty  of London. Sonnino  ^
had no des i re  to weaken his t r ea ty  by aiding the Yugoslavs. The leader  
of the opposition was Bissola ti ,  who favored a Wilsonian peace,  conci l ia ­
tion of the Yugoslavs, and annexation of Fiume. In the middle was Orlando, 
sympathetic to B isso la ti  but afra id  of openly defying Sonnino. The debate
lasted  until January  1919, and revealed  the division of the Ital ian policy- j  ~
1 ?m akers ,  a split that was never effectively reconciled.
Page symbolized the two ir reconc ileab le  elements of I ta lo -A m erican  
re la tions .  His beliefs ref lec ted  the difference between Wilsonian in te r ­
nationalism and Italian  nationalism. To his personal f rus tra t ion  he was 
never able to unite these  two d ispara te  s trands  of thought. Because of J
these  divisions his d ream  of a c loser  postwar rapport  between Italy and 
the United States was shattered.
Like Wilson, Page wished to see the end of w ars  fought for t e r r i ­
to r ia l  gain. He was confident that the United States could accomplish  
this.  Wilson’s m ora l  leadersh ip  and the p res t ige  and power of the United 
States would bring a jus t  peace to prevent future w ars .  This could be 
achieved by d isarm ing  Germany, making her pay war repara t ions ,  and 
creating  a League of Nations to c rea te  an international dialogue and
l^ A lb r e c h t -C a r r i e , Italy at the P a r i s  Peace  Conference , 
pp. 70-73.
1maintain  world peace.
Page also accepted  the contradic tory  position of supporting much of 
I ta ly ’s nationalist ic cla ims. He believed that  the United States, especia lly  
P re s id en t  Wilson, did not understand the nature  and s trength of I tal ian 
demands. In his l e t t e r s  to Wilson, House, and Lansing, he sought to 
explain Italy. He believed that her  nor thern  c la im s were  based  on s tra teg ic  
necess ity .  14 On the other hand, her  des ire  for Adria tic  t e r r i t o r y  showed 
he r  nationalism, her  hopes for future national g rea tness .  ^  To Italy the 
peace rep resen ted  a means of expressing  her  national power and com ple t­
ing her  t e r r i to r i a l  ambitions.  The F rench  rega rded  Alsace and L o r ra in e  
a s  symbols of F rench  security;  s imilar ly ,  the Ital ians  considered T ren t 
and T r ie s te  as  essentia l  to I ta ly 's  future success .  16
Page did not recognize the incongruity of his two opinions. Although J 
he wanted an associa t ion  of nations to prevent war,  he did not rea l ize  he 
supported c la im s that might ve ry  well c rea te  another war .  If Italy were  
to rece ive  all  that she had asked  for in the T rea ty  of London plus Fiume, 
a future war was very  probable.  The Yugoslavs could not support any 
t r e a ty  denying the ir  in te res ts .  Tension a l ready  existed between Italy and 
the Yugoslavs, who were  outraged by the well-publ icized repo r ts  of I ta ly 's
^ P a g e ,  "Simple P roposit ions,  " undated ms (probably writ ten  in 
December ,  1916), Thomas Nelson Page Collection, Duke Univer­
sity. Here inaf te r  r e f e r r e d  to as  Page Collection.
^ P a g e  to House, October 29, 1918, Page Collection.
15Ibid.
^ P a g e  to House, October 25, 1918, Page Collection.
17intentions to seize the lands p rom ised  to her  by the London Pact.
On the eve of the p r e - a r m i s t i c e  negotiation, I ta lo -A m erican  r e ­
lations were  uncertain.  Wilson 's p ro g ram  was unclear ,  but the Fourteen  
Points  did not indicate much sympathy for the Ital ian position. I ta ly 's
p ro g ra m  was even le ss  apparent.  Her cabinet was divided over such 
fundamental is sues  as  the T rea ty  of London and the annexation of Fiume. 
But a growing spir i t  of I tal ian nat ionalism prom ised  a t im e when not even 
the T rea ty  of London would suffice to satisfy  the people. Taken together, 
these  p rog ram s  seemed to be on a collision course  in late October.  That 
they did not produce sparks  at this t ime was the re su l t  of a b lu rr ing  of 
differences in two dist inct episodes:  the p re -A rm is t i c e  meetings of Octo­
be r  1918, and Wilson 's v isi t  to Italy in Decem ber  1918.
2. LOST OPPORTUNITIES: THE PRE-ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
AND WILSON'S ITALIAN VISIT
There  were  two chances for the two governments to recognize and 
frankly d iscuss  the ir  dif ferences  in the months before the actual  opening 
of the P a r i s  Peace  Conference.  The f i r s t  of these  occu rred  in late October
17Mamatey, The United States and East  Central  Europe,  p. 360.
18'Wilson seemed to be but of sympathy with much of I ta ly 's  cla ims 
at this t ime. In an October 16, 1918 interview with Sir William 
Wiseman, a B r i t i sh  journa l is t ,  he said that he favored a s e t t le ­
ment on the bas is  of se lf -dete rm ination .  This indicated that he 
would work against  much of what Italy wanted, for most of this 
land was populated either with Yugoslavs or A ustr ian  Germans.  
John L. Snell (e. . ), "Wilson on Germany and the Fourteen  Poin ts ,  ' 
Journal of Modern History,  XXVI (December,  1954), p. 367.
1918, when P res id en t  Wilson sent Colonel House to P a r i s  to rep resen t  
the United States on the Supreme War Council. House 's  m iss ion  was to 
get Allied acceptance of the F our teen  Points as  a bas is  for peace.  At the 
meetings of the Supreme War Council House was perhaps too eager  to 
secure  Allied pledges supporting the Fourteen  Points.  He t r ied  to avoid 
specific is sues  likely to produce conflict. He believed these  could be 
d iscussed  m ore  advantageously a t  the Peace  Conference.  House t r ied  to 
gloss over differences with Italy. He had l i tt le knowledge of, and in te re s t  
in, the Adria tic  question. ^  He and Wilson considered Germany the 
enemy; consequently, I ta l ian objections to the Fourteen  Points,  som et im es  
vehemently expressed  by Sonnino and Orlando, were  b rushed  as ide  as i r ­
re levant.  After al l,  I ta ly 's  enemy was Austr ia .  On November 5, 1918, 
a form al Allied note was sent to Wilson. As it contained only B r i t ish  r e s ­
ervations to the Fourteen  Points,  Wilson assum ed  that I taly had no m ajo r  
objections. House 's  cables to Wilson failed to convey the substance,  in ­
tensi ty ,  and formal nature  of I ta ly 's  d isagreement.  Thus Wilson did not
2 0know of Sonnino's position until he a r r iv e d  in P a r i s  in December of 1918.
House a lso  ag reed  to a proposal by B r i t ish  P r im e  M inis ter  Lloyd 
George that the m ili ta ry  t e rm s  of A ustr ia -H ungary 's  a rm is t ic e  be p repa red  
and presen ted  without consulting Wilson. He agreed  to t e r m s  that  were not
^ M a m a te y ,  The United States and East  Centra l  Eu rope , p. 360.
^^Ibid. , pp. 36-362. John Wells Gould, "Italy and the United 
States, 1914-1918: Background to Confronta tion ,"  (unpublished 
Ph. D. d isserta t ion ,  Dept, of History,  Yale University ,  1969), 
pp. 177-181.
m e re ly  mil i ta ry .  A r tic le  III of the a rm is t ic e  provided for the m ili ta ry  
occupation of the t e r r i to r y  ass igned  to Italy by the T re a ty  of London.
House approved this t e r m  because it did not mention the T rea ty  of Lon­
don by name, but by allowing Italy to occupy this land he was granting 
the t r e a ty ’s intent. F u r th e rm o re ,  he did not tel l  Wilson about this. 
Genera l  T ask e r  H. B liss  of the Supreme War Council also  saw the t e rm s  
and did not ra i s e  any objections. The State Department,  aw are  of the
a r m i s t i c e ' s  contents, did not p ro tes t  i ts  provisions or inform Wilson of
21them. And yet Wilson had no intention of honoring the trea ty .
The resu l t s  of House 's  diplomacy were  unfortunate.  House had not 
secured  Ital ian assen t  to Point IX, and he had c rea ted  a g rea t  deal of con­
fusion. Because  he did not hear  to the contra ry ,  Wilson believed that 
Italy had ag reed  to the F our teen  Points,  including Point IX, explicitly j - 
in the G erm an a rm is t ic e  and implicit ly in the Austro -Hungar ian  a r m i s ­
t ice.  This was one of the guiding assumptions of the A m erican  experts
2 ?during the P a r i s  P eace  Conference. On the other hand, Italy a ssum ed  
the opposite, that she had accepted  the Fourteen  Points  with specific ^
21Mamatey, The United States and East  Centra l  Europe, pp. 362- 
364. Gould, pp. 182-184.
22 In December ,  1918, David Hunter M iller,  one of the Inquiry 's  
leading experts,  wrote to General  T aske r  H. Bliss  that  although 
there  had been no fo rm al modification of the T re a ty  of London, 
I tal ian acceptance  of the Fourteen  Points indicated a modif ica­
tion of the t rea ty  where  it was inconsis tent with the Fourteen  
Points.  M iller to B liss ,  December 13, 1918, P a r i s  Peace  Con- 
ference ,  Vol. I, p. 413.
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re se rva t ions  about Point IX. F u r th e rm o re ,  her poli ticians believed that
23A rt ic le  III was an implicit  recognition of the T rea ty  of London,
Between November 1918 and December  1918, the tension grew worse .  
The Adriatic  question exploded over the question of the disposal of the A u s ­
t r i a n  fleet. On October 30, 1918, the A ustr ians  turned  over the ir  navy to 
the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslavs, in turn,  sent a note to Wilson implying 
that the ships would be given to the United States, G reat Brita in ,  or F rance ,  
but not to Italy. ^  The Ital ians  were  ex tremely  angry  over this .  If any 
of the Allied fleets met the Yugoslavs as  equals,  it would indicate i s im i­
la r  t rea tm en t  a t  the peace table. The Ital ian government p ro tes ted  any 
such action, arguing that Italy considered the Yugoslavs as  enem ies  who 
could not be thought of as fr iends  m ere ly  because  they dropped the ir  a l l e ­
giance to A ustr ia .
At the same time, I tal ian  troops occupied the t e r r i t o r y  assigned in } 
the T rea ty  of London and t rea ted  it as the ir  own. Italy t r i ed  to use  its 
A m er ican  regim ent to give an In ter-A ll ied  ch a rac te r  to the occupation.
The reg im ent was divided into battalions and accompanied Ital ian  troops 
into F iume and Cattaro .  Although the A m erican  so ld ie rs  were  actually 
under Ital ian control , they w ere  brought along to give the im press ion  of 
United States approval of the occupation. When S ecre ta ry  of War Baker j 
heard  about this, he o rdered  A m er ican  troops  out of the a r e a  and back to
23oould, pp. 89-91.
^ P a g e  to Lansing, November 2, 1918, Fore ign  Relations Supple­
ment 1, 1918, Vol. I, p. 862.
2 ^Page to Lansing, November 15, 1918, P a r i s  Peace  Conference ,
Vol. I, p. 448.
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2 6F rance  under General  P e r s h in g 's  com pany .
But House again managed.to confuse the issue .  P r io r  to B aker 's  
o rde r ,  he had conferred  with Fa ther  Korosek, a leader  of the Yugoslav 
National Countil. Korosek had urgently  asked for A m erican  troops  in the 
t roubled Adriatic  a rea .  Because Orlando had also asked  for American  
fo rces ,  House thought it safe to ag ree  to K orosek ’s reques ts .  He rece ived  
Wilson’s consent and asked General  Persh ing  for troops.  Persh ing  r e -  
pli ed that A m er ican  so ld ie rs  were  a l ready  stationed in the Adria tic  and 
waived his c la im  to them. Thus,  the A m erican  regiment rem ained  in the 
Adria tic ,  serving I ta ly 's  purposes .  This bla tant m isuse  of A m erican  
fo rces  ceased only when General  B liss  received  Wilson's approval to
O  ' 7
withdraw them  from  the Ital ian command.
During these  months, Page had one m ajor  purpose in mind: to con - - ]
vince the P re s id en t  to vis i t  Italy before  the beginning of the Peace  Confer­
ence. 2'8 He wrote several  l e t t e r s  to House and Lansing about the d e s i r -  j 
ability of such a journey. Wilson's tr ip  would be beneficial in several  
ways. F i r s t ,  it  would im m easu rab ly  improve I ta lo -A m erican  re lations.  
Second, Page believed that  Italy would feel slighted if Wilson came to P a r i s /
2 6Mamatey, The United States and East  Centra l  Europe , pp. 366-367.
^^Ibid. , pp. 367-368. B liss  to Wilson, Decem ber  23, 1918, P a r i s  
Peace  Conference , Vol. II, pp. 337-338.
28 F lorence  G. Speranza (ed. ), The Diary of Gino Speranza: I taly, 
1915-1919, (2 vols. ; New York: Columbia University  P r e s s ,
1941), Vol. II, pp. 209-210.
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and not to Italy. ^
Ear ly  rep l ies  to P age 's  reques ts  failed to give any positive plans 1  
for a v isi t  to Italy. Lansing wrote that the P re s id en t  had made no plans 
to come to Rome, although he believed that he might possibly do so b e ­
fore his re tu rn  to the United States. 30 Page replied,  "P lease  say to the __
P res iden t  for me: 'F o r  heavens sake don't come to Europe without v i s i t ­
ing Italy before  re turn ing home. '"31 He believed that  the Yugoslav q u e s ­
tion -was getting out of hand and wanted Wilson to get some f irs t-hand  i n ­
formation about the situation. Because he did not hear  anything more from 
the State Department,  he believed it n ece ssa ry  to go to P a r i s  to see the  ^
P res iden t .  "All I taly looks to the Ambassador  to make cer ta in  that Wilson 
will v is i t  Italy, " wrote Gino Speranza, P ag e 's  poli tical analyst.  32 I
When Wilson a r r iv e d  in P a r i s  on Decem ber  14, 1918, Page,  Sonnino, 
and Orlando were  waiting for him. The talks between Wilson and the two
^ P a g e  to Lansing, November 19, 1918, P a r i s  Peace  Conference ,
Vol. L, p. 137. Page to House, November 19, 1918, Page Col­
lection.  At this t ime F ranco-I ta l ian  re la tions were  bad. Italy 
blamed the F rench  for s t i r r ing  up the Yugoslavs. Many Italians 
believed that  F rance  was taking steps to deprive Italy of land 
p rom ised  her in the T rea ty  of London. Page believed that I taly 
would resen t  Wilson 's meeting with the Allies in P a r i s ,  F r a n c e ' s  
capital,  un less  he visi ted Rome, I ta ly 's  capital. Ibid.
30■ Lansing to Page,  November 26, 1918, P a r i s  Peace  Conference ,
Vol. I, pp. 141-142.
3-lpage to Lansing, November 27, 1918, ibid. , p. 142.
32gperanza  D iary , Vol. II, pp. 209-210.
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Ital ians  were  very  vague. Because only Sonnino knew how to speak Eng­
lish,  Wilson received a d is to r ted  view of what Italy wanted. The Fore ign  
M inis te r  had been warned in advance by Page not to mention the T rea ty
t -
of London and to emphasize Ital ian  security  instead. Sonnino followed 
this advice, leading Wilson to believe that Fiume was not a necessa ry  
pa r t  of I ta ly 's  demands. 33 Deeply in te res ted  in the Adriatic  question, 
Wilson decided to pay official v is i t s  to London and Rome when the Con- ) " 
ference was delayed until January .  34 Page was pleased to hear this and 
re tu rned  to Rome on December  22 to p repa re  for the P re s id e n t ' s  visit.
Unfortunately, Wilson 's t r ip  accomplished very  l ittle.  Accompanied ? 
by Page,  who met him at  the Ital ian border ,  he a r r iv e d  in Rome on the 
morning of January  3, 1919. He was met at  the ra i l road  station by King 
Victor Emmanuel III. That af ternoon he went to a luncheon, addressed  the 
Ital ian  P ar l iam en t ,  v is i ted  with a deputation f rom  the Quirinal, and r e ­
ceived the citizenship of Rome. The following day he toured Rome, v i s ­
ited the Pope, at tended an official luncheon at  the A m erican  Embassy, 
talked with the King, and left Rome. 35 Because of this hectic schedule, 
th e re  was l i ttle t ime to c larify  problems by any h e a r t - to -h e a r t  talks w i th j  
Sonnino or  Orlando.
J J XXX, "Fiume, L 'A dria tique , et Les  Rapports F ran co - I ta l ien s , " 
Revue des Deux Mondes, LXI, No. 2 (15 January ,  1921), p. 365.
^ A l b r e c h t - C a r r i e ,  Italy a t  the P a r i s  Peace  Conference,  p. 81.
3 5j\]-ew York T im e s , January  3, 4, 5, 6, 1919, p. 1.
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By this  t ime, however, the P res iden t  probably had a good idea of 
what Italy wanted. His purpose for making the t r ip  was to sound out the ^  
strength  of his sympath izers .  He knew that B isso la t i  was his m ajor  
defender in the Ital ian Cabinet, 36 and he needed to m easu re  the Ita l ian 
m in i s t e r ' s  support. P ag e 's  m essages  had indicated that  B is so la t i ' s  fol-
• 2 7
lowing was small ,  and Ray Stannard Baker,  who had visi ted  Italy ea r ly  
the p r io r  month, had been discouraged by the strength of the anti-W ilson 
fo rces  in Italy. But only a personal visi t could c la r ify  this, thought 
Wilson. 38
On the other hand, the Ital ian government was dete rmined  to block 
Wilson f rom  encouraging and mixing with the Bissola ti  movement.  B i s ­
so la t i ' s  res ignation  on December  28, 1918, had publicly d ram atized  the 
conflict within the Cabinet. The government did not want any m ore  trouble  
on the eve of the Conference.  The methods it used to prevent Wilson f rom  
meeting with the Italian people were  outrageous and deceitful. When the j ^  
P res id en t  was on his way to the Chamber of Deputies, he was told that  
his motorcade would stop at the P iazza  Venezia so he could a d d re ss  the 
people. Instead,  he was whisked away to the P a r l iam en t ,  leaving thousands
3 bActually, B isso la t i  had resigned by this t ime, but this was done 
af te r  Wilson had made his plans. And Bissola ti  still had a 
significant following.
3^Page to the Comm ission  to Negotiate Peace ,  December 28, 1918, 
P a r i s  Peace  Conference,  Vol. I, p. 470.
3 ftJOArne J.  Mayer, Poli t ics  and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Con­
tainment and Counterrevolution at  V ersa i l le s ,  1918-1919 (New
York: Alfred  A. Knopf, Inc. , 1967), pp. 211-212.
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of people, including Page,  waiting in the P iazza  for him. On the evening [ 
of his depar tu re ,  he was supposed to speak to the people f rom  the balcony 
of the Quirinal . When he s ta r ted  to go out, he was informed that there  
was no audience. Actually, this was t rue ,  but only because Ital ian sol­
d ie rs  had prevented anyone f rom  coming near .  After he left Rome, the 
Italian government c ircula ted  false repo r ts  that Wilson had a phobia for 
c r o w d s  and that  it had fea red  that someone might throw a bomb. ^9 
But Wilson was convinced that the people supported him. His 
tremendous reception in Italy led to his belief that  the Ital ians favored a 
Wilsonian peace. He should have rem em b ered  that  both Page and Baker 
had e a r l ie r  s t r e s s e d  the r i s e  of a sp iri t  of im p e r ia l i sm  in Italy.
Since he did not a s s e s s  the p roblem rea l is t ica l ly  and because  the govern-
/ ^
ment had l imited-his contact with the Ital ian people, he re tu rned  to P a r i s  < 
with the idea that he had won an unofficial contest  with Orlando and Son­
nino. This mis taken im press ion  inspired  him to make a costly blunder
in April 1919, when he appealed to the Ital ian  public on the question of 
Fiume.
^ Speranza D iary , Vol. II, pp. 238-239.
40pa ge to House, November 15, 1918, P a r i s  Peace  Conference, 
Vol. I, p. 448. Gould, p. 352.
41 Gould, p. 352. This im press ion  was probably re inforced  by 
P ag e 's  m essages ,  which stated that a f te r  Wilson 's visit , Son­
nino appeared m ore  willing to compromise.  He also  told of 
the Ital ian en thusiasm for Wilson. Page to Commission to 
Negotiate Peace ,  January  7, 1919, P a r i s  Peace  Conference, 
Vol. I, pp. 153-154.
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3. BASIC POSITIONS AND AMBASSADORIAL FAILURE 
If Sonnino and Orlando appeared  to o b se rv e rs  as  a smoothly function - j  
ing diplomatic team, it was only a surface il lusion that  hid the hopeless 
division of the two men. They did not ag ree  on what they were  fighting for.  
Sonnino did not rea l ize  that A u s t r ia ' s  total defeat had changed I ta ly 's  p o s i ­
tion by destroying the old balance of power. Unprepared to accept Wil­
sonian diplomacy, he re fused  to acknowledge the pr incip les  of the F o u r ­
teen  Points.  But his policy was quite unrea l is t ic  in severa l  ways. He did 
not do anything about I ta ly 's  financial dependence on the United States, a l ­
though this position might endanger Ita ly 's  c la ims. He a lso  did not rea l ize  
that his " rea l i s t ic "  policy of 1915 had become outmoded by 1919. A us t r ia -  
Hungary no longer existed, and internally divided Yugoslavia was no th rea t  
to  I ta ly 's  security .  But Sonnino refused to recons ide r  his ideas and re -  j  
mained devoted to his T re a ty  of London.
The only rea l is t ic  man in the Ital ian government was Bissolat i .  He 
accepted A m erican  power in European diplomacy and believed Wilson's 
p ro g ra m  was beneficial  to I tal ian in te res ts .  He favored a League of Na­
tions to pro tec t  the weaker  countries like Italy and wanted to abandon the 
T rea ty  of London to facil itate an I ta lo -A m erican  alignment.  He also 
thought that  r igid adherence  to the London Pact would c rea te  a Slav i r -  
r eden t ism  that  would drag Italy into future w ars .  Willing to modify these  
demands,  he wished to concentra te  on Fiume. But the powerful, unreal is t ic
42Gould, pp. 270-279.
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I tal ian des i re  for security  in the Adriatic and SonninoTs stubborness  caused 
Bisso la ti  to res ign  on December  29, 1918. His subsequent at tempts  to e x ­
plain publicly his policy were  shouted down. The Ital ian people were too
43land-hungry to l i s ten  to his  sane, rea l is t ic  program .
Orlando meanwhile c rea ted  the Ital ian  in te re s t  in Fiume by sending 
in Ita l ian troops on November 2, 1918, and ordering a fu l l - sca le  occupa­
tion of the city two weeks la te r .  He had logical reasons  for desiring Fiume, ^4 
and was willing to modify the T rea ty  of London to obtain it. But he was u n ­
willing to r isk  a b reak  with his Foreign  M in is ter ,  whose poli tical support 
was n ec e ssa ry  for the survival of his coalition government. Instead, he 
t r i ed  to whip up public en thusiasm  for Fiume to coerce  Sonnino to abandon 
some of his Adriatic demands.  His policy backfired,  however, when Sonnino 
refused  to back down. Because  of the newly crea ted  fe rvor  for Fiume, the 
Ital ian peace delegation went to P a r i s  badly divided. Most of i ts  m em bers  
w ere  willing to b a r te r  Dalmatia for Fiume; Sonnino wished to drop Fiume 
but r igidly stuck to his o f t -exp ressed  position on the T rea ty  of London. 
Meanwhile, newspapers  and the Ital ian public c lamored for  both Fiume and 
the T rea ty  of London. Sonnino refused to budge, but Orlando did not da re  
to confront his uncompromising Foreign  Minis ter.  As a resu l t ,  the I t a l ­
ian delegation ended in a deadlock and, swayed by the rep o r ts  of fervent
" ^ C h r i s t o p h e r  Seton-Watson, Italy f rom  L ib e ra l i sm  to F a s c i s m , 
1870-1925 (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd. , 1967), pp. 508-509.
^^Sonnino' s reasons  were :  (1) to redeem  Italians living there;
(2) to annex an a re a  he felt economically n e c e ssa ry  to Italy;
(3) to allow Italy to pene t ra te  the Centra l  European vacuum 
caused by the decline of Austr ia-Hungary .  Gould, pp. 301-302.
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annexationism back home, claimed both Fiume and Dalmatia.
Meanwhile, the A m erican  position was gradually defined. After his ) 
t r ip  to London and Rome, Wilson worked on the Italian problem. Three  
m ajo r  p re-Conference  repo r ts  influenced the A m erican  p rog ram .  The 
f i r s t  was the Cobb-Lippmann m em orandum  p repared  for Colonel House 
before the P r e -A r m is t i c e  negotiations. The second was an Inquiry study 
of the s tra teg ic  nature of the A ustro -I ta lian  fron tie r  writ ten  by the famed 
geographer  Ellen Churchil l  Semple. Third  was a December 12, 1918 p r o ­
posal p repa red  by the Inquiry’s Italy "exper t ,  " William Lunt, at  the P r e s i ­
dent’s request .  The Inquiry’s tentative r ep o r t  of January  21, 1919, in- 
corpora ted  a lm ost al l  of the ir  recommendat ions.
The Inquiry 's  mem orandum  dealt with two major  problem s. The 
f i r s t  was I ta ly 's  no r thern  border .  Both Semple 's  repo r t  and the Cobb- 
Lippman p ro g ra m  urged concess ions to Italy. M ili tary  adv iso rs  ag reed  
that  I ta ly 's  s tra tegic  needs w arran ted  consideration.  The final advice was 
to "give Italy all  that par t  of the Tyrol to which she has any jus t  c la im  on — 
linguistic,  cultural ,  or h is to r ica l  grounds. It was believed that  this
adjustment would make the League of Nations’ job eas ie r  and its success  
m ore  probable by discouraging future G erm an aggress ion .  I ta ly 's
4 ^A lbrech t-C arr ie ,  Italy at  the P a r i s  Peace  Conference , pp. 89-90.
48Gelfand, pp. 221-224.
4 ^Outline of Tentative Recommendation, January  21, 1919, as  
quoted in Gelfand, p. 224.
48Ibid.
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A dria tic  c la im s, the second problem, were  modified. The experts  re jec ted  ' 
the T rea ty  of London line because  it violated Yugoslav nationali ty and because 
Italy had no close economic t ie s  with the a r e a s  she claimed. The final r e ­
por t  conceded Italy a few por ts  for  national secur ity  but denied any c la im  
over Fiume on the grounds the city was vital to Yugoslavia 's  economy and 
future growth. The rep o r t  concluded that if Italy were  given all her  A d r ia ­
tic demands,  she would dominate the en ti re  a r e a ,  a situation detr im enta l  
to Yugoslav security .  ^9
Acting on this repor t ,  Wilson came up with his own plan. F a r  f rom  ^  
being uncompromising on the Ital ian  question, he re ta ined a great  deal of 
f lexibility. He knew that he had to deal with Ital ian nat ionalism, p e r s o n ­
a l i t ies  of the Conference ,  d e s i re s  of new nations,  and plans of other s t a t e s ­
men. Thus, he was willing to yield more  to Italy than what the Inquiry 
recommended. And in making up his mind, he sought other advice. He j  
had talked with Orlando and Sonnino before visit ing Rome. At the Ital ian 
capital he had conferred  with Bissola ti  and had tes ted  public opinion.
He had also  l i stened intently to the counsel of H. Wickham Steed, a 
B r i t i sh  journa l is t  with in timate knowledge of Italy and Yugoslavia. ^0 
He neglected only one source ,  his Ambassador  to Italy. Why did he ig- > ^ 
nore  Page,  who had so much knowledge of the Ita l ian situation?
P ag e 's  opinions were  regarded  with suspicion f rom  the very  beginning 
by the A m erican  Commiss ion.  Before it came to P a r i s ,  Page had cabled
^ G o u ld ,  pp. 363-369. 
SOlbid. , p .  378.
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the State Department for p e rm is  sion. to meet with Wilson on the l a t t e r ' s  
a r r iv a l .  The State Departm ent reac ted  with l i t t le en thusiasm  to th is  r e ­
quest.  Only af te r  he appealed to Colonel House did he rece ive  the nece ssa ry  
approval.  51 When he talked to Wilson about Italy, the re  w ere  indications  ^
that the two men d isagreed. ~^
Many of the Comm ission  m e m b ers  believed that  Page was too p ro -  /  " 
I tal ian  to be objective. General  T aske r  M. B liss ,  the leading m ili ta ry  
advisor  of the A m erican  Commission,  observed, "It seem s to me that Mr. 
Page like near ly  all  A m ericans  in Italy, simply make them selves  (sic) 
mouthpieces  of I tal ian wishes.  Ray Stannard Baker  wrote House that
Page had succumbed to I ta ly 's  official views and had lost  touch with rea l  
I ta l ian popular opinion. A s  the Conference continued, his daily reports,  
heavily dependent on the work of Gino Speranza, made l i t t le im press ion .
The C om m iss ioners  and A m erican  intell igence officers had long considered 
Speranza to be an uncrit ica l  Italophile and believed that Page was under his 
a id e 's  influence. ^  In F eb ru a ry  1919, two of P ag e 's  te le g ra m s  on F ran co -  
Ita l ian re la tions  came before  a meeting of the C om m iss ioners  with this
Sllbid. , p. 375.
52Sp eranza  D ia ry , Vol. II, p. 233.
Cl
Bliss  Diary as  quoted in David F. T rask ,  "General  T ask e r  Howard 
Bliss  and the 'Sessions of the World, ' 1919, " T ransac t ions  of the 
A m er ican  Philosophical  Society, Vol. L.VI, P a r t  8 (1966), p. 21.
54Gould, p. 37 5.
~^~*Ibid. , p. 68.
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reaction: "The C om m iss ioners  were  amused by the apparent d iscrepancy
e  Z.
and the conclusions were  not too flat tering to A mbassador  Page.  "
P a r t  of the C om m iss ion 's  opinion of Page was justified. In late 1918 ^  
Page expressed  opinions consis tently backing Ital ian c la ims, especially  to 
F ium e. ^  In the Yugoslav-Italian dispute of November, he continually 
blamed the Yugoslavs for causing the problem. Undoubtedly he was 
strongly influenced by Gino Speranza. As Speranza noted in his diary,
"He t r u s t s  my judgment la rgely ,  if not wisely, because  he t r u s t s  my af- 
fection and loyalty. "59 Speranza favored maximum concessions  to Italy 
and Page concurred.
If anything, Page became even m ore  of an advocate of I tal ian in t e r ­
es ts  in the months between Wilsonrs v is i t  to Rome and the April  explosion 
over  Fiume. In his l e t t e r s  he distinguished between the Ital ian people and  ^^ 
the ir  government, making it c lea r  that he wanted jus tice  only for the fo rm er .  
He believed that  they had en tered  the war  to l ibe ra te  I talians living under ^  
A ustr ian  rule and had continued fighting despite tremendous hardships .
They quite justly  re sen ted  being put on the same plane as  the Yugoslavs, 
who "were  but yes te rday  A ust r ians  engaged in the act  of destroying with
3DC hris t ian  H er te r  to Joseph  Grew, F e b ru a ry  12, 1919, as  quoted 
in Gould, p. 376.
c 7
Page to Colonel House, November 15, 1918, P a r i s  Peace  C onfer­
ence , Vol. I, p. 447.
^ P a g e  to Lansing, November 14, 1918, ibid. , Vol. II, p. 293.
Page unwittingly aided the Ital ian government 's  deception by 
urging that A m erican  troops  not be withdrawn f rom  Italy.
Page to Lansing, November 26, 1918, ibid. , p. 314. Page 
to Lansing, November 27, 1918, ibid. , p. 316..
5 9 ^  ranza  D iary , Vol. II, p. 210.
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joy Ital ians  and Italian vil lages.  . . . Although he said he favored a ^
Yugoslav state, he did not believe in putting them  on the same level as  
the Ital ians.  He would render  jus tice  by allowing Italy to redeem  her land, 
including Fiume, and to provide for her security .
He was ex t rem ely  apprehensive about what would happen if Italy did 
not receive  essentia lly  what she asked for. In the f i r s t  place, he believed  ^
I tal ians would blame the United States for blocking her demands and siding 
with her enemy, the Yugoslavs. All hopes for any I ta lo -Am erican  rappor t  
would then be lost . ^2 Second, he also feared  that if Orlando and Sonnino 
did not succeed in appeasing Ital ian public opinion, the ir  government would 
fall, paving the way for in ternal revolution and, possibly, Bolshevism. j 
The results,  he believed, would be d isas t rous ,  for the future of Europe, 
and the League of Nations. ^3 Thus, his sympathy for the Italians, his 
re liance  on Speranza,  his incomplete conception of collective security,  ) ^  
and his des i re  to avoid a serious  I ta lo -A m erican  argument led him to 
advocate a p ro g ram  favorable to Italy.
But even if he was an Italophile, his repo r ts  should have received
An° Page to Arthur  Hugh F r a z ie r ,  M arch  4, 1919, Page Collection.
^*Jbid. , Page to House, M arch  15, 1919, Page to Lansing, April 
22, 1919, Page to Lansing, April 23, 1919, Page to Major 
Stephen Bensal,  M arch  10, 1919, Page Collection.
^ P a g e  to House, April  17, 1919, Page Collection.
k^Page to House, M arch 15, 1919, M arch  28, 1919, April  19, 
1919, April  22, 1919, Page Collection.
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m ore  careful scrutiny by the Commission and Wilson. Speranza was an  
able commentator on Ital ian p re s s  and public opinion. During these months, 
his repo r ts ,  as  t ransm it ted  by Page to P a r i s ,  c lear ly  noted the rising tide 
of I tal ian annexationism. They were  important not for what they advocated 
but ra the r  for what they descr ibed. If Wilson had been accura te ly  informed 
of the ir  contents, he would have rea l ized  that  one of his fundamental p r e ­
m ise s  was wrong. The Ital ian public would not support his p rog ram  if it  ^
did not include Fiume. It would not support any public declaration  to give 
up Fiume, no m a t te r  how ra tionally  such a request  might be presented.
Thus forewarned, he could have avoided one of his biggest  poli tical b lun­
ders ,  the April Appeal to the Ital ian people.
4. THE QUESTION OF FIUME: EXPLOSION AND REACTION'
The question of I ta ly 's  c la ims was of secondary importance  to the ) ^  
P a r i s  Peace  Conference and was not considered at any length until April
1919. Before  that the concern was with the League of Nations and with 
the difficult questions of the disposit ion of G erm any 's  colonies, the F rench  
demand for security ,  the d isa rm am ent  of Germany, and repara t ions .  All 
of these  involved long discuss ions ,  constant bickering,  and frequent c o m ­
prom ise s .  By the time I ta ly 's  problems were  d iscussed, nerves  were 
frayed  and tem pers  short. In pa r t icu la r ,  the overburdened Wilson was 
t i red  and ill. In ear ly  April  he suffered what was then diagnosed as  an 
at tack  of influenza. At le a s t  one medical  expert  bel ieves  that Wilson had 
actually suffered a minor  stroke with some resultant vascu la r  damage
and behaviora l  changes, an omen of his l a te r  m ajor  stroke, in October 1919.
It was in such a setting that the question of Fiume was considered.  
With i ts  continuing fixation on the Adriatic  problem, the Ital ian  delegation 
rem ained  deadlocked. Sonnino was not in te res ted  in the League of Nations 
or  the changing s t ruc tu re  of world power except when I ta ly 's  in te re s ts  
were  d irec tly  involved. His own concentration on t e r r i t o r i a l  i s su es  led 
h im to ignore the economic and financial aspec ts  of the peace,  features  
vital to I ta ly 's  future. Unlike Sonnino, Orlando 's poli tical support was 
tenuous and dependent on his ability to get Fiume. Popular demand for 
F ium e, which Orlando had helped c rea te ,  was out of control; if Orlando 
could not p rocure  Fiume, his government would fall. His only rea l is t ic  
chance was to abandon the T rea ty  of London, but he could not afford to 
b reak  with Sonnino, whose poli tical backing was n ece ssa ry  for his govern­
ment. In br ie f ,  he was trapped. The resu l t  was diplomatic para lys is ,  
not I tal ian wiliness.  The indecisive Italians found i t  impossible  to accept 
any t e rm s ,  so they re jec ted  them  all. ^5
In April,  Wilson had a f i rm  program . The A m erican  delegation had 
begun to split in March. Most of the t e r r i t o r i a l  exper ts  supported the ir  
e a r l i e r  p roposals ,  but Colonel House and Dr. Sidney Mezes ,  D irec to r  of 
the Technical  Experts ,  favored a more  concil ia tory  policy towards the
64Edwin A. Weinstein, "Woodrow Wilson's Neurological I l lness,  " 
Journa l of A m erican  History,  LVII, (September,  1970), pp. 
339-345.
^ M a y e r ,  pp. 679-681. Gould, p. 12.
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Ital ians.  ^6 Again, Wilson carefully considered all his maps and rep o r ts  
and decided against  the House group. He had a l ready  p rom ised  most of 
I ta ly ’s nor thern  bo rde r  to Sonnino,.^7 but said that otherwise he would a c ­
cept the exper ts '  proposals .  He made one fu r ther  exception to this p r o ­
gram; he was willing to allow F iume status as  an international port  r a th e r  
than ceding it to Yugoslavia. 6*3 His position was re la tively  flexible. He 
could com prom ise  on Fiume, and he had severa l  possible boundary l ines  
to divide the Adriatic  t e r r i to ry .  F u r th e rm o re ,  he had the final r e s o r t  of 
threatening to reduce economic aid to Italy. ^9 But he failed to reckon 
with Ital ian  stubborness and division. Even the potential financial th rea t  
was not sufficient to deter  Sonnino.
The Ital ian question was considered secre t ly  by the Conference 's  
Council of Four f rom  April  19 to April 23. G rea t Brita in  and France  
stayed on the diplomatic sidelines.  Although both countries favored 
par ing I ta ly 's  demands,  they were  bound as  s ignatories  of the Trea ty  of 
London to honor all of I ta ly ’s c la ims except F iume. Several people, 
mainly  Lloyd George and Colonel House, unsuccessfully  t r i ed  to advance 
com prom ise  schemes.  On April  22, hopes for a solution soared.  With 
Lloyd George acting as  an in te rm ediary ,  Wilson and Orlando discussed
^^Ray Stannard Baker,  Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement
(3 vols. ; New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1922),Vol. II,
p p .  144-145.
A lb re c h t - C a r r i e , Italy at  the P a r i s  Peace  Conference , pp. 80-81.
^ B a k e r ,  Vol. II, pp. 145-151. 
69Gould, p. 413.
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7 0var ious  concessions ,  but negotiations stalled on the question of Fiume.
With the positions deadlocked, Wilson decided to change his tac tics  
f rom  sec re t  to public diplomacy. On April 24, European newspapers  head­
lined his appeal to the Ital ian people. The sta tement was carefully prepared^ 
and c lear ly  explained his views. He said that the T re a ty  of London was of 
no use  because  of A us t r ia -H ungary 's  disintegration.  His proposals  would 
allow Italy to inc rease  her  b o rd e r s  and her security.  He closed with a 
strong appeal to I ta l ian -A m erican  friendship,  hoping tha t  this  m essage
71 ^would somehow resu l t  in a modification of I ta ly 's  p rogram . 11
Wilson's frontal  a t tack  had been carefully p repared .  His t r ip  to Rome
had given him the im press ion  that  the Ital ian people backed him ra th e r  than
Orlando. Some of P ag e 's  rep o r ts  tended to give the im p re ss io n  that public "
opinion was different f rom  the newspaper accounts. ^  Wilson believed
V ^that  the papers  were  controlled by the Ital ian delegation. He had con­
f e r r e d  with the t e r r i to r i a l  experts  and the A m erican  peace com m iss ioners  
before  making his final decision. Many of the experts  and C om m iss ioners  
Lansing, B l iss ,  and Henry White favored a strong stand and decisive 
action.  They pushed him to a s s e r t  his leadership .  ^  Also, the P res id en t
v n' uA lb rech t -C a r r ie ,  Italy at the P a r i s  Peace  C onference , pp. 132-140 
7 3-Baker, Vol. II, pp. 166-167.
^ F o r  instance,  Page wrote to House, "I feel. . . . tha t  he, Wilson, 
may have to appeal to the people, and then leave it to t im e to let  
them  recognize anew who has  a t  hea r t  the ir  t rue  in te re s ts .  "
Page to House, April  14, 1919, Page Collection.
73A lb re c h t -C a r r ie ,  Italy a t  the P a r i s  Peace  Conference , p. 143.
74]viayer, pp. 6 95-700 .
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had been falsely  led to believe that  Lloyd George and P r e m ie r  Clemenceau 
would issue s im i la r  ult imata.  A joint declara tion  would put p re s s u re  on 
Ital ian  m odera tes  to get Orlando to b reak  with Sonnino. Finally,  he 
hoped the appeal would ra lly  not only the Wilsonians of Italy, but also of 
B rita in ,  F rance ,  and A m erica  to his p rogram . None of these expec­
tations w ere  realized .
The Ital ian delegation reac ted  quickly to Wilson 's challenge; Orlando
left the same evening to get a vote of confidence f rom  the Ital ian  P a r l i a -  ^
)
ment. Page was su rp r i sed  and shocked by the news. Unwarned by any 
p r io r  notice f rom  P a r i s ,  he heard  of Wilson 's s ta tement in the Embassy 
severa l  hours  a f te r  the official news had been b roadcas t  over Rome. He 
knew that I tal ian reaction  would be virulently anti-Wilson, but refused a ^  
government offer to furn ish  so ld ie rs  to pro tec t  the A m erican  Embassy.  
Although he believed in the Ital ian cause, he t r i ed  not to give any public 
sign of his sympathy. He had to obey the P res iden t ,  but he decided to 
go to P a r i s  to confer with Wilson. 77
Page rea l ized  that public opinion in Italy had r i s e n  to a fever pitch.
He had witnessed in ternal d iso rde rs  in M arch and April.  Militant so­
c ia l is ts  had called s tr ikes  in Rome and other cit ies.  Coun te rdem ons tra ­
tions led by mili tant r ight-wing F asc i  caused violent confrontations.
75B a k e r , Vol. II, p. 166.
^ M a y e r ,  pp. 694-695.
77Ronald T ree ,  "Thomas Nelson Page,  " F o r u m , LXIX 
(January ,  1923), p. 1139.
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the right-wing p r e s s  attacked all socia lis ts  as  Bolsheviks, and the re  was
70
much speculation about a communist revolution. 0 Page believed that a
peace on Wilson's I tal ian  te rm s  would crea te  a chaotic poli tical situation, /
with the possibil i ty of a Bolshevik revolution or a re tu rn  to absolutism.
In ei ther  case,  Italy would re jec t  Wilsonian diplomacy for the'old. system
of al l iances.  I ta lo -A m erican  friendships would be destroyed, and Italy
would eventually tu rn  to Germany for friendship. Such a combination j
79would be d isas t rous  for world peace. 7
Page also  believed that the whole incident could have been avoided 
with m ore  A m erican  sympathy for Italy. After all,  he reasoned, Italy 
had fought for "L iberty"  and self-determination ,  two Wilsonian princip les .  
All I tal ians asked for now was to be t rea ted  with reasonable  considera tion 
and have the ir  sac r i f ic ies  recognized. 80 He believed that the t e r r i to r i a l  
experts  had neglected to consider  the people in the ir  proposals .  Although 
he supported Wilson 's p ro g ram  in general ,  he could not support his de- j  — 
cision on Fiume. Despite his belief in a viable Yugoslav state, Italy
O 1
should have a p r io r  claim. 0
Because they were  a la rm ed  at the situation in Italy, Page and Claude 
B a r r e r e ,  F ren ch  A m bassador  to Italy, left Rome by t r a in  for P a r i s  on ^
^ M a y e r ,  pp. 681-687.
79 p a ge to House, M arch  15, 1919; Page to Henry White (American 
Com m iss ioner) ,  June 2, 1919, Page Collection.
80page to F r a z ie r ,  April 8, 1918, Page Collection.
8 l lb id .
May 8. Page a r r iv e d  in P a r i s  alone because B a r r e r e  rece ived  a te leg ram  
f rom  the F rench  government telling him to r e tu rn  to Rome. When Page
a r r iv e d  in P a r i s  on May 9, he went d irec tly  to the Hotel Cril lon  to explain 
that  "nothing can save Italy but giving her Fiume. "83 a ssum ed  that
Wilson would want to see h im as  soon as  possible and wrote a note to the  ^
P re s id en t  of his availability.  ^
On May 11, House phoned Wilson to warn him that  Page might res ign  
immedia te ly  if Wilson did not see him. Wilson rep lied that it made l i t tle 
difference whether Page res igned  then or la te r .  85 When no answer to his 
f i r s t  note came, Page sent a longer le t te r  that urgently  explained his b e ­
liefs  in detail. ^  Although Wilson finally agreed  to meet with Page,  the 
conference achieved li tt le. The P res iden t  did not want to hea r  what Italy
^ T r e e ,  p. 1139. The United States peace com m iss ioners  were  not 
enthusiastic  about any Page visit to Rome during the F iume c r i s i s .  
Both Lansing and Henry White concurred  that  it would be "unfor­
tunate for Page to be absent f rom  Rome" and reques ted  a te le g ra m  
express ing  this feeling be sent to Rome. Minutes of the Daily 
Meetings of the Com m iss ioners  Plenipotentiary ,  Thursday, April 
24, 1919, P a r i s  Peace  Conference, Vol. XI, p. 163.
O OOJLansing diary  as  quoted in Paul B irdsall ,  V ersa i l le s  Twenty Y ears  
After (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941), p. 282.
84page to Wilson, May 10, 1919, Wilson P ap e r s ,  L ib ra ry  of Con­
g re s s ,  Ser ies  5b. Here inafte r  r e f e r r e d  to as  Wilson P ap e rs .
^ H o u s e  Diary, May 13, 1919, as cited in B irdsa l l ,  p. 283.
86p a ge to Wilson, May 12, 1919, Wilson P ap e r s ,  Series  5b. At 
the end of the le t te r  he added, "The p resen t  situation is  so c r u ­
cial that  I feel you will pardon my seeming urgency in requesting 
a chance to place all the information in my possess ion  at  your 
disposal. "
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was saying; he believed she was greedy, and he did not ca re  about he r  
sac r i f ices .  Though Page publicly stated optim ism  when he left P a r i s ,  ^ " 
he was b i t te r ly  disappointed with the P re s id e n t1 s attitude. 87
Newspapers  combined repo r ts  of the W ilson-Page d isagreem ent 
with ru m o rs  that  Page had tendered his resignation.  As ear ly  as  F e b r u ­
a ry ,  the New York T im es  had repor ted  that Page had decided to r e t i r e .  88 
In Apri l  these ru m o rs  increased , but the A m bassador  and the State De­
par tm en t  denied that any such action had occurred .  It was not until July 
14, 1919 that Page confirmed his intention to resign:
While the war was being fought it was nece ssa ry  for all of 
us  to do our bit, as  it was given us to do. I felt it was my 
duty to rem a in  in Italy and do my bit, but with the signing 
of the Peace  T rea ty  I felt that I had finished my war duty 
and could come home. 89
Actually, Page had considered resignat ion since 1915, when he ex- ^ 
p re s s e d  a des ire  to get away f rom  his t ir ing duties. ^0 The problem s of 
war and peace re s t ra in ed  him from  taking any positive action until January  
1919. Convinced by Wilson 's vis i t  to Rome that  everything would be worked 
out to I ta ly 's  satisfaction,  he expressed  his des ire  to re tu rn  to the United 
States la te r  that  spring. He requested,  however, thatthe State Depar tment 
not publish the news of his decision until his re tu rn  home. ^ ^
87Tree ,  p. 1140.
®%ew York T imes,  F eb ru a ry  18, 1919, p. 11.
^ T h o m a s  Nelson Page as  quoted in New York T im e s , July 15, 1919. 
q q
Page to Rosewell and Ruth Nelson Page,  November 19, 1915, Page
Collection.
Page to Wilson, January  21, 1919, Wilson P a p e r s ,  Series  5b.
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There  were severa l  reasons  for his res ignation.  Now that the e m e r ­
gency situation of war  had ended, he no longer felt bound to his post. Also, 
living abroad  had t i r ed  the elderly Pages  mentally and physically. The A m ­
bassador  was w orr ied  about his wife 's  health and des ired  a r e s t  for h im ­
self. Back home he could resum e  his l i t e r a r y  c a r e e r  by using his exper i -
qoences as topics for new books. But the major cause of his decision was
frustra tion .  He complained that the State Department never  listened to 
his advice or informed him of its policy. Although he had made the E m ­
bassy  m ore  efficient and had crea ted  fr iendlier re la tions with Italy, the 
Depar tment never expressed  its grati tude or granted his requests .  He b e ­
lieved that his sacr i f ices ,  justified perhaps by war,  were  no longer necessary .  
He was m ore  than ready to r e t i r e .  93
Wilson 's tremendous work load at  P a r i s  caused him to defer P a g e 's  
resignation.  He may have believed that such an action would weaken h is  
position in the negotiations. In May, however, he was ready to accept this 
request .  Newspaper accounts quoting Page as  saying that Wilson completely 
misunderstood the psychology of the Italian people must have upset the P r e s i ­
dent. Accepting P a g e 's  resignat ion would enable Wilson to p resen t  a m ore  
unified front to Italy by avoiding the em b ar ra ssm en t  of having a prominent 
A m erican  official publicly cr i t ic ize  his government. Wilson 's decision
92pa ge to William A. White, January  14, 1919, Page Collection. 
93pa ge to F r a z ie r ,  March 5, 1919, Page Collection.
was facili tated by ind isc ree t  r e m a rk s  made by M rs .  Page during her j
husband's May visi t  to P a r i s .  94 When Page offered to stay at his post
until the sett lement of the Ital ian problem, Wilson promptly  answered
that he had offered the post to Brand Whitlock, who had im mediately  ac-  
q  5
cepted.
All that remained  were  the form ali t ies .  Page announced his r e s ­
ignation in m id-Ju ly  and submitted his formal le t te r  to Wilson shortly 
t h e r e a f t e r .  96 On August 22, the State Department announced his r e s ig ­
nation, but withheld any news of his successor .  97 Wilson completed the 
fo rm al it ies  with a le t te r  to Page expressing his r e g re t s  and his grati tude 
for P age 's  w o r k .  98 Thus, the p rocess  initiated eight months p r io r  was 
completed. The Pages  left Europe that sum m er and a r r iv e d  home in 
autumn. The diplomatic phase of P ag e 's  life was now over.
94AHan Nevins (ed. ), The L e t te r s  and Journal of Brand Whitlock 
(New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inco r ­
porated,  1936), 1. 570.
95'W'ilsonto Page,  June 14, 1919, Page Collection. Whitlock, who 
talked with the P re s id en t  in June, said the P res iden t  smilingly 
told him, "I was very  glad. . . to  be able to write  him that  the 
post had a l ready  been tendered  to you and accepted. Still, . . .1 
wish to let him down easily, and so I have told him that he could 
announce his own re t i rem en t  when he goes home, and then I shall 
make the appointment. " Whitlock diary as quoted in Nevins, p. 
571. Whitlock subsequently reconsidered  leaving his post at 
Belgium and turned  down the Rome position.
96page to Wilson, July 19, 1919, Wilson P a p e r s ,  Series 5b.
97^ 0 ^  York T i m e s , August 23, 1919, p. 18.
98wilson to Page,  August 29, 1919, Wilson P ap e rs ,  Series 5b.
EPILOGUE
1. AFTERMATH
Upon Orlando 's r e tu rn  to Rome afte r  Wilson 's April  Appeal, I ta l­
ian public opinion erupted in nationalistic fevor. Orlando waited in Rome 
for some concil iatory gesture  because it seemed impossible that Wilson 
would maintain  his opposition in the face of such an up roar .  Although he 
had received a vote of confidence f rom  the Ital ian P ar l iam en t ,  no hint of 
com prom ise  came from  P a r i s .  Realizing that Italy might be ignored c o m ­
pletely in the peace,  Orlando re tu rned  to Rome on May 5. Negotiations 
on Fiume and Dalmatia began again, with House and Andrb Tardieu ,  
C lem enceau 's  confidante, trying to effect a compromise.  Although both 
sides made some concess ions,  the gap was still too wide, and in June the 
negotiations completely failed. That same month, Orlando's government 
fell. 1
Popular  sentiment in Italy, f ru s t ra ted  by the outcome of the peace, 
was swayed by ex t rem is ts .  Gabriele d'Annunzio, the nationalist poet and 
novelist,  led a band of volunteers  who seized Fiume in September 1919.
He ran  his own government the re  until the end of 1920. In November 1920, 
the Ital ian government signed the T rea ty  of Rapallo with Yugoslavia. Under 
the te rm s  of the t rea ty  Fiume became a f ree  city, an ironic development
^-Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy f rom  L ibera l i sm  to F asc ism ,  
1870-1925 (London: Methuen and Co. L td . ,  1967), pp. 529-536.
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because Wilson had been willing to accept this some twenty months b e ­
fore. ^
Meanwhile, an opportunistic Benito Mussolini  took advantage of 
I ta ly 's  political s tr ikes ,  governmental bankruptcy, rampant unemployment, 
and war hysteria .  Invoking the specter of "Bolshevism, " he used the fea rs  
that socialis t  s t r ikes  had a roused  in the middle c lass  to argue that he was 
the only safeguard against  internal revolution. Although the actual danger 
of revolution was small , indus tr ia l i s ts ,  landowners, policemen, p ro fe s ­
sional people, and ve te rans  accepted his myth of an impending communist 
coup. By October 1922, his supporters  numbered m ore  than 300, 000. At 
the end of that month, the F as c i s t s  marched on Rome. Knowing that his 
a rm y  would not fight the F a s c is t s ,  King Victor Emmanuel III te legraphed 
Mussolini,  who had prudently stayed in Milan, to come to Rome to form a 
cabinet. Mussolini then gradually turned his constitutional government into 
a fasc is t  dictatorship.  ^
In the United States, Page 's  res ignat ion left a vacancy that was not 
filled for eight months. Although the post had been offered to Brand Whit­
lock, he turned  it down, p re fe r r ing  to rem ain  in Belgium as her A m erican  
Ambassador.  ^ Wilson 's i l lness  prevented any fur ther  action for several  
months. On F eb ru a ry  12, 1920, the newspapers  announced that  Robert 
Underwood Johnson Would be nominated as A m erican  Ambassador  to Italy.
2Ibid. , p p .  543-547, 577-582.
3jbid. , pp. 570-629.
^Allan Nevins (ed. ), The L e t te r s  and Journal of Brand Whitlock,
(New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Company Incorporated
1936), p .  571.
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A distinguished author and one-time editor of Century Magazine, Johnson 
had been assoc ia ted  with Italy for over th i r ty  yea rs .  In 189 5, he had been 
decora ted  as  a Cavaliere  of the Crown of Italy.  ^ As it had done with Page,  
the New York T im es  hailed Johnson 's appointment.  ^ Johnson 's tenure  
only las ted  a year ,  for he was replaced when W arren  G. Harding became 
P res id en t  in 1921.
When he re turned home, Page was given a la rge  reception in Rich­
mond by the Virginia House of Delegates. The Pages  then t rave led  to 
southern  California, where the ex-Ambassador worked on his new book,
Italy and the World W ar . Page hoped that this work would co r re c t  A m e r i ­
can opinion that  Italy had fought selfishly and d isastrously .  His lack of 
objectivity led him to write  a book that s t re s sed  the sacr i f ices  of the I ta l­
ian people in the ir  quest for "Liberty.  " It was m ore  a testimony to his 
sympathies than it was a work of h is to r ica l  scholarship.  It was at best  a 
superfic ia l  h is to ry  of modern Italy and at worst  an emotional diatribe.
After  this book's publication, the Pages  traveled to South Carolina,  
Colorado, and England, among other places. Although the t r ip s  were 
beneficial to her  husband, they proved to be too much for Mrs.  Page,  
who died during a short v is i t  to M assachuse tts .   ^ The hear tbroken  husband
% e w  York T im e s , F eb ru a ry  12, 1920, p. 11.
New York T im e s , F e b ru a ry  12, 1920, p. 10. 
^New York T i m e s , June 7, 1921, p. 17.
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re tu rned  to his birthplace,  "Oakland. " On November 1, 1922, he died of
a heart  at tack while working in his garden. Both deaths were  sadly noted
by the Ital ian people, who had a grea t  deal of re spec t  for the Pages .  And
Page, so sore ly  disappointed by his government 's  failure to recognize him,
would have been very  pleased by an editorial  in the New York T im e s :
And at Rome Thomas Nelson Page. . . proved to be a diplomat 
of pa r ts  and a sound in te rp re te r  of the Italian war  spirit .
During the Fiume complication, when A m erica  (was) none 
too popular in Italy, he saved an awkward situation by r e ­
s tra in t  and his happy faculty of conciliation. He had a lready  
endeared himself  to the Ital ian people by his love of the a r t s  
and a personali ty  that was agreeable  and tactful and engaging.
A Virginian gentleman who was a man of l e t te r s  and unde r ­
stood the Italian cha rac te r ,  and who besides  was what may be 
called a p rac t ica l  idealist ,  had qualifications for the post that 
a poli tical appointee would certa in ly  have lacked. No one has 
brought the valor and fortitude of thq Ital ian a rm y  m ore  vividly 
to the mind than Thomas Nelson Page in his descr iption of 
v is i t s  to the front. His p ic tu res  of the achievements of the 
troops in the rugged passes  of the Alps a re  unforgettable. ^
2. CONCLUSIONS 
Judged by his own goals, Page as  an am bassador  was a failure.
His p r im a ry  purpose,  to help bring about c loser  I ta lo -Am erican  re la tions ,  
was totally ruined by the conflict at P a r i s  in 1919. The lack of knowledge 
that had existed when he a r r iv ed  in Rome in 1913 continued to exist afte r  
his departu re .  Neither country knew or ca red  much about the motives 
and policies of the other.  The d iscord  caused by the P a r i s  Peace  Confer­
ence played a d irec t  ro le in bringing Mussolini to power; the re su l t  of h is
% e w  York T im e s , November 23, 1922, p. 16.
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fasc is t  dictatorship was a war with I taly 's  fo rm er  a l l ies ,  F rance ,  Great 
Bri ta in ,  and the United States. P ag e 's  prediction of a Germ an-I ta lian  
all iance was rea l ized  with the Rom e-Berlin  Axis of 1936.
Why was P ag e 's  d ream  unfulfilled? The most obvious reaso n  was 
I ta ly 's  failure to develop a rea l is t ic  foreign policy. Here the p r im ary  
blame must be placed on Sonnino. The Foreign Minis ter  dominated the 
formulation of I tal ian plans through a succession of I tal ian war m in is t r ie s .
His views were  incorporated  in the T rea ty  of London when Italy entered  
World War I. Sonnino ins is ted  on his "b lessed T rea ty"  in the face of 
revolutionary change in the old balance of power. Preoccupied with his 
des ire  to insure  I ta ly 's  security ,  he neglected cultivating any friendship 
with the new nationali ties a r is ing  f rom  the ashes  of the destroyed  A ustro-  
Hungarian Empire .  Even m ore  cr i t ica l  was his failure to develop any 
strong friendship with the United States, on whom Italy was financially 
dependent. His fear  that the United States would chip away at  his T rea ty  
of London kept him from  initiating any frank discussion of I ta ly 's  pos t­
war  needs. With Page he was evasive and nonspecific. The re su l t  of 
such policies was an incomplete understanding of what Italy wanted and 
needed. Because he always concentrated on Ita ly 's  t e r r i to r i a l  needs, he 
overlooked her economic situations. Shortages of coal, grain, and money 
did not faze him. What he did not realize  was that the United States did 
not need Italy, but Italy requ ired  the friendship of a cred i to r  country like 
the United States. In the long run, his policy won out over the m ore  r e a l i s ­
tic p rog ram s  advocated by Bissola ti  and Nitti.
Finally, Sonnino's intransigence kept I ta ly 's  peace delegation di­
vided a t  P a r i s .  The wavering Orlando was m ore  willing to compromise  
with Wilson, but Sonnino re fused  to budge. As a resu lt ,  most Wilsonians 
mistakenly believed that Italy wanted both the T rea ty  of London and Fiume. 
The im press ion  of a greedy Italy that had craft i ly  bargained  its way into 
the war gained strength and led many Am ericans  on the Peace  Comm ission 
to oppose any concessions to Italy. Fiume became a symbol of this d e t e r m ­
ination. The deadlock thus crea ted  severely  damaged Italy. Orlando 's 
p res t ige  suffered, and he quickly lost  power. Italy failed to get any 
financial aid f rom  her  Allies;  her  resultant economic d i s t r e s s  caused 
poli tical and social un res t ,  a situation exploited by the opportunistic 
Mussolini.  In this way Sonnino helped pave the way for the r i s e  of I tal ian 
fasc ism .
Even by m ore  objective s tandards,  P ag e 's  c a re e r  i l lu s t ra te s  a 
fa ilure  of am bassador ia l  diplomacy. He became increasingly  isolated 
f rom  the decision-making p ro cess  in Washington. At f i r s t ,  during the 
period of A m erican  neutrality,  the re  was no coherent I tal ian policy, a 
r e su l t  of purposeful neglect. A m erican  attention quite rea l is t ica l ly  
focused on Germany and Great Britain.  Italy was only of minor concern 
to Wilson, Lansing, and House. The United States could afford to be 
vague; Italy needed her aid, but was not n ece ssa ry  ei ther  to A m erican  
diplomacy or  to her  la te r  conduct of the war. When decisions were  
made about I ta ly 's  postwar c la ims, Wilson l istened p r im ar i ly  to his 
experts .  P age 's  views held l i t tle sway. Only his ear ly  1914-1915
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te leg ram s ,  s t ress ing  I taly 's  reasons  for entering the war,  influenced 
A m erican  policy.
Page had l i tt le effect on the adm inis tra tion  because he was considered 
an Italophile. There  is l i tt le evidence to counter this view; Page did b e ­
come convinced of the rightness  of the Ital ian cause and used his position 
to advance his opinions. His major advisor,  Gino Speranza,  helped to 
re in force  his b ias  with his p ro-I ta l ian  analyses.  Speranza 's  opinions 
were  suspect in cer ta in  intelligence c i rc les ,  and it was co r rec t ly  assum ed  
that P age 's  repo r ts  ref lected  the opinions of his aide. As a resu lt ,  the 
valuable pa r ts  of his m essages ,  those dealing with Ital ian public opinion, 
were  overlooked by Inquiry experts  and other m em bers  of the A m erican  
delegation. This helped to pave the way for Wilson's unfortunate April 
Appeal to the Ital ian people.
The fa ilure  of am bassador ia l  diplomacy was not caused solely by 
P ag e 's  inadequacies or lack of objectivity. Wilson and the State D epa r t ­
ment put Page in severa l  tight spots because they failed to keep him in ­
formed of developments.  The Attualit^. case showed a lack of communi­
cation between the State Department and its rep resen ta t ive  in Rome.
Another example was the failure of the State Department to tel l  Page 
anything about the important meeting between Wilson, House, and 
B r i t i sh  Foreign  Secre ta ry  Arthur  J. Balfour. At this meeting in April 
1918, the th ree  men discussed the T rea ty  of London, but nobody t r a n s ­
mitted  the t e rm s  to Page.  Instead, he read of it in the p re s s  afte r the 
Bolsheviks pr inted  it months la te r .  Most unfortunate was P age 's
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unawareness  of the decision to issue an appeal to the Italian people in April ,  
1919. Caught completely by su rp r ise ,  Page had no opportunity to take any 
m e asu re s  to counteract  the inevitable public reaction  to this maneuver. 
Because he was badly informed, Page could not coordinate his actions with 
Wilson’s policies.  It is  a lso  possible that by denying Page complete in fo r ­
mation the government prevented him from  be t te r  communication with 
Sonnino. Though the possibil ity was remote ,  this might have changed the 
F ore ign  M in is te r ’s mind. N evertheless ,  Page would have been a much 
m ore  capable diplomat if he had received a m ore  complete outline of what 
Wilson planned and wished him to do.
In some re sp ec ts ,  P age 's  tenure was not completely a failure. He 
was rem em bered  and loved by the Ital ian people. Much of this adm ira tion  
undoubtedly s temmed f rom  his well-known support of I ta ly 's  te r r i to r ia l  
p rog ram ,  but most of it came from  popular appreciation of his other a c ­
t iv it ies .  His a ttempts  to aid the ea r thquake-s tr icken  people of Avezzano, 
his visit  to the Ital ian front, his m a s te ry  of the Ital ian language, his ob­
vious respec t  for I tal ian culture,  and his wife 's  efforts to help w ar-ravaged  
Italy were  evidence of his deeply-felt  sympathy for Italy. The public r e s p e c t ­
ed him for this.
P ag e 's  fa ilures  were  symptomatic of the contemporary  American  
diplomatic system. The diplomatic corps was made up of many people 
like Page,  people who were  inexperienced and unqualified for sensitive 
foreign positions.  Also, the State Department lacked an adequate bu reau c ­
racy  to aid its am bassado rs .  Many of P age 's  subordinates  in the Embassy
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had l i tt le training in Ital ian affa i rs .  Page also  suffered f rom  the lack of 
any rea l  support and direction f rom  the State Department. When he sought 
professional aid, the State Department sent him am a teu rs .  When he m e s ­
saged for m ore  information, he received  almost nothing substantial. 
Ironically,  the Peace  C om m iss ioners  decided to send him information 
af te r  the Fiume question had exploded.  ^ It was a question of much too 
l i t tle much too late. At leas t  Page rea lized  that em bass ies  needed m ore  
than jus t  a few se c re ta r ie s  to meaningfully analyze complex situations and 
countries .  His plans to c o r re c t  this situation were halting, inadequate, 
and sometimes mistaken, but they indicated a direction for future diplo­
matic re form . Above all, each of his act ivit ies demonstra ted  his r e a l i z a ­
tion that a successful  am bassador  had to know and re spec t  the country to 
which he was accredited .
In conclusion, Thomas Nelson P age 's  diplomatic c a r e e r  demonstrated 
ce r ta in  c h a rac te r i s t i c s  of Wilsonian diplomacy. Wilson's I tal ian policy 
was,  for the most part ,  a rea l is t ic  one in te rm s  of methods and goals.
At P a r i s  he re ta ined a good deal of flexibility. He had an ult imate weap­
on, economic coercion, but he never got the chance to uti l ize  it because of 
Sonnino. On the other hand, his failure to uti l ize  Page showed his tendency 
to re ly  on people outside of formal diplomatic c i rc le s  for plans and action.
His t ru s t  in academic scholars  was evident in his re liance  on the Inquiry, 
r a th e r  than his fellow com m iss ioners ,  to furnish him with information.
^Minutes of the Daily Meetings of the C om m iss ioners  Plenipoten­
tia ry ,  Monday, May , 1919, P ape rs  Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States: The P a r i s  Peace Conference (1 3 
vols. ; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942-1947), p. 174.
Any comments by Page were  fi l tered  through the experts,  who did not 
t r u s t  his judgments. As a resu lt ,  Page,  who should have been at  the 
center  of I ta lo-Am erican  re la tions,  remained  on the per iphery .
B IB L IO G R A P H IC A L  ESSAY
An examination of Thomas Nelson P age 's  life, especially  his diplo­
matic c a re e r ,  n ece ssa r i ly  touches upon several  la rge  h is to r ica l  topics.
Page was a w r i te r  whose fiction must be evaluated in te rm s  of somewhat 
contradic tory  developments in the post-Reconstruction  South: the c r e a ­
tion of the plantation life myth and the simultaneous growth of the New 
South creed.  Page also has h is to rica l  in te res t  to those concerned with 
race  rela tions a t  the beginning of the twentieth century. Finally, he was 
a diplomat during the World War I era .  This c a re e r  encompassed the 
per iod of A m erican  neutrali ty,  the war,  and the P a r i s  Peace  Conference.
To unders tand Page,  one m ust know a great  deal about A m erican  history.
I do not pretend to understand this period fully. The following essay  will 
descr ibe  the works that I found most useful in writing this paper.
There  is no definitive Page biography. His b ro ther ,  Rosewell Page, 
has w rit ten  a life story, but the resu l t  is an affectionate, anecdotal,  un ­
c r i t ica l  book, m ore  a tr ibu te  to his bro ther  than a useful work of s c h o la r ­
ship. H arr ie t  Holman's unpublished Ph.D . d isser ta tion ,  writ ten  twenty- 
four y ea rs  ago at  Duke University,  contains the most detailed information 
on Page'. Her in te res t ,  however, stops at the end of P age 's  l i t e r a ry  ca ree r .  
His involvement in diplomatic affa irs ,  the focus of this essay,  is d ism issed  
in a few short pages.
122
123
P ag e 's  l i t e r a r y  c a re e r  is  most completely d iscussed  by Holman and 
by Theodore  G ro s s ' s  Thomas Nelson P ag e . The la t te r  work seems to owe 
a g rea t  deal to Miss Holman's conclusions. Because he was an essay is t ,  
P a g e 's  theories  on rac ia l  re la tions a re  best  understood by reading some 
of his a r t ic le s .  "The Negro: The Southerner 's  P rob lem " and "The Old-
Tim e Negro" (contained his The Old South) a r e  two of his m ore  revealing 
essays .  Guion Griffis  Johnson 's "The Ideology of White Supremacy" and 
"Southern P a te rn a l i sm  toward Negroes a f te r Emancipation" were  most 
helpful in providing a conceptual f ramework for a discussion of P age 's  
ideas.  Also useful was Thomas G osse t t 's  Race: The His tory  of an Idea
in A m e r ic a .
The two most important sources  of P age 's  c a re e r  as an am bassador  
a r e  his papers  at Duke University and P ape rs  Relating to the Foreign  R e la ­
tions of the United States. The Page Collection at Duke provides copies 
of most of his le t te r s  to P res iden t  Wilson, Secre tary  of State Lansing, 
and Colonel House. It a lso  contains other l e t t e r s  useful in determining 
P ag e 's  personal opinions about his diplomatic ta sks .  Fore ign  Relations 
gives information on the important aspects  of I ta lo -A m erican  policies.
Taken together,  these two sources  yield an accura te  picture  of the p ro b ­
lem s that existed between the two countries and P age 's  a t tempts  to deal 
with them.
P age 's  diplomatic c a re e r  must be considered in light of events in 
the United States. Arthur S. L ink 's  Wilson the Diplomatist is  a good 
s tart ing point for any attempt to deal with this period. His monumental
biography of Wilson provides the most detailed information on Wilsonian 
foreign policy. They also  show the re la tive  lack of concern for Italy in 
Washington during the period of A m erican  neutrali ty.  E rnes t  R. May's 
The World War and A m erican  Isolation is a multiarchival study that e m ­
phas izes  decision-making in London, Berlin, and Washington. It is p a r t i c ­
u la r ly  enlightening about Chancellor Bethmann1 s despera te  but u n s u c c e s s ­
ful at tempt to keep the United States out of war.  Daniel M. Smith's  The 
G reat Depar ture  is a convenient summary of Wilsonian foreign policy 
through the t ime of the P a r i s  Peace  Conference. Five works shaped my 
opinions about the P eace  Conference. Paul B i rd sa l l ' s  V ersa i l le s  Twenty 
Y ears  After and Thomas Bai ley 's  Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace  
chronicle A m erican  involvement at  P a r i s ,  albeit  with somewhat differing 
conclusions about Wilson's effectiveness. Arno J. M ayer 's  Poli t ics and 
Diplomacy of Peacemaking focuses on Wilsonian diplomacy in relation to 
public opinion in A m erica  and Europe. It was especially helpful in d e t e r ­
mining why Wilson went to Rome before the P a r i s  Conference began. 
Another informative study about the relative lack of concern about Italy 
before the P a r i s  Peace  Conference and the influences on Wilson's I talian 
policy is  Lawrence Gelfand's The Inquiry . Finally, Ray Stannard Baker 's  
Wilson and World Sett lement was important both for its f ir s t -hand  inform a­
tion about the problems with Italy and for a very  useful scheme of o rganiz­
ing this ra the r  complex topic.
As for Italy herse lf ,  two general  works that  proved enlightening 
were  Chris topher  Seton-Watson's Italy from L ib e ra l i sm  to F asc ism  and
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Denis Mack Smith's  Italy: A Modern H is to ry . These  books and William. A. 
Renzi 's  "Italy 's  Neutrali ty and Entrance into the Great War" formed the 
bas is  of my comments about I ta ly 's  decision to join the Entente. Italian 
and A m erican  problems with A ustr ia -H ungary  and Yugoslavia a r e  ably 
d iscussed  by Victor S. M amatey 's  The United States and East  Central 
Europe and Arthur J. May 's The Passing  of the Hapsburg Monarchy.
Ita ly 's  problems and failure at the P a r i s  Peace Conference is discussed  
in detail by Renfe Albrecht-Carr ife ' s Italy at the P a r i s  Peace  Conference.
There  is no complete published study of I ta lo-Am erican  relations 
during this period.  John Wells Gould's P h .D .  d isserta tion ,  "Italy and 
the United States, 1914-1918, " however, was quite important to this 
study. Gould originally set out to write  about P age 's  am bassador ia l  
c a re e r ,  but he gave up this project  when he determined that Page had 
li ttle influence on Ita lo -Am erican  re lations.  Still, his d iscussion con­
s iders  P ag e 's  role in some detail. Also, his study, based on a careful 
investigation of A m erican  and Italian sources ,  has severa l  opinions that  
influenced my discussion. His d is ser ta t ion  emphasizes  the rea l i sm  of 
A m erican  policy towards Italy, the stubborn influence of Sonnino, and the 
resu ltan t clash of two fundamentally i r reconcileable  policies at P a r is  in 
1919. Gould b lames Sonnino for a lack of r e a l i sm  and believes that Wilson, 
con tra ry  to the opinion of other h is to r ians ,  came to P a r i s  prepared  with a 
flexible p ro g ram  for Italy.
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